




















presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfilment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 



















Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2017 





Examining Committee Membership 
The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the 
Examining Committee is by majority vote. 
 
External Examiner    Todd McGowan 
      Associate Professor 
 
 
Supervisor(s)     Alice Kuzniar   
                                                                        Professor  
 
                                                                        Kevin McGuirk  
                                                                        Associate Professor  
 
 
Internal Member    Ken Hirschkop 
      Associate Professor  
 
 
Internal-external Member   Bojana Videkanic  
      Assistant Professor 
 
 
Other Member(s)               Ashley Rose Mehlenbacher   






















I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, 
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 












































This dissertation explores the cinema of Christopher Nolan over a 15-year period. 
It focuses on the portrayal of the subject in five of his major films: Memento (2000), The 
Prestige (2006), The Dark Knight (2008), Inception (2010), and Interstellar (2014). In its 
chronological critique of Nolan’s cinema, this project explores subjectivity, to use 
Lacanian terminology, as a distorted vision provided by the desire for the impossible 
objet petit a. It records a shift of perspective in Nolan’s later characters, which endows 
them with a better understanding of their relationship with the object cause of desire.   
The dissertation studies the relationship between the subject and the objet petit a 
through the encounter with the anamorphotic gaze, which reveals the impossibility of 
fantasy at the heart of desire. In doing so, this project provides several ways through 
which anamorphosis proves to be a point that exposes the limitations of what Lacan calls 
the Symbolic Order. This dissertation proposes the term structural anamorphosis to 
introduce the Lacanian gaze as a temporal point in the film’s narrative. Structural 
anamorphosis is what retroactively uncovers the futility of fantasy and reveals the 
distorted views of the spectators.  
In its discussion of subjectivity, this dissertation shows that the quest for the objet 
petit a, which is the essence of desire, is similar to capitalism’s obsession with objects. In 
his films, Nolan shows how the subject’s desire is shaped by ideology unconsciously. By 
doing so, Nolan dismantles ideology and provides a space for rethinking the surrounding 
world: the spectators who watch the films of Christopher Nolan understand that they need 
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The brevity of the seven-word title of this dissertation (Christopher Nolan and the 
Art of Anamorphosis) conceals one significant name: Jacques Lacan. The hint to Lacan 
in the title is the word anamorphosis, which he connects to the subject’s perception in 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1973). To put it simply, the term 
anamorphosis signifies a distorted perspective, if the viewer (or the subject) looks at the 
work of art directly. In order to make sense of an anamorphotic image, one needs to look 
from an awkward, non-perpendicular angle. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
Online, the word anamorphosis, which comes from Greek (ana, meaning “back, again,” 
and morphosis, meaning “to form”), is a “distorted projection or drawing of anything, so 
made that when viewed from a particular point, or by reflection from a suitable mirror, it 
appears regular and properly proportioned” (“Anamorphosis, n”). Anamorphosis “plays 
havoc with elements and principles” because “instead of reducing forms to their visible 
limits, it projects them outside themselves and distorts them so that when viewed from a 
certain point they return to normal” (Baltrušaitis 1).1 Lacan uses this term to talk about 
subjectivity, as a position between two poles: something and nothing. The subject is 
something when she or he mistakenly thinks that she or he is in possession of the scene, 
as a conscious being, capable of making sense of everything that she or he sees. In the 
example provided by Lacan (Holbein’s The Ambassadors), one could initially think of 
her or himself as fully in control of the picture. There is, however, one obscure spot in the 
bottom center of the picture which raises curiosity (see fig. 1). Now the subject is nothing 
                                                 
1 While the word anamorphosis appears first in Gaspar Schott’s Magia universalis naturæ et artis (1657), 
the earliest recorded anamorphotic drawing appears in Leonardo da Vinci’s Codex Atlanticus (c. 1485) 




when provided with another perspective that reveals the vanity of the first impression. If 
we look from high on the right side of the picture, the blurred, mysterious spot turns out 
to be a human skull, returning the gaze of the viewer: it represents Renaissance’s  
 
 




Memento Mori and undermines the symbols of wealth, knowledge, and power in the 
picture. This alternative outlook shatters the illusion that perception is managed by the 
eye in the form of a direct look.  
Based on what Lacan says, the relationship between the painting and the viewer is 
determined by the angle from which she or he looks at the work of art. The viewer’s 
position shifts from all-knowing to partial. In addition, the picture, which initially seemed 
to be an object being looked at, turns into an all-seeing entity because it seems to be 
returning the look of the viewer. This radical changing of positions between the subject 
and the object brings us to one of the seemingly difficult-to-understand quotations of 
Lacan: “in the scopic field, the gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say, I am a 
picture” (Four Fundamental Concepts 106). The scopic field and the gaze in the previous 
sentence relate to the scopic drive, or the desire to see, which is one of the four partial 
drives that constitute every human being. For Lacan, desire is caused by a missing object, 
known as the objet petit a: it is the “lost object” or that “which is never found in the 
position of being the aim of desire” (Four Fundamental Concepts 185-86). This object 
cause of desire is what constitutes the gaze, an important term in the Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. The gaze as the objet petit a signifies an essential lack in the life of the 
subject, the same lack that takes place upon the subject’s entry into the Symbolic Order, 
which should be considered as the realm of language and the law. The subject does not 
confront the gaze often because getting too close to the objet petit a would threaten the 
subject with the inherent lack in her or his existence. The encounter occurs rarely and 
only through the irruption of the order of the Real, which, unlike the Symbolic, is full and 




of the Symbolic Order. Unveiling this void has one very important outcome: the 
emancipation of the individual.  
For Lacan, the gaze not only embodies the object cause of desire as a lack, but 
also triggers “visual fascination” or “captivation” of the subject because it “magnetizes 
the eye,” as one could clearly see in Holbein’s The Ambassadors (Scott 5). As Lacan 
himself points out in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,   
In Holbein’s picture I showed you at once—without hiding any more than 
usual—the singular object floating in the foreground [the skull], which is 
there to be looked at, in order to catch, I would almost say, to catch in its 
trap, the observer, that is to say, us. It is, in short, an obvious way, no 
doubt an exceptional one, and one due to some moment of reflection on 
the part of the painter, of showing us that, as subjects, we are literally 
called into the picture, and represented here as caught. (92) 
Therefore, a certain work of art such as Holbein’s The Ambassadors provides us with the 
Lacanian gaze as both an irrecoverable lack of the objet petit a, and as a trap for the 
subject (or the viewer) to get “caught, manipulated, captured, in the field of vision” (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 92).   
There is an analogous relationship between the spectator and the works of 
Christopher Nolan. The obsession with the objet petit a is the underlying code of Nolan’s 
filmmaking. His narratives involve a certain traumatic loss that the subject desperately 
attempts to master. In certain moments when the subject gets troubled by the 
impossibility of mastering such a lack, one would feel the presence of the Real gaze:2 the 
                                                 
2 The phrase the Real gaze has been adopted from the title of Todd McGowan’s book, “The Real Gaze: 




function of this gaze is to remind the spectator that it is impossible to find an imaginary 
wholeness both in the theater and in real life. Therefore, the spectator of Nolan 
experiences the objet petit a as an impossibility. In his earlier films, this dissertation 
argues, Nolan portrays the subject as moving forward, albeit non-progressively: the 
subject repeats himself time and again to manage the trauma in which he is located, but in 
vain. In Memento, for example, Leonard Shelby, is stuck within a non-ending loop of 
desire: he kills endlessly to reach the object cause of his desire, which seems to be 
reunion with his murdered wife. The case is the same with The Prestige and The Dark 
Knight: with the passage of time, there is no fulfillment of desire. The basic problem of 
subjects in these films is that they cannot master the trauma in which they are confined 
because they are unable to accept it. In a way, they are unable to see that there is a lack in 
the big Other, or the realm of language and law, which is the residue of the subject’s 
desire. Leonard Shelby (Memento), Robert Angier (The Prestige), and Harvey Dent (The 
Dark Knight) cannot accept that there is no objet petit a, that one could never find an 
imaginary wholeness with the passage of time. In these three films, the intrusion of the 
Real cancels out the seemingly progressive movement of time as promised by the 
Symbolic Order.  
By shattering the illusion of the objet petit a, and showing the fruitlessness of the 
seemingly progressive movement of time, Nolan strikes a blow to one significant element 
of contemporary late capitalism. “The fundamental gesture of capitalism,” Todd 
McGowan points out, “is the promise of future returns” since “the future embodies a type 
of satisfaction foreclosed to the present” (Capitalism and Desire 11-12). In other words, 




a chance to obtain their object cause of desire, the ultimate source of happiness that fills 
the essential lack. Since capitalism is a large body of interconnected networks, it evades a 
clear, proper definition. What makes capitalism the proper discourse to critique from a 
Lacanian perspective is its emphasis on commodity: capitalism is the discourse of 
(accumulating) objects. As McGowan points out,  
The essence of capitalism is accumulation. The capitalist subject is a 
subject who never has enough and continually seeks more and more. But 
this project of endless accumulation is built, ironically, on the idea of its 
end. Capitalist accumulation envisions obtaining the object that would 
provide the ultimate satisfaction for the desiring subject, the object that 
would quench the subject’s desire and allow it to put an end to the 
relentless yearning to accumulate. In this sense, an image of the end of 
capitalism is implicit in its structure, and the key to capitalism’s staying 
power lies in the fact that this ultimately satisfying object doesn’t exist. 
(Capitalism and Desire 21)  
Capitalism doesn’t exist without this obsession with objects and the future. In no other 
ideology is there such an obsession with obtaining objects: “The capitalist subject is 
always looking forward to new objects that might attract its desire” (McGowan, 
Capitalism and Desire 159). In this sense, Lacan’s objet petit a, has strong connections 
with capitalism’s commodity fetishism because in both there is a future promise. The 
anamorphotic art of Nolan, however, runs against this perspective. As we witness in the 
cinema of Nolan, desire and fantasy would not help the subjects to find the imaginary 




own lack and accept it as it is. In Nolan’s later films, such as Inception and Interstellar, 
we witness a significant change: the subjects come to the understanding that they need to 
come to terms with the fact that there is no possibility of discovering the objet petit a. 
They find satisfaction not in a fantasmatic, imaginary wholeness, but in partial 
enjoyment.  
It is in relationship with the social order that we can distinguish total and partial 
enjoyments. Social order, in the form of contemporary late capitalism, demands total 
enjoyment from the subject. As Todd McGowan points out, “Capitalism, in its latest 
manifestations, has played a crucial role in working to de-emphasize prohibition or Law 
in the social order” (End of Dissatisfaction 30). The subjects are asked to enjoy as much 
as possible. They are told to work in order to obtain the object they have been dreaming 
of. What the discourse of capitalism allows is “imaginary enjoyment” (McGowan, End of 
Dissatisfaction 73) or “libidinal enjoyment” (Declercq 75). This enjoyment has “anti-
social effects” because it “connects subjects with objects and not with other subjects 
(Declercq 75). The alternative to such a total enjoyment is partial enjoyment. As Todd 
McGowan puts it,  
The advantage of partial enjoyment lies in its connection to the Real. 
Unlike total enjoyment, which is always imaginary, partial enjoyment is 
Real. It involves an experience of the Real, specifically the way in which 
the Real throws the symbolic order out of balance. In the experience of 
partial enjoyment, the subject enjoys its own lack without feeling this lack 
as a deprivation. This experience frees the subject by breaking its link to 




that eludes the subject; the secret exists in the subject itself. (End of 
Dissatisfaction 195) 
The only way to break with the social order is that the subjects understand the inherent 
lack in the Symbolic law. They should accept that it is impossible to find the object of 
dreams known as the objet petit a.  
In the period between 2000 and 2008 Nolan communicates to the spectators the 
message that the objet petit a does not exist. The portrayal of the subject that Nolan 
depicts for us in this period is the one who is unable to accept this message. In this 
period, characters move in a vicious circle which leads nowhere. In the period between 
2008-2014 the message remains the same: there is no objet petit a. However, the subjects 
are more sophisticated because they accept the nonexistence of the object cause of desire 
and move towards partial enjoyment. In the depiction of characters such as Cobb 
(Inception), Amelia Brand and Cooper (Interstellar), one can see the shift from earlier 
sketches that we find in the cinema of Christopher Nolan. The unchanging message of 
Nolan in both periods is that, unlike what capitalism promises, the objet petit a doesn’t 
exists and is beyond the subject’s reach.  
The anamorphotic art of Christopher Nolan has one more function: it captivates 
spectators. In other words, the spectators come to know that almost nowhere in the film 
were they in full control of the scene. One significant way through which Nolan 
challenges perception is the use of multilayered narrative structures: several plotlines run 
together with the result that no focal point could be detected easily. The task of piecing 
the film together, therefore, becomes a demanding task. What makes this task even more 




concept, with the result that the spectator encounters a fragmented work of art. It is as if 
something external from nowhere, like the Lacanian gaze, hammers this anamorphically 
fragmented structure. In addition, the spectators of Nolan need to watch his films with 
utmost carefulness and attention, because there are quick, almost unnoticeable frames in 
his films that hide facts. Nolan attempts to deceive the spectators initially in his films 
with the retroactive aim of telling them that they need to reconsider their conditions in 
life. In a way, Nolan reflects on how ideology works in general: because of its 
unconscious functioning, an ideological view of reality is taken for granted.  
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to show how Nolan depicts the 
anamorphotic gaze of (or as) the objet petit a through the agency of the Real. I claim that 
we can trace the presence of the Real in the distorted images of the Symbolic Order that 
we see in Nolan’s films. The distortion of the Symbolic Order exposes its limits to the 
spectators and reveals the fact that, unlike what it seems, it is not a flawless, 
unimpeachable body of truth. As a ubiquitous form of law and language, the Symbolic 
Order is what makes ideology functioning proper. The anamorphotic art of Christopher 
Nolan dismantles this functioning of ideology and criticizes the logic of late capitalism in 
terms of time and the imaginary promise that the future would bring the lost object of 
desire. In his films, Nolan tells us how deceptive and fragile our conception of reality 
would be despite its hyperreal façade. The encounter with anamorphotic gaze in the 
cinema of Christopher Nolan, which slows down perception, provides an opportunity for 
the spectators to re-examine perception and the unconscious functions of ideology. I shall 
introduce the art of anamorphosis in Christopher Nolan as that which makes the 




To locate anamorphosis in films by Christopher Nolan, I shall take certain ideas 
from Slavoj Žižek and Todd McGowan, who have written abundantly on the Lacanian 
concept of the Real in philosophy and film. In “Grimaces of the Real,” Slavoj Žižek 
shows us that “the anamorphotic distortion of reality is the way the gaze [of the Real] is 
inscribed into the object’s surface” (47). What Žižek suggests is that the visible deformity 
that one could see in an object is caused by an invisible gaze on the part of the Real. 
Žižek provides several examples including David Lynch’s film, The Elephant Man 
(1980), and Edvard Munch’s paintings Vampire (1893), Ashes (1894), and The Kiss 
(1897), in which the deformed body and the disfigured face indicate the presence of the 
Real. The gaze of the Real object occurs where there is an incongruity in the image 
represented by the Symbolic Order. Žižek elaborates on Munch’s painting, The Scream 
(1893), and Sergei Eisenstein’s film, Battleship Potemkin (1925), in both of which “the 
scream we perceive is mute since the anxiety is too taut for it to find an outlet in 
vocalization” (48). In other words, the voice does not accompany the image because it 
gets stuck in the subject’s throat. It is here that there is a visible crack in our perception of 
the Symbolic Order. In The Fright of Real Tears (2001), Žižek specifies how one could 
discern the anamorphotic stain in the film The Double Life of Véronique (1991):  
[W]hen Véronique is sitting on a train next to a window, her perturbed 
state presaging her impending heart attack is signaled by the barely 
perceptible distortions of what we see through the train window due to the 
uneven glass surface. This scene first renders visible her perturbed 
subjectivity (that is to say, subjectivity as such, since […] subjectivity as 




Real) in the guise of its ‘objective correlative’, the slightly distorted view 
of the countryside through the window-frame, i.e. the anamorphotic stain 
which disfigures the clear window; then, Véronique takes into her hand 
the magic glass ball and, after shaking it, focuses her gaze on it: the 
relationship between the anamorphotic stain and reality is now reversed, 
the subject perceives clearly the ‘magic’ interior of the ball, while ‘reality’ 
around it dissolves into a formless smear. (50) 
In the relationship between the subject and the object, as Žižek suggests, one could find 
certain moments when anxiety or trauma appears on stage. It is there that one could 
witness anamorphosis. Not only does this dissertation take this specific notion of 
anamorphosis to identify it in the cinema of Nolan, but also it moves further by claiming 
that there are also examples of what I wish to call structural anamorphosis as paradoxical 
moments where the temporal flow of narrative breaks down with the result that the logic 
of the Symbolic fails to make sense.  
 Another scholar, whose work has contributed significantly to the Lacanian Real in 
film is Todd McGowan. In The Real Gaze: Film Theory After Lacan (2007), Todd 
McGowan specifies that there is a specific trend in the cinema of the past few decades, 
which he names the cinema of intersection: “The experience of the impossible in the 
cinema of intersection reveals not simply the possibility of the impossible but also its 
disruptiveness and its inability to be assimilated to the everyday order of things [… it] 
attempts to highlight the hole in its [ideology’s] midst” (165-66). One of the examples of 
the film directors that adopts such a trend of filmmaking is Andrei Tarkovsky (1932-




McGowan claims that in his films, Tarkovsky portrays a “divide between the world of 
desire and that of fantasy not in order to stress their difference, but to expose their 
identity” (182). The fact that desire and fantasy are the same brings forward a 
disappointing conclusion: fantasy does not provide the subject with the object petit a. 
Desire simply gives the promise that moving from one partial object to another would 
eventually bring the object cause of desire, but in vain. As McGowan points out,  
The films of Tarkovsky demand that we grasp the underlying identity of 
the objet petit a as it motivates different objects of desire. […] Through its 
emphasis on the distinctiveness of the experiences of desire and fantasy, 
the cinema of intersection renders visible the role that repetition plays in 
the existence of the subject. The subject does not progress nor does it have 
a future, and yet it continually invests itself in the idea of progress. This 
idea of progress— hope for a different future—represents a fantasmatic 
seduction that the subject rarely escapes. By helping the subject to 
disentangle itself from this fantasy, Tarkovsky’s cinema confronts the 
subject with the inescapability of its object, and it offers the subject the 
possibility of identifying with this object and thereby accepting its own 
mode of enjoyment rather than imagining that the ultimate enjoyment is 
elsewhere. (184) 
As I will argue in this dissertation, the films of Christopher Nolan, too, represent the 
subject in such a relationship with the objet petit a. It is only in relation to this missing 
object that the subject interacts with her or his world. While in most of his films there is 




proves that the subject is stuck in a loop in which there is no possibility for regaining the 
lost object. Only those who truly understand that this object is impossible to find 
(characters in his later films) are able to make sense of this vicious circle.  
This dissertation is highly indebted to the theories of Todd McGowan. I have 
taken several of McGowan’s ideas on the Lacanian film theory and capitalism. However, 
this dissertation provides its unique contribution to existing knowledge by redefining and 
developing the concept of anamorphosis. In this project, I propose the term structural 
anamorphosis to give a fresh orientation to the Lacanian gaze as having not only a visual 
but narrative component. At certain moments in Nolan’s films temporality breaks down, 
confusing the viewer; time becomes anamorphotically contorted. I thus illustrate how 
anamorphosis may have a significant narrative structural dimension. But structural 
anamorphosis is not simply a non-linear arrangement of the narrative events; rather, it is a 
temporal dislocation in the film that only retroactively manifests its significance: the 
futility of the expected fantasy. I will also introduce the encounter with the Lacanian gaze 
through anamorphosis as an opportunity to rethink perception. To expand, I will discuss 
how the oblique perspective provided by Nolan’s anamorphotic art undermines the 
spectators’ vision and asks them to reconsider what they have already taken for granted in 
theater and life.  
This dissertation consists of an introduction (the current section), six chapters, and 
a conclusion. Chapter 1 provides the basic methodology used to critique films that will 
be discussed individually in Chapters 2-6. It starts with an overview of the concept of 
subjectivity from Descartes until Lacan. Lacan develops his version of the concept from 




deconstructed subject in the cinema of Christopher Nolan, who radically defines time, 
reality, and storytelling. In elaborating on the methodology, I will elucidate some of the 
very essential terms in Lacanian psychoanalysis, such as the Real and anamorphosis. 
Then, I shall discuss the two major trends in Lacanian film theory. Based on their 
individual understanding of the concept of gaze, each of these theoretical schools 
emphasizes one aspect of Lacan’s topography of subjectivity. This dissertation moves in 
the direction of the more recent Lacanian film theory which highlights the significance of 
the order of the Real. In the final pages of Chapter 1, I will introduce important cinematic 
techniques that allow one to find the coordinates of the Lacanian Real in the cinema of 
Nolan.3 Extreme close-up, extreme-long shot, and low-key lighting are the most repeated 
cinematic terms in this dissertation. Parallel editing (or crosscutting), also, would serve as 
a key term in this work, not only because it juxtaposes the Real to the Symbolic, but also 
because it leads to another very significant feature in Nolan: layered narrative as 
structural anamorphosis.  
From Chapter 2 onwards, each chapter will individually discuss one of the films 
directed by Christopher Nolan. These chapters move chronologically: they start with 
Memento (2000) and end with Interstellar (2014), and cover most of a 15-year period. 
The major reason for choosing a chronological approach is to trace Nolan’s view of 
subjectivity over time. It is interesting to note that Nolan starts with a limited scope (as 
we see in Memento): the individual’s life in relation to himself or a very small number of 
other individuals in a socio-geographically small environment (the local subject). With 
The Prestige, The Dark Knight, and Inception, Nolan aims for the subject within a large 
                                                 





society or societies (the global subject): the subject is depicted in either a certain 
historical period (The Prestige), or in the near future in an American society (The Dark 
Knight and Inception). And finally, when we get to Interstellar, we are provided with an 
image of the subject with relation to the universe (the universal subject). The significance 
of such a socio-geographical perspective stems from the fact that, for Lacan, the subject’s 
desire is always shaped by the big Other, which is located in the Symbolic Order. The big 
Other is an immeasurable entity, other than the subject himself, which is highly important 
in shaping the subject’s desire. The subject’s relationship to objet petit a is determined by 
the lack in the big Other: if the subject comes to the understanding that there is an 
essential lack in the big Other, that the objet petit a is also lacking—something that we 
can see in later films by Nolan—then this subject is a liberated subject. In Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 we can find examples of the non-liberated subject, the subject in a never-ending 
connection with the objet petit a, while in chapters 5 and 6 we can witness the arrival of 
the free subject.  
In Chapter 2, I will argue that Memento represents a fragmented subject of 
desire, who is unable to take in the truth of the objet petit a. The loop of desire within 
which the main character of Memento moves would never allow him to reach the object 
cause of his desire simply because there is no such object in the first place. The intrusion 
of the Real, which is triggered with the traumatic event of the murder of his wife, 
continues to haunt Leonard in dreams. He is unable to communicate properly with his 
past. His future is already doomed because he is unable to master the traumatic event. 




The basic argument of Chapter 3 (The Prestige) is that magic serves as the 
platform where the magician promises that the spectators will obtain their lost object, 
while he simply creates a loop of desire. I will point out that the backstage of magic 
serves as the unconscious where certain things are always arranged to be hidden from the 
eyes of the spectators. And, in this manner, the arrangement of magic is to be seen as a 
site for the unconscious construction of ideology. I will also focus on the characters of 
Robert Angier and Alfred Borden, whose fascination with objects prevents them from 
relating truly to the people around them. The Prestige is where the world of objects 
prevents people from communicating with each other. The film, which pictures early 20th 
century England and United States, depicts one essential feature of capitalism: the 
fascination of subjects with objects at the cost of losing intersubjective relations.  
Chapter 4 focuses on The Dark Knight, which is possibly the most political film 
by Nolan. My discussion in this chapter involves Batman-Joker oppositions. The mise-
en-scène plays a key role in my critique of this film. Nolan’s aerial shots provide us with 
the symbols of the capitalist city of Gotham, such as skyscrapers, multi-industry 
companies, luxurious restaurants, and the super-rich upper class. I will argue that the 
seemingly monolithic order of the Symbolic (or the law) is repeatedly struck by the order 
of the Real through the agency of the Joker. The Joker, with his grotesque face and his 
extremely unruly behavior is the reverse side or the senseless core of capitalism. While 
Batman, as an extended form of law, attempts to counteract him, the Joker, nonetheless, 
leaves his traumatic effect forever. Not only does the Joker succeed in creating chaos in 
the city of Gotham, but also he leaves his impact by creating a monster from Gotham’s 




Angier in The Prestige, is that he is unable to cope with the traumatic event of the death 
by explosion of his beloved Rachel. In order to master the trauma, he chooses to start an 
endless killing, the same loop of revenge that we saw in Memento. He is engaged in a 
vicious circle that eventuates in his death.   
In Nolan’s Inception one can best touch the unconscious functioning of ideology. 
The film centers on the concept of mind heist through inserting an idea into the subject’s 
unconscious while she or he is dreaming. In this chapter, I will discuss the art of trompe 
l’œil as a means to design hyperreal worlds that create the illusion of reality. Besides 
elaborating on ideology as unconscious, Chapter 5 highlights the impact of trauma on 
the subject’s mind. I will argue that, although Cobb is haunted by the traumatic memories 
of death (by suicide) of his wife, he is finally able to find solace because he finds the 
truth about the objet petit a. After a massive turbulence created in dreams, Cobb is 
relieved once he finds the lack in the logic of desire.  
Chapter 6 focuses on Nolan’s Interstellar. I will discuss anamorphosis in terms 
of time, space, and sound as ways to show the limitations of desire at the core of the 
Symbolic Order: anamorphosis is a surplus or a stain that shows the futility of fantasy 
promised by desire. This stain demands a rethinking of vision and consciousness. I will 
also elaborate on the Dust as the traumatic force with massive consequences for Earth.4 I 
will claim that, like Cobb in Inception, Cooper and Amelia find the lack at heart of desire 
and deal with the traumatic encounter.  
In the concluding section of this dissertation, I highlight the ways through which I 
have focused on the term anamorphosis in the films of Christopher Nolan. I shall discuss 
                                                 




the significance of the anamorphotic encounter with the Real as a way to reconsider the 
world around us. I will elaborate on the task of the spectator that Nolan’s filmmaking 
necessitates. Nolan, as a filmmaker, attempts to view or represent the Symbolic Order in 
ways other than those we already know. This demands from the spectators a rethinking of 
everything around them, because it is in such moments that they could decrypt 
ideological formations, especially that of capitalism. Capitalism’s emphasis on the objet 
petit a is the major target of Christopher Nolan because not only it deceives subjects by 
promising that sometime in the future they will get the ultimate object of desire, but also 


















Chapter 1: Lacan, Film Theory, and Nolan 
 
 
1.1 Introductory Statements 
 
This chapter has two major objectives: first, to introduce and clarify the basic 
concepts and theories that underpin my work throughout this dissertation; and second, to 
build a framework which will help sketch the anamorphotic art of Christopher Nolan. In 
the first part of this chapter, I shall elaborate on the major concepts which are of 
considerable importance for both Lacanian film theory and the purposes of this 
dissertation. This elucidation starts with an overview of the development of the term 
subjectivity by certain major philosophers from Descartes to Lacan. Here, the emphasis 
lies on the way that philosophy shifted from viewing human beings as conscious living 
souls having control over their thoughts and actions to seeing them as merely subjects of 
the unconscious. When we compare Lacan to Descartes, who provided us with the first 
modern sketch of the human mind, we see a significant evolution. To put it briefly, while 
Descartes views thinking as that which gives existence to the individual, with his famous 
“I think, therefore I am” (18), Lacan views thinking as taking away the subject’s being: “I 
am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking” (Écrits 430). This 
radical change, taking place in a time span of about 320 years,5 has several missing links, 
which I will discuss in the next section of this chapter. For now, it would suffice to 
mention that what separates Lacan from Descartes is the notion of the unconscious, 
which is of paramount importance in psychoanalysis.  
                                                 
5 Descartes’ Discourse on Method was first published in 1637 and Lacan’s “The Instance of the Letter in 
the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud,” from which the above citation has been taken, was delivered as a 





Next, this chapter, will take up some of the key terms in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
especially the Real, the gaze, the objet petit a, and anamorphosis. It should be noted here 
that the Real has a history of its own. It was introduced by Lacan, but several scholars 
attempted to develop and reformulate it. Among them, Slavoj Žižek reintroduced and, in 
a way, revolutionized the term. Žižek’s particular interest in film initiated a new trend in 
Lacanian film theory, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
The section on Lacanian film theory will discuss the two major trends that came 
into existence in the second half of the 20th century. Based on their focus on a particular 
order in the Lacanian triad (The Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real), the early and the 
new Lacanian film theories provided different approaches towards reading films. It would 
suffice for now to say that the early Lacanian film theorists considered film as a space 
where fantasy reconstituted the subject’s relation to ideology, because they had an 
Althusserian or Foucauldian reading of Lacan, but the new trend, inspired by Žižek and 
Copjec, emphasized that film had the capability of creating a hole in ideology.  
The last section in this chapter describes some of the cinematic techniques and 
elements used in elaborating Nolan’s films throughout this dissertation. Parallel editing, 
mise-en-scène, specific shot types—especially extreme close-up and extreme long shot, 
and low-key lighting are those features that will provide a better reading of Nolan 
through the lenses of Lacan.        
 
1.2 Subjectivity Before Lacan  
 
          Lacan’s theory of subjectivity was informed mostly by the teachings of Freud, who 
is considered the father of psychoanalysis. Freud’s model of human development 




regard to human consciousness. While they all believed that (wo)man is a conscious 
being in control of her or his thoughts, the father of psychoanalysis conceived the 
unconscious as the root of all human actions. While each provided a revision of their 
predecessors, philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, and Hegel all focused on human 
consciousness and reason as the essential constituents of mind. René Descartes (1596-
1650), for example, with his I think, therefore I am provided the prototypical formulation 
of cognition and challenged previously held positions towards human mind and 
existence, which were common in the Middle Ages. Cartesian cogito, as it was named 
later, was a “break from a philosophy of existence based on obedience to social and 
religious institutions and divine law” (Hall 20). He believed that real thinking started with 
doubting, and, therefore, attempted to question everything that he doubted because of the 
possible illogicality of the phenomenon. As he points out in Discourse on Method,  
For a long time I had noticed that in matters of morality one must 
sometimes follow opinions that one knows to be quite uncertain, just as if 
they were indubitable, as has been said above, but because I then desired 
to devote myself exclusively to the search for the truth, I thought it 
necessary that I do exactly the opposite, and that I reject as absolutely 
false everything in which I could imagine the least doubt, in order to see 
whether, after this process, something in my beliefs remained that was 
entirely indubitable. (18) 
Descartes felt the urge to reexamine his ideas based on concrete evidence. As Martin Jay 
puts it in Downcast Eyes, since Descartes believed that vision was “the most 




evidence” which would lead to “a decidedly empirical direction” (70-71). Jay argues that 
“Descartes posited a structure of the mind and then assumed it was congruent with the 
external world in a specular way” (79). Descartes’ suggestion is that the I am brings us 
awareness of our existence and our knowledge. The fact that the existence of the I 
precedes our orientation towards the surrounding world, as well as any understanding of 
it, places it above body. As he clarifies in Discourse on Method, “Thus this ‘I,’ that is to 
say, the soul through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even 
easier to know than the body, and even if there were no body at all, it would not cease to 
be all that it is” (19). In other words, Descartes suggests, there is a duality between the 
mind and the body.  
For Descartes, it is the mind which does the thinking, not the body. For Kant 
(1724-1804), there is no distinction between mind and body in the process of thinking. 
Still, Kant agrees with Descartes that it is I that is thinking. In Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant proposes that I, as the repertoire of the phenomenal world, is a unified entity: 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought 
at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be 
impossible or else at least would be nothing to me. (246) 
For Kant, the I who thinks already knows that she or he exists. That is why Kant’s I think 
replaces Descartes’ I think, therefore I am, meaning that there is no duality in any sense, 
neither the duality of mind and body, nor the duality of the I that exists from the I that 
thinks. However, one thing that is in common with both philosophers is their emphasis on 




Like Descartes and Kant, Hegel supported the idea that human beings were 
rational by nature. Hegel (1770-1831) conceived of human consciousness not as an 
isolated entity, or simply an internal quality as against the external nature, but actually as 
existing in connection with another consciousness. As he indicates in Phenomenology of 
Spirit, “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists 
for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (111). This theory of 
consciousness is later seen in Lacan, where he makes connections between one’s image 
of her or himself as always shaped, and in need of recognition, by the desire of the big 
Other. Such an understanding of consciousness leads Hegel to formulate his master and 
slave dialectic: the encounter between two consciousnesses makes them come out of their 
place. Each consciousness loses itself in the other, and, at the same time, finds itself in 
the image of the other. As Hegel puts it in Phenomenology of Spirit,  
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out 
of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds 
itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, 
for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its 
own self. (111)  
Although each side of the relationship requires acknowledgment from the other, because 
of the inherent inequality at the core of this interaction, one becomes master and the other 
becomes slave: 
In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as 
pure self-consciousness. In immediate self-consciousness the simple ‘I’ is 




The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience; 
through this there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a 
consciousness which is not purely for itself but for another, i.e. is a merely 
immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of thinghood. Both 
moments are essential. Since to begin with they are unequal and opposed, 
and their reflection into a unity has not yet been achieved, they exist as 
two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent 
consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the 
dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be 
for another. The former is lord, the other is bondsman. (115) 
The dependence of one’s consciousness on another’s and the ongoing need for 
recognition from the other creates a relationship which is not stable and clear-cut. Indeed, 
it does not put oneself in the position of the master and the other in the position of the 
slave forever. This is one of the key points that later Marx uses in talking about class 
struggle.  
While Descartes, Kant, and Hegel all conceived man as a rational being, 
Nietzsche provided a significant challenge to their theories of the mind. Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900), in The Will to Power, proposed that what we name consciousness 
has no direct role in our experiencing the world: 
That which becomes conscious is involved in causal relations which are 
entirely withheld from us—the sequence of thoughts, feelings, ideas in 
consciousness does not signify that this sequence is a causal sequence; but 




founded our whole idea of spirit, reason, logic, etc. (–none of these exist: 
they are fictitious syntheses and unities), and projected these into things 
and behind things! (284) 
Therefore, in The Will to Power, Nietzsche rejects the idea that consciousness is “the 
supreme court” or “the directing agent”; rather, he proposes, it is “only a means of 
communication” or “an organ of the directing agent” (284). For him, consciousness has a 
“subsidiary role […] superfluous, perhaps destined to vanish and give way to a perfect 
automatism” (283). Nietzsche introduces the unconscious as “the inner world,” as against 
consciousness which is our relation to the “outer world,” which, he believes, is a 
“thousandfold complexity,” but we simply consider it as “a unity” just because we “lack 
any sensitive organs for” it (283-84).  
The writings of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) provide us with an even more 
systematic account of the unconscious mind. Freud’s focus was on “the developmental 
aspects of individual psychology and a recognition of the powerful influence of the 
unconscious on conscious life” (Hall 60). In The Ego and the Id, Freud reiterates that the 
psychical mind is divided into “what is conscious and what is unconscious” and 
emphasizes that his method “cannot situate the essence of the psychical in consciousness, 
but is obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the psychical, which may be present 
in addition to other qualities or may be absent” (3). In other words, consciousness is only 
a part—and not a significant part—of the whole. The unconscious, as Freud puts it, 
consists of “very powerful mental processes or ideas” that could affect mental life 




In the Freudian notion of the subject, “we have an interior life split between the 
socially and culturally integrated processes of the conscious mind, and the threatening or 
unconfessable impulses of the unconscious, which the conscious hopes to keep in its 
place by a quantum of mental force called repression” (Mansfield 30). In Freud’s 
topography of subjectivity, the ego is responsible for the individual’s conscious life, the 
id is the storehouse of instinctual energies, and the preventive superego is the voice of 
society, morality, and law. As he elaborates, the ego “supervises all its own constituent 
processes” and, even more, “exercises the censorship on dreams” (Ego and Id 8). Freud, 
connects the ego to reason (or the reality principle) and the id to passions (or the pleasure 
principle) and suggests that “the ego seems to bring the influence of the external world to 
bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to substitute the reality principle for 
the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id” (19). In order to give us a 
visual analogy, Freud describes the relationship between the ego and the id as a man on 
horseback and develops it even further: “Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his 
horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the 
habit of transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own” (19). Lastly, the 
superego “represents an energetic reaction-formation against” object choices of the id 
(30). It stands for the ethical and moral standards of the society that require the subject to 
move in a particular direction.  
For Freud, dreams reveal the unconscious thoughts in an indirect, oblique way. In 
fact, the unconscious uses dreams to enter consciousness. What he calls dream-thoughts 




The dream-thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two 
versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more 
properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts 
into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws it is 
our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. 
(Interpretation of Dreams 295) 
The original dream thoughts are, therefore, presented to the dreamer in the translated 
form of the dream-content. In other words, dream-content presents to the dreamer a 
“pictographic script” of the dream-thoughts (296). The transformation of dream-thoughts 
into dream-content is due to the fact that the ego filters repressed impulses of the 
unconscious and represents them to the dreamer in a distorted way. Freud points out that 
it would lead to error if we attempt “to read these characters according to their pictorial 
value instead of according to their symbolic relation” (296). Such a distortion is part of 
the dream-work which takes place at various levels, two of which are of a considerable 
importance for our later discussion of Lacan: condensation and displacement. 
Condensation, as Freud says is a “manipulative process” through which only “those 
elements which have the most numerous and strongest supports acquire the right of entry 
into the dream-content” (302). In displacement, because of the complex function of the 
dream-work, an image is replaced for another with the consequence that “the dream-
content no longer resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no 
more than a distortion of the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious” (324-25). Both 




What Freud proposed as a theory of dreams (displacement and condensation in 
particular) as well as his idea that subjectivity is formed mostly by external forces 
(society and law), which shape the unconscious is what Lacan later takes to develop his 
own conception of subjectivity. In the next section, I will elaborate on key concepts in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially those which would prepare us for watching the films 
of Nolan.   
 
1.3 The Lacanian Subject, the Real, and Anamorphosis 
 
Lacan’s account of subjectivity was inspired by the teachings of Freud, Saussure, 
and Jakobson among others. First and foremost, he took Freud’s views on the 
unconscious as well as his theory of dreams (displacement and condensation); second, he 
developed Saussure’s concept of the sign (the signifier and the signified); and finally, he 
was fascinated by the way Jakobson compared the two axes of language (metonymy and 
metaphor) to Freud’s concepts of displacement and condensation. This section briefly 
describes the connection between Lacan and the above-mentioned scholars, and then 
provides a detailed explanation of the key Lacanian terms that we will encounter 
throughout this dissertation.  
Like Freud, Lacan believed that the unconscious is of critical importance in the 
formation of the subject. Lacan, however, added an important dimension to his 
understanding of the unconscious: linguistics. Inspired by Roman Jakobson’s “Two 
Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” which was an innovative 
combination of the theories of Saussure and Freud, Lacan proposed that “the unconscious 




with speaking or enunciation, there are unconscious streams running in the background. 
For Lacan, the only way one could access the unconscious was through language:  
We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of 
it which is articulated by passing into words. It is for this reason that we 
have the right—all the more so as the development of Freud’s discovery 
will demonstrate—to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end 
no other structure than the structure of language. (Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
32) 
Roman Jakobson (1896-1982) had proposed that language works within two axes: the 
horizontal axis of combination or metonymy and the vertical axis of selection or 
metaphor. The horizontal axis, Jakobson argued, would be called metonymy since it 
functions on the element of contiguity; it connects words of different grammatical 
functions to make a sentence. The vertical axis, he said, functions on the element of 
similarity because it replaces a word with similar meaning, as we witness in a metaphor. 
The two axes are involved in making every utterance in the system of language. As 
Jakobson points out in Language in Literature, an utterance “is a combination of 
constituent parts (sentences, words, phonemes) selected from the repository of all 
possible constituent parts” (99). Jakobson related the two axes of language to Freud’s 
terms about dream-work:  
Thus in an inquiry into the structure of dreams, the decisive question is 
whether the symbols and the temporal sequences used are based on 




“condensation”) or on similarity (Freud’s “identification and symbolism”).  
(113) 
This connection between language and dreams is what Lacan embraces to formulate his 
notion of subject. For Lacan, any attempt to understand the complexities of human mind 
needs to consider the structures of communication closely.  
Lacan was also inspired, like Jakobson, by the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913), but he made significant changes to them, and, in various ways, 
subverted Saussure’s ideas. As Saussure puts it in Course in General Linguistics, any 
sign is formed by a combination, in an “arbitrary” enclosure, of the concept (signified) 
and the sound-image (signifier) (67). The signifier and the signified form an 
interconnected configuration as they “do not seem to slip away from each other” (Fink, 




), and there is a strong connection between the two in a way that they are 
considered two sides of the same coin. Lacan, on the contrary, cancels this enclosure and 
rejects any mutuality between the signifier and the signified. The relationship between 
the signifier and the signified, for Lacan, is not a one to one, direct relationship: we 
cannot simply attach a signifier to a signified. He turns the diagram on its head, by 
putting the signifier over the signified (
Signifier
Signified
). Therefore, Lacan prioritizes the signifier 
by proposing that in language we move from one signifier to another without ever being 
able to access the signified. In Lacan’s equation, the bar that separates the two, has a 
significant role: it resists “signification” (Écrits 415) and puts the signifier always ahead 




the former. Lacan equates the meaning produced out of this relationship with what he 
later calls the Imaginary when he says that  
[…] the signifier-signified division will always reproduce itself. There’s 
no doubt that meaning is by nature imaginary. Meaning is, like the 
imaginary, always in the end evanescent, for it is tightly bound to what 
interests you, that is, to that in which you are ensnared. (Psychoses 54)  
Language, for Lacan, is an indefinite set of signifiers and signifieds that shape a 
continual, endless slippage of meaning and that only occasionally, through what he calls 
point de capiton or “quilting point,” comes to a halt (Psychoses 267). The function of 
these points is to momentarily stop the continual “sliding of the signified under the 
signifier” (Lacan, Écrits 419). As Žižek says, the point de capiton is “the word which, as 
a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given field, constitutes its identity: it 
is, so to speak, the word to which ‘things’ themselves refer to recognize themselves in 
their unity” (Sublime Object 105). An example by Žižek gives us a better sense of 
Lacan’s point de capiton. If we knit the free floating of signifiers with the word 
communism, then the term class struggle (which is the central focus of communist 
ideology) “confers a precise and fixed signification” to other signifiers such as 
democracy, feminism, or ecologism because they are all focused on the conflict of 
interests between contesting groups of society (Sublime Object 96). While it is true that 
under such occasional circumstances we might be able to find meaning, the final outcome 
of the eternal sliding of the signifiers and the signifieds is nothing but “a continuous 
evacuation of meaning” and therefore, “a constitutive lack at the core of language” which 




The arrangement of signifiers, for Lacan, is not simply a linguistic event, but 
actually, and more importantly, the emergence of unconscious desires in one’s utterances, 
and this feature makes him different from Saussure. In fact, it is language or discourse 
that brings us the Lacanian subject. To make it more precise, the subject, for Lacan, is 
“divided in subordination to the signifier” (Vanier 1649), which means that the subject, 
considering the fact that she or he is a “speaking being,” is a split subject, “since speech 
divides the subject of the [enunciation] from the subject of the statement” (Evans 195). 
Such a consideration of the subject, as divided by speech, means that the subject is never 
fully in control of her or himself; as Dylan Evans points out, “The split denotes the 
impossibility of the ideal of a fully present self-consciousness; the subject will never 
know himself completely, but will always be cut off from his own knowledge” (195). A 
good example of such a divided subject—subject under the control of the unconscious—
in Nolan’s films is Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) in Memento. He is the one who has 
murdered his own wife, but his unconscious turns out to have displaced events and 
people in a way that even he himself, or simply his conscious self, does not know the 
truth, as he kills a couple of people suspected of raping and murdering his wife. 
Things are different before the introduction of a human being to the realm of 
language. At the beginning, the infant finds her or himself in absolute unity with her or 
his mother. This is one of the shortest periods in the life of the individual, and much in 
line with the Lacanian Real, as it is a state of fullness. There is no realization, in any 
sense, felt by the infant, of the mother’s body as external. The very first signs of such a 
recognition emerge when the infant is between six to eighteen months. This is a period in 




recognizes her or his own image in the mirror. This discovery does not necessarily 
happen in a real mirror, but in actuality, it may occur when the child identifies with the 
body of a parent or a sibling. The image that the child experiences is both a recognition 
and misrecognition. It is recognition in the sense that the child can certainly see her or 
himself as a seemingly unified body separate not only from that of her or his mother, but 
also from the rest of the world. It is, however, a misrecognition, because what the child 
sees does not truly reflect her or his fragmented, still uncoordinated body. Moreover, it is 
not an exact image in terms of dimensions as well as orientation. The child, still 
imperfect in vision, sees fragments of her or his body, but misconceives them as unified 
and complete. As Elizabeth Grosz clarifies,  
the child is now enmeshed in a system of confused 
recognition/misrecognition; it sees an image of itself that is both accurate 
(since it is an inverted reflection, the presence of light rays emanating 
from the child: the image as icon); as well as delusory (since the image 
prefigures a unity and mastery that the child still lacks). (39) 
In fact, the image that the child sees “as better coordinated and more coherent” than her 
or his real body “belies real bodily fragmentation” of her or his body (Iversen 7). “The 
mirror,” Iversen continues, “in Lacan’s account of this developmental stage, does not 
reflect back an already constituted self. Rather, it creates a reasonable facsimile or 
simulacrum of a self” (7).  
Such a duality of experience begets the child’s ego. This image is an alienated 
image because its source is located outside the body, it is a reflection, and not a truthful 




stage in Lacan’s triad of subjectivity. The Imaginary, therefore, is what controls the 
relationships “between self and other”; it is, to be more exact, “the domain in which the 
self is dominated by images of the other and seeks its identity in a reflected relation with 
alterity. Imaginary relations are thus two-person relations, where the self sees itself 
reflected in the other” (Grosz 46). As Fredric Jameson points out, in his Ideologies of 
Theory, “the mirror stage, which is the precondition for primary narcissism, is also, 
owing to the equally irreducible gap it opens between the infant and its fellows, the very 
source of human aggressivity” (87). The Imaginary, therefore, is the source of all future 
aggressivity and rivalry that every human being experiences. The mirror stage in the 
Imaginary, as Fredric Jameson affirms, creates “a relationship of otherness” and serves as 
the primordial source of “the violent situational content of those judgments of good and 
evil that will later cool off and sediment into the various systems of ethics” (Ideologies of 
Theory 89). In other words, it is the mirror stage that provides an ethical position for the 
subject, and it is always from this specific position that the subject considers things as 
either ethically good or bad. In Nolan’s The Prestige, in the rivalry between the two 
magicians, each performs evil to the other equally. The film portrays the never-ending 
battle between Angier and Borden as they are shown in several hostile encounters. 
However, we, as spectators, take side with one of them (either Angier or Borden) because 
we all have experienced the mirror stage. 
The ego which is shaped by the Imaginary, as I mentioned before, is an alienated 
ego, because of the child’s identification with an image outside the body. This alienated 
image is actually an illusion of what the child would like to be in the future, it is an ideal 




purge the constructed ego of any undesirable “impulses and objects that cannot be 
assimilated into the beautiful, coherent picture” (Iversen 7). This is an initial phase of 
banishing the Real, the next step of which would be when the Symbolic Order enters the 
scene. One of these bits and pieces to be “marginalized by the defensive ego” is death (7). 
In the initial Imaginary phase, death is filtered so that the subject leads a normal life. In 
later stages of life, death appears as a traumatic encounter for the subject. It is not merely 
death but actually the way the subject encounters it that matters. When someone finds her 
or himself very close to death, she or he faces the return of the repressed Real. The 
speechlessness that accompanies the traumatic death of a close relative shows the void on 
which the Symbolic Order has been built. In the cinema of Nolan, death has a significant 
role as it introduces a traumatic encounter, which the subject should master in order to 
resume her or his normal life. In Nolan’s The Dark Knight, the Joker arranges for the 
death by explosion of Rachel and Harvey Dent. They are placed in two different locations 
to be exploded at the same time, while they can talk to and hear each other through radio. 
The joint feeling of disappointment and horror experienced by both characters, which is 
depicted through their tearful eyes and flushed faces, shows the void of subjectivity and 
the return of the Real. In such moments—and through the agency of the Real—one can 
clearly see how fragile is the façade of stability created by the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic orders.  
Because of the fact that the Imaginary procedures fail to give the subject a unified 
whole, and, instead, give her or him an alienated image, there is a need for the arrival of 
the Symbolic to solve the problem. But we need to keep in mind that the Symbolic is 




use language to describe the images of their infant. The illusory function of the Imaginary 
forces the infant to seek stability in the Symbolic. To put it simply, the Symbolic is the 
realm of language. However, as language brings us many other related categories such as 
law and culture, we need to consider the Symbolic as a wide network with a significant 
role in shaping subjectivity. When the subject is introduced into language, she or he is 
actually assigned a position in the Symbolic Order. As Stavrakakis affirms in Lacan and 
the Political, “By submitting to the laws of language the child becomes a subject in 
language, it inhabits language, and hopes to gain an adequate representation through the 
world of words” (20). It is, therefore, the law of the language, and the play of 
signification that forms the subject; consequently, Stavrakakis continues, the subject 
“becomes an effect of the signifier. In that sense it is a certain subordination, an exercise 
of power, that constitutes the condition of possibility for the constitution of subjectivity” 
(20). It is the-Name-of-the-Father, which, as the agent of the Symbolic law (or simply, 
power), sets rules for the subject to be able to live in the society.  
Once the subject enters the realm of language, she or he experiences separation. 
The subject is now formed as she or he interacts with something (i.e. language) that is 
once again outside the subject’s body. Similar to the alienation that takes place in the 
Imaginary, the separation in the Symbolic, or the realm of the big Other, plays a 
noticeable role in the formation of the subject. The outcome of separation is desire. The 
fact that the individual experiences alienation in the Imaginary, and, then, is further 
separated in the Symbolic, produces a subject which is not only divided but also, a 
desiring being, always in search of something lost (the initial union with the body of the 




loses all contact with the Real, which I will elaborate on soon. Such a desiring subject 
always desires what the Other (it could be simply the mother or the big Other) desires, 
because the subject is a constitution of something external. As Bruce Fink points out, 
The child would like to be the sole object of its mother’s affections, but 
her desire almost always goes beyond the child: there is something about 
her desire which escapes the child, which is beyond its control. A strict 
identity between the child’s desire and hers cannot be maintained; her 
desire’s independence from her child’s creates a rift between them, a gap 
in which her desire, unfathomable to the child, functions in a unique way. 
(Lacanian Subject 59) 
This is the tragedy of the Lacanian subject. The subject will never know what the Other 
desires because desire comes from the unconscious. This failure leads to separation from 
the Other’s desire (Fink, Lacanian Subject 121). In the process of (mis)communication of 
desire, the subject blindly wants to be desired by the Other, as in the case of a child who 
wants to be the object of mother’s desire. The result is that what the subject consciously 
thinks to be her or his own desire is simply (the desire to be) the desire of the Other 
which has been internalized in a mutually misunderstood discourse. Christopher Nolan’s 
Inception involves the idea of planting an idea into the subject’s mind without her or him 
ever suspecting that what she or he wants is the other’s wish. The focal character, Cobb, 
succeeds in planting the idea, in a very long and complicated unconscious process, in 
Fisher’s mind, of taking a different path from that of his father.   
Considering the fact that in both the Imaginary and the Symbolic it is something 




determined by and located in the Other. If separation brings nothing but desire, why does 
the subject submit to it? The answer is that the subject accepts the law to avoid further 
fragmentation. The arrival of the-Name-of-the-Father, as the agent of the Symbolic order, 
breaks any remaining connection between the child and the mother and adamantly 
prohibits it in the future. The annihilation of the child-mother unity by the (Symbolic) 
father brings about the “separation [which] leads to the subject’s expulsion from the 
Other, in which he or she was still nothing but a place-holder” (Fink, Lacanian Subject 
58). This is the impact of the Symbolic on the Real. The Name-of-the-Father is the law, 
that tells the child to avoid any desire for the mother. This rule is internalized upon the 
child’s introduction to the language, when she or he finds a place in the signifying chain. 
That is why it is no exaggeration if we claim that “the subject is an effect of language” 
(Evans 198).  
The further division of the subject by language shapes the underlying framework 
of Lacan’s theory of subjectivity. And it is here that Lacan, following Freud, 
distinguishes himself from the rationalist philosophies of mind. As I mentioned earlier, 
Lacan rewrites Descartes’ famous I think, therefore I am by replacing it with I am 
thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking. What Lacan suggests 
here is that being does not co-exist with thinking. For Lacan, unlike Descartes, thinking 
and being are mutually exclusive; if you are thinking, then you cease to exist; if you exist, 
you are unable to think (and therefore, speak.). While the Cartesian ego is in control of 
itself, in terms of being and consciousness, for Lacan, “ego thinking is mere conscious 
rationalization” and only a false thinking (Fink, Lacanian Subject 44). The Lacanian 




of self,” which happens in the Imaginary, and “the automatic functioning of language” or 
the signifying chain, which is a function of the Symbolic (45). It is only occasionally and 
only “momentarily” that this split subject, while mostly “excluded at the level of the 
unconscious thought,” can move beyond the id (or the unconscious), take control of it, 
and therefore, overcome the division (46, 48). In Nolan’s Memento, the two plotlines, one 
in black and white and the other in color, represent the ego and the unconscious. In the 
black plotline, we see a linear narrative, in which Leonard seems to be conscious about 
whatever he says or remembers; in the color plotline, on the other hand, we witness a 
non-linear narrative in which events are distorted and dream-like. Interestingly enough, 
the color narrative takes more than two thirds of the film’s length, which is an indication 
of the fact that the unconscious has a more important role than conscious mind. As the 
film proceeds, the spectator is more and more convinced that Leonard, despite his 
seemingly empirical approach towards truth, would not access knowledge.      
The subject of Lacan, unlike that of Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, and even more 
radical than Nietzsche and Freud, is not the subject of knowledge, but of non-knowledge. 
Neither the mirror stage nor the big Other produces a subject in control of (an internal) 
consciousness. As Bruce Fink indicates,  
By internalizing the way the Other sees one, by assimilating the Other’s 
approving and disapproving looks and comments, one learns to see oneself 
as the Other sees one, to know oneself as the Other knows one. As the 
child in front of the mirror turns around and looks to the adult standing 
behind her for a nod, recognition, a word of approval or ratification […] 




herself as if she were the parental Other, comes to be aware of herself as if 
from the outside, as if she were another person. (Lacan to the Letter 108) 
In other words, it is always in the position of the Other that the subjects define 
themselves. Self-consciousness is an illusion created by the ego, developed further by the 
big Other in the Symbolic Order, and therefore, the subject of the unconscious has no 
knowledge of the self in the literal sense of the word. The outcome of such a positioning 
of the self is discontent. 
As mentioned above, the social order that is shaped by the Symbolic creates 
“incomplete or lacking” subjects whose experience of the realm of the law and language 
brings them nothing but separation and negativity (McGowan, End of Dissatisfaction 16). 
Language substitutes symbols for absent things, and, as a result, produces negativity. As 
McGowan points out,  
The symbol brings death and alienation into the world because it brings 
absence—or, more properly, presence in absence. Because the symbol 
allows us to experience the presence of absence, it allows us also to 
become conscious of death without actually dying. The symbol thus 
makes it possible for us to obtain a kind of being-towards-death” (26). 
The subject is now caught in an endless quest for something to fill the gap, like the play 
of signification which is a never-ending attempt to find the eventual signified. The 
culprit, as Joan Copjec points out, is simply language because signification always gives 
the subject something (signifier) in place of something else (signified):  
Desire […] stems from the feeling of our having been duped by language, 




determinate object or goal for which we can aim. Desire has no content—
It is for nothing—because language can deliver to us no incontrovertible 
truth, no positive goal (55).  
Desire is indeed the leftover of the demand expressed through language to another or 
interpreted through the Other.  
In the play of signification, in the movement from one signifier to another, we 
lose part of our “animal being” to become “social animals” (Fink, Lacanian Subject 116). 
Giving up (or sacrificing) “part of themselves” makes subjects “imagine or fantasize an 
object that exists in the gap left by their sacrifice” (McGowan, End of Dissatisfaction 16). 
That something which seems to promise an eventual satisfaction and a consequent end of 
desire is called the objet petit a. The essential lack in the subject, which, as indicated 
previously, is an outcome of the Symbolic and the resultant death of the Real, shapes the 
objet petit a. As Stavrakakis clarifies, “The object [ɑ] aims to cover over this lack, it is 
promising to bring back the real; this is an imaginary promise which can be supported 
only when the object is posited as missing” (51). The objet petit a, however, is possibly 
“just a little piece of Real” because upon “the emergence of the signifier” and the 
“murder” of the Real, it seems impossible to reunite with it; the object is just a reminder 
of “the loss of an always already-lost Unity” (Chiesa 122). This “reminder” serves as a 
“remainder,” too, not only of the past unity between the subject and the (m)Other, but 
also of the following rift between them (Fink, Lacanian Subject 59). The role of the objet 
petit a is to create an illusion for the split subject of wholeness because, as Lacan says, 




Bruce Fink confirms, “by clinging to object ɑ, the subject is able to ignore his or her 
division” (Lacanian Subject 59).  
The objet petit a is not an object in the literal sense of the word, nor is it 
something that exists in reality. To quote Slavoj Žižek, “we search in vain for it in 
positive reality because it has no positive consistency—because it is just an 
objectification of a void, of a discontinuity opened in reality by the emergence of the 
signifier” (Sublime Object 104). In other words, the objet petit a is simply a corollary of 
the signifier, something produced by the desiring subject in order to fill the hole produced 
by the Symbolic. Richard Boothby describes the objet petit a as “primordially lost” and 
an “essentially lacking object,” or “a profoundly negative object,” which is absent rather 
than present (244). Boothby believes that the objet petit a has a retroactive character in 
the sense that it is the cause of desire; it actually precedes the subject as “there is always 
already an object of desire in relation to which the desiring subject is constituted in the 
first place” (244). The retroactive function of the objet petit a is a consequence of the 
same process in signification. In this process, the subject only finds meaning 
retroactively, that is, by considering the sentence backward, as it is impossible to make 
sense of an utterance while it is not yet finished. The objet petit a manipulates fantasies, 
and serves as an instrument that gives the subject excitement. It should be noted that this 
object is not the object of desire, but actually its cause. Also, it is not aimed at satisfaction 
because desire disappears when it finds its object; rather, it moves from one object to 
another since it looks for its “continuation and furtherance” (Fink, Clinical 51). The 
essential feature of Christopher Nolan’ films is their portrayal of the subject in search of 




affected by his search for the objet petit a. That is why Angier embarks on a long journey 
to have Tesla build him an impossible machine that one could only find in dreams. Tesla 
eventually provides Angier with the machine of his dreams; however, Angier is 
disappointed because he finds that, like any other object, the Machine doesn’t give him 
what he has been looking for. The Angier that we see at the end of the film is much more 
dissatisfied than the Angier that we see at the beginning. The subject always wants or 
desires something more, and this is, to reiterate, because of the lack in language. 
Language, as a site of the big Other, articulates our demands in an improper way as the 
Other does not know exactly what we want as subjects.  
The relationship between the subject and the objet petit a creates fantasy. Fantasy 
is not simply “an imagined scenario representing the realization of desire”; rather, 
“through fantasy we learn ‘how to desire’” (Žižek, Sublime Object 132). The function of 
fantasy, therefore, is to hide the gap in the desire of the Other in order to provide meaning 
for the senseless experiences of the subject (132). Fantasy, in this sense, is an instrument 
of ideology. In Todd McGowan’s words, “Ideology […] needs fantasy to compensate for 
its constitutive incompleteness. No ideology can ever provide all the answers for the 
subject, and fantasy fills in the blank spaces in an ideological edifice” (Real Gaze 36). 
Capitalism, for example, tells the subjects that by following a set of objects they would 
eventually find the objet petit a. In the capitalist ideology, time is an important factor 
because it is in the future that one could find her or his lost object. The relationship 
between the subject and the objet petit a is determined by an indefinite number of objects, 
none of which help the subject to obtain the eventual object. The subject in contemporary 




object cause of her or his desire in a moment of fantasy. As I will discuss later, the best 
message that one could get from watching Nolan’s films is that the objet petit a does not 
exist. The spectators are tacitly told that it is capitalism that urges them to be obsessed 
with objects and, as a result, become isolated subjects surrounded by indefinite number of 
objects.  
It is only through fantasy that most of the non-answerable questions of ideological 
thinking find their explanations. As Stavrakakis points out,  
From millenarianism to the Communist Manifesto and up to Green 
ideology, we know that every political promise is supported by a reference 
to a lost state of harmony, unity and fullness, a reference to a pre-symbolic 
real which most political projects aspire to bring back. (52)  
The problem, however, lies in the fact that they provide a specific ideological 
perspective, which is always already limited and is only a misrepresentation of the Real. 
Ideology is incomplete because it “functions on the level of the signifier” (McGowan, 
Real Gaze 36). The signifier gives ideology a paradoxical nature because, while it 
provides ideology with “power to constitute identity, to provide the totality of identities 
that the subject can possibly adopt,” yet “it also limits the ability of ideology to create a 
social reality complete unto itself. Every system of signification—and thus every 
ideology—is beset by lack, lacking what exists beyond the signifier” (36). The fantasy 
provided by such perspectives gives us only a shadow of the real enjoyment we seek. 
That is why the divided subject finds only an imaginary relief from her or his essential 




If the human condition is marked by a quest for a lost/impossible 
enjoyment, fantasy offers the promise of an encounter with this precious 
jouissance, an encounter that is fantasised as covering over the lack in the 
Other and, consequently, as filling the lack in the subject. (46)  
Fantasy, however, does not provide the key to total enjoyment, because such an 
enjoyment is impossible in the first place. If it is prohibition in the Symbolic that creates 
desire, and it is the Imaginary function of fantasy that brings subjects an illusory 
completion, then how can subjects make a significant change to their conditions? Maybe 
in the Real. 
The Real is one of the most elusive, complicated terms in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis because of its paradoxical nature: it is nothing and everything since it 
does not exist, but it is that in which “[t]here is no absence” (Lacan, Ego in Freud’s 
Theory 313). The simplest definition of the Real is that it is a fullness, a state of non-lack, 
which is, at the same time, impossible since, as Lacan clarifies, it “resists symbolization” 
(Freud’s Papers 66). That is why Lacan uses the term “ex-sistence” to describe it 
because it exists beyond or outside the Imaginary and the Symbolic (Heath 55). Ironic as 
it may seem, the Real, while being impossible, occurs to us in our phenomenal world, in 
our daily life. As Alenka Zupančič points out, “the impossibility of the Real does not 
prevent it from having effect in the realm of the possible” (235). Or, as Yannis 
Stavrakakis puts it, “Although it is impossible to touch the real, it is possible to encircle 
its impossibility, exactly because this impossibility is always emerging within a 
symbolization” (83). However, the function of the Real is different from the Symbolic. 




formations fluctuate” but “an obstacle” that displaces every center (Puppet and Dwarf 
67). In fact, the Real uncovers “precisely what is excluded from our reality” (Leader and 
Groves 61) because our perception is shaped by language or the Symbolic Order. Reality 
appears as an obstacle to the Real; it serves as a suppressive force that splits the subject, 
so that any reunion with the Real seems impossible. Unlike the Imaginary, in which the 
subject fantasizes about satisfaction, and therefore moves in line with, and confirms the 
ideological social order (or the Symbolic), in the Real, as Todd McGowan points out, 
things move differently:  
Real enjoyment occurs when the subject abandons the security of its 
symbolic identity and thereby breaks from the constraints of the symbolic 
order. In this enjoyment, the rules of the symbolic game cease to apply. 
The subject neither obeys nor disobeys: she/he enjoys through a disinterest 
in these prevailing rules. Thus, enjoyment in the Real is a radical 
experience, but at the same time it is necessarily traumatic because it 
leaves the subject without any ground on which to stand. (End of 
Dissatisfaction 70) 
Such a traumatic enjoyment is in fact a “partial enjoyment” as it happens in the Real and 
as it breaks the links of the subject to “the symbolic Law” (69). This partial enjoyment is 
not the same as the limited pleasure we take as a regulation of the pleasure principle. On 
the contrary, as McGowan continues, “In the experience of partial enjoyment, the subject 
enjoys its own lack without feeling this lack as a deprivation” (195). 
If we want to imagine the Real, we might need to think about a time in which 




was no language and consequently, no Symbolic Order (Fink, Lacanian Subject 24). The 
Real then was simply killed when language arrived. Today, if we want to conceive the 
Real, we should consider the infant’s body, before it comes under the control of the 
Symbolic Order, before “it is subjected to toilet training and instructed in the ways of the 
world” (24). Once the baby passes through phases of socialization, “the body is 
progressively written or overwritten with signifiers; pleasure is localized in certain zones, 
while other zones are neutralized by the word and coaxed into compliance with social, 
behavioral norms” (24). Before this process happens, there was once “one unbroken 
erogenous zone” with no privileged areas (24). The Symbolic (in the form of language), 
then, outweighs the Real. Language is thus synonymous with existence because anything 
that is not uttered in language, does not exist. As Fink points out in The Lacanian 
Subject, “language brings things into existence (makes them part of human reality), 
things which had no existence prior to being ciphered, symbolized, or put into words” 
(25). The absence of the Real is synonymous with a narrow, ideological thinking because 
the reality constructed by language is a product of the social group to which the 
individual belongs. In other words, “Every person’s reality differs by the mere fact that 
every cultural and religious group, subculture, family, and set of friends develops its own 
words, expressions, and idiosyncratic meanings” (26).  
The Real is non-existent in our reality. This fact, however, does not mean that the 
Real is dead; rather, it exists outside our own reality. To make it even more ironic, the 
Real is a condition for the Symbolic to exist, yet it a threat for its stability. In Sean 
Homer’s words, the Real is “the unknown that exists at the limit of this socio-symbolic 




supports our social reality – the social world cannot exist without it – but it also 
undermines that reality” (81). As Lacan himself confirms, “the real is beyond…[and] 
behind the automaton” (Four Fundamental Concepts 53-54). By automaton, Lacan 
means the signifying chain, as against what he calls Tuché or “the encounter with the 
real” (53).  
The Real, as mentioned above, does not disappear, forever; it resurfaces in 
specific moments, such as in trauma or dreams. Richard Boothby points out that while 
“the real escapes all representation […] its indeterminate force may be encountered in the 
experience of the uncanny or evidenced in the effects of the trauma” (12). The Real of 
trauma “returns in a sense in the form of a center of gravity around which the symbolic 
order is condemned to circle, without ever being able to hit it” (Fink, Lacanian Subject 
28). This return results in an impossible situation, an unusual representation, or an 
impasse which devastates the normal way of things happening. As Fink indicates, “If the 
real finds a signifier, that signifier must be operating in a way that is highly unusual. For 
the signifier generally replaces, crosses out, and annihilates the real; it signifies a subject 
to another signifier, but it does not signify the real as such” (Lacanian Subject 115). 
Trauma is part and parcel of the cinema of Christopher Nolan. It appears as an encounter, 
which exceeds the limits of the subject; in other words, it is that which is repeated in the 
psyche of the subjects in a way that it seems beyond their control. The traumatic 
encounter in Nolan’s films appears in the form of an unexpected death (in almost all of 
his films), a natural disaster (Interstellar), or chaos (The Dark Knight). It is in such 
moments that we should expect the encounter with the gaze, an encounter that reveals the 




The return of the Real creates a weird representation of the Symbolic. It is 
perhaps here that Lacan’s view of subjectivity is to be differentiated from a 
constructionist such as Althusser. Louis Althusser (1918-1990), in “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatus,” provides a pessimist version of Lacan by indicating that 
“ideology is eternal” and “an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is 
born” (175-76). He reiterates that through “interpellation or hailing” ideology surrounds 
the subject forever, and therefore, there remains no hope for breaking the rules of 
ideology (174). Lacan’s notion of the Real, on the other hand, creates a chance to 
challenge the status quo of society in order to emancipate subjects. That is why 
Stavrakakis calls Lacan a “real-ist” (69) because of the radical positioning of the Real as 
opposed to the Imaginary and the Symbolic in the triad of subjectivity. Lacan’s real-ism, 
however, as Stavrakakis indicates, is 
alien to all other standard versions of epistemological realism in the sense 
that this real is not the ultimate referent of signification, it is not something 
representable, but exactly the opposite, the impossible which dislocates 
reality from within. The real does not exist in the sense of being 
adequately represented in reality; its effects however are disrupting and 
changing reality, its consequences are felt within the field of 
representation (69).  
The effects of the Real, to reiterate, are felt in our everyday life. While the Imaginary 
Order, through the support of the Symbolic, attempts to create the illusion of self-mastery 
for the subject, the Real interrupts such a continuous stream through anxiety and trauma. 




no direct engagement and no positive characterization but is encountered only in the 
negation of the imaginary” (149). The Real, Boothby continues, “intrudes traumatically 
upon the subject from beyond the battery of representations like a force from outside the 
psychical system” (294). Boothby provides us with coordinates of the Real when he 
indicates that it could be witnessed “only in the misalignments, dislocations, and 
catastrophes (in the mathematical sense of the term) of the structures of representation” 
(295). In fact, the Real acts as an absent cause. As Žižek puts it, “The paradox of the 
Lacanian Real, then, is that it is an entity which, although it does not exist […], has a 
series of properties - it exercises a certain structural causality, it can produce a series of 
effects in the symbolic reality of subjects” (Sublime Object 183).  
Slavoj Žižek, in elaborating on Hitchcockian films, provides us with several ways 
through which we can feel the presence of the Real in cinema. The famous MacGuffin in 
Hitchcock, for example, is a non-existent object, as we never see but only hear about it. It 
serves as a trick “to set the story in motion,” as something that “must seem to be of vital 
importance” for the characters (Sublime Object 183). In other words, the Hitchcockian 
MacGuffin is an absent cause since, while it doesn’t even exist, it acts as a driving force, 
a propeller of the action of the film. In Nolan’s Interstellar, the others, who seem to be 
watching our planet from somewhere in the outer space, have an analogous role: they do 
not exist but initiate the interstellar mission.  
For Žižek, there are other ways in which one can see the emergence of the Real in 
film. One is through an object which serves as a means of “exchange circulating among 
subjects, serving as a kind of guarantee, pawn, on their symbolic relationship” (Sublime 




sides of a pole, is actually “a leftover of the Real,” but it has a positive function because it 
restores the symbolic structure (207). The third way in which an object represents the 
Real could be identified in Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963). In this film, as Žižek clarifies, 
the birds have “a massive, oppressive material presence,” which is to be seen as an 
“imaginary objectification of the Real” (209). They are always a stain in the scene and 
undermine the spectator’s seeming mastery of the image. In Nolan’s Interstellar, the Dust 
which is an all-encompassing, devouring, inscrutable object is of this third kind of the 
manifestation of the Real. The Dust not only blurs the view, but also causes the trauma 
that triggers a mission to the outer space.  
The arrival of the Real is simultaneous with a twisted, disjointed Symbolic. In 
other words, as Žižek says, the Real is “a cause […] which is present only in a series of 
effects, but always in a distorted, displaced way” (Sublime Object 184). Because of some 
certain features, Slavoj Žižek considers the Lacanian Real as “a sublime object,” which is 
“an embodiment of the lack in the Other, in the symbolic order” (192). For Žižek, the 
sublime object has one significant feature: 
The sublime object is an object which cannot be approached too closely: if 
we get too near it, it loses its sublime features and becomes an ordinary 
vulgar object - it can persist only in an interspace, in an intermediate state, 
viewed from a certain perspective, half-seen. If we want to see it in the 
light of day, it changes into an everyday object, it dissipates itself, 
precisely because in itself it is nothing at all. (192) 
The sublime object of the Real is crystalized, or at least felt in the Symbolic world 




In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan elaborates on the 
term anamorphosis by talking about a painting titled The Ambassadors by the German 
and Swiss artist, Hans Holbein the Younger (1497-1543). In this painting, there are two 
ambassadors, one in secular and the other in clerical attire, at the court of Henry VIII. 
There are also a number of objects symbolizing art, science, wealth, and other worldly 
values of the Renaissance. Until now, we may think that we are in control of the look as 
everything seems clear to the eyes. Suddenly we notice that there is also a distorted object 
in the picture which could not be recognized by looking directly. It is only by looking 
from a specific angle that this “magical floating object” turns out to be a skull staring at 
us (92). As Lacan clarifies, the inverted skull “is a use…of the geometral dimension of 
vision in order to capture the subject” (92). It represents the split subject, or, in Lacan’s 
words, “the annihilated subject” since it “reflects our own nothingness, in the figure of 
the death’s head” (92). As Margaret Iversen points out, the skull in the painting stands for 
“the blind spot in conscious perception”; in other words, “The real, in the scopic field, is 
formed when vision is split between conscious sight and what is expelled” (7). The Real 
in this respect is “the disavowed X on account of which our vision of reality is 
anamorphically distorted” (Žižek, Puppet and Dwarf 75). This sudden realization of the 
lack in our understanding is precisely the trauma of the Real. And, the function of 
anamorphosis is to invert the perspective to show us that the Real is always there to 
undercut the Symbolic. Therefore, it is possible to see the Real happen through 
distortions in the Symbolic, since, as Žižek says, “the Real intervenes through 
anamorphosis” (75).  




Here, in our delineation of the term anamorphosis, the notion of gaze is of pivotal 
significance. In order to shape his own version of the gaze, Lacan adopted the theories of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). As mentioned in 
section 1.2, Descartes, ocularcentric as he was, prioritized vision over all other senses 
because he believed that sight would give a direct, clear exploration of the external world. 
Sartre “posited a radical break between sight and consciousness” by claiming that one’s 
self “is constituted by the gaze of the other” (Jay 288). Sartre differentiates between the 
eye and the look in Being and Nothingness, when he points out that 
If I apprehend the look, I cease to perceive the eyes […] It is never when 
eyes are looking at you that you can find them beautiful or ugly, that you 
can remark on their color. The Other’s look hides his eyes; he seems to go 
in front of them. This illusion stems from the fact that eyes as objects of 
my perception remain at a precise distance […] whereas the look is upon 
me without distance while at the same time it holds me at a distance […] 
(258)  
The gaze, for Sartre, is an intersubjective entity in the world of objects. In other words, 
when I, as a subject, become conscious of the fact that another subject is looking at me, 
my existence is being threatened: 
The look which the eyes [of the Other] manifest, no matter what kind of 
eyes they are is a pure refence to myself. What I apprehend immediately 
when I hear the branches crackling behind me is not that there is someone 




occupy a place and that I can not in any case escape from the space in 
which I am without defence—in short, that I am seen. (259) 
When the subject discovers that she or he is being-looked-at, she or he experiences 
shame; in a way, she or he loses her or his freedom. Unlike Sartre, Lacan’s notion of the 
gaze does not require intersubjective relations. As he puts it, 
A gaze surprises him [Sartre] in the function of voyeur, disturbs him, 
overwhelms him and reduces him to a feeling of shame. The gaze in 
question is certainly the presence of others as such. But does this mean 
that originally it is in the relation of subject to subject, in the function of 
the existence of others as looking at me, that we apprehend what the gaze 
really is? (Four Fundamental Concepts 84) 
What makes Sartre different from Lacan is that he equates the gaze with looking while 
Lacan reiterates that the gaze is not the same as the look:  
The gaze sees itself—to be precise, the gaze of which Sartre speaks, the 
gaze that surprises me and reduces me to shame, since this is the feeling 
he regards as the most dominant. The gaze I encounter […] is, not a seen 
gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other. (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 84) 
For Lacan, the location of the gaze is not simply in the eyes of the subject but in the 
object. In Dylan Evans’ words, “When the subject looks at an object, the object is always 





By indicating that the gaze is not visible, Lacan seems to be closer to Merleau-
Ponty in his understanding of this term. Both Lacan and Merleau-Ponty believe in “the 
pre-existence” of the gaze: “I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at 
from all sides” (Four Fundamental Concepts 72). There is a considerable difference, 
however, in their views when we examine them closely. For Merleau-Ponty, “there is a 
universal all-seer” or “an imaginary being behind the eternal gaze” and “the visible 
depends on the eye of the seer” (Quinet 139). Lacan, on the contrary, argues that “such a 
being doesn’t exist” and the gaze “is neither apprehensible nor visible, a blind gaze which 
is erased from the world” (Quinet 139). The Lacanian gaze belongs to the realm of the 
Real because it is not identifiable in the phenomenal world. Lacan provides us with a 
definition of the gaze, which specifies the fact that the gaze is not equal to the look: “In 
our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and 
ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from 
stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it—that is we call the gaze” (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 73). The gaze, therefore, is not discernible to the eye. 
Nevertheless, what determines the subject “in the visible” is the gaze located outside: 
“the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied” and “I [as the subject] am 
photo-graphed” (Four Fundamental Concepts 106). This instrument does not see the 
subject because it is blind.  
In elaborating on the concept of the gaze, Lacan focuses on the art of painting. He 
points out that in every picture, there is always a trace of the painter’s gaze. The painter, 
does not simply want “to be looked at”; rather, he “gives something for the eye to feed 




as one lays down one’s weapons” (Four Fundamental Concepts 101). The anamorphotic 
stain in Holbein’s The Ambassadors, which subverts the viewer’s look because of its 
askew position, provides a sudden encounter with the gaze as the objet petit a. The 
function of anamorphosis is to challenge ideology as it provides an angle which breaks 
through the seemingly flawless picture that every ideology provides. As Žižek says,  
The criticism of ideology must perform a somewhat homological 
operation: if we look at the element which holds together the ideological 
edifice, at this ‘phallic’, erected Guarantee of Meaning, from the right (or, 
more precisely- politically speaking - left) perspective, we are able to 
recognize in it the embodiment of a lack, of a chasm of non-sense gaping 
in the midst of ideological meaning. (Sublime Object 110) 
In other words, it is only from one specific angle that we may be able to criticize an all-
encompassing ideology. It is only through uncovering the mechanics that produce 
ideology, that we are able to expand our perception of things. What Lacan elaborates on, 
however, is, in his discussion of anamorphosis, how art could serve as disruptive of its 
own logic, of its own illusion. As Iversen mentions in Beyond Pleasure, “the distended 
skull in the foreground should be understood as figuring for Lacan something about the 
nature of art in general. The suggestion is that art, the beautiful illusion, contains within 
itself a seed of its own dissolution” (11). In other words, even if a work of art, like film, 
creates an illusion or an ideological framework, it simultaneously incorporates the means 
of its own subversion. This last point is what makes the recent Lacanian film theory 




this chapter, we witness how the recent Lacanian film theory creates an anti-ideological 
approach towards watching films.  
 
 
1.4 Lacanian Film Theories and Ideology  
 
Lacanian film theory is no longer a unified, congruent body of literature. While in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, film was seen as an ideological apparatus repositioning the 
imaginary relationship of the subject to the network of power, from the 1990s onwards 
there has been a shift of perspective which introduces film as a means of ideological 
resistance. Joan Copjec, a key thinker of the recent Lacanian film theory, argues that the 
major problem with early Lacanian film theory is that it takes “the screen as mirror” (16). 
She objects to what she calls “Foucauldization” of Lacan, which she describes as “a 
misreading” that labelled Lacan as a “spendthrift” Foucault (19). Due to such a 
misunderstanding, Copjec says, film theory went into a wrong direction by considering 
“cinematic representation […] not a clear or distorted reflection of a prior and external 
reality but one among many social discourses that helped to construct reality and the 
spectatorial subject” (20). Inspired by Althusser’s rethinking of Lacanian Imaginary, 
which made it an essential part of the construction of the subject, early Lacanian film 
theorists, such as Jean-Louis Baudry, Christian Metz, Jean-Louis Comolli, and Stephen 
Heath, Copjec argues, posited that since “the screen is a mirror […] representations 
produced by the institution of cinema, the images presented on the screen, are accepted 
by the subject as its own” (21). Such an internalization of the image by the spectator 
would result in what they called the “reality effect” or the “subject effect” because, they 




and its world” and therefore, “satisfied that it has been adequately reflected on the 
screen” (22). What exactly happens in this case is that the subject identifies with the gaze, 
or “the point from which the image makes sense” (22). The subject finds that if she or he 
takes this position, then she or he would be able to supply the image with meaning. In 
elaborating further on the early Lacanian film theory, Copjec indicates that a 
misunderstanding of the place of the gaze occasioned the wrong direction: 
In [early Lacanian] film theory, the gaze is located “in front of” the image, 
as its signified, the point of maximal meaning or sum of all that appears in 
the image and the point that “gives” meaning. The subject is, then, thought 
to identify with and thus, in a sense, to coincide with the gaze. In Lacan, 
on the other hand, the gaze is located “behind” the image, as that which 
fails to appear in it and thus as that which makes all its meanings suspect. 
And the subject, instead of coinciding with or identifying with the gaze, is 
rather cut off from it. (36) 
In other words, Copjec believes, while the previous generation of Lacanian film theorists 
Foucauldized Lacan by indicating that Lacan’s gaze is similar to Foucault’s panoptic 
gaze, which includes an always-watching Other tracing the subject’s every step, making 
her or him attempt to be recognized by it, the Lacanian Other is actually blind, incapable 
of seeing the subject, and therefore, does not try to make her or him seek recognition.  
Copjec is right to point out that the early Lacanian film theorists were inspired by 
Louis Althusser, too. In his “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus,” Althusser 
considered Lacan’s Imaginary as culprit in the formation of every ideology. He 




reality—because “they do not correspond to reality”—and an “allusion to reality”—
because they attempt to “discover the reality of the world behind their imaginary 
representation of that world” (162). The mirror in the Imaginary is where an ideology 
manifests itself to the subject. Inspired by such a perspective, early Lacanian film 
theorists proposed that “the filmic image and the narrative of classical Hollywood movies 
were complicit in the formation of subjects who, captivated by the image, would identify 
themselves with idealized film characters and reproduce their social roles” (Iversen 7-8). 
In other words, since the spectators considered the motion picture as a mirror for their 
own conditions, they misrecognized such “a representation as a reflection of [their] real 
relation to the world” (Iversen 8). One such film critic was Laura Mulvey, who, in her 
Visual and Other Pleasures, elaborated on the similarities between screen and mirror and 
the fact that such a misrecognition would eventually result in both a forgetting and a 
reconstituting of the ego: 
[I]t is an image that constitutes the matrix of the imaginary, of 
recognition/misrecognition and identification, and hence of the first 
articulation of the “I,” of subjectivity [.…] Quite apart from the extraneous 
similarities between screen and mirror (the framing of the human form in 
its surroundings, for instance), the cinema has structures of fascination 
strong enough to allow temporary loss of ego while simultaneously 
reinforcing the ego. The sense of forgetting the world as the ego has 
subsequently come to perceive it (I forgot who I am and where I was) is 





What Mulvey was trying to affirm, through such an Althusserian framework, was the 
view that Hollywood cinema was simply attempting to strengthen ideological values of 
patriarchal society by representing an image of the woman as an object of male gaze.  
Another critic, whose work is in line with the theories of Althusser, is Christian 
Metz. He does not consider the screen as a mirror, as something in which the spectators 
find their own image, but actually as representing objects other than the spectator; in this 
sense,  
At the cinema, it is always the other who is on the screen; as for me, I am 
there to look at him. I take no part in the perceived, on the contrary, I am 
all-perceiving […] because I am entirely on the side of the perceiving 
instance: absent from the screen, but certainly present in the auditorium, a 
great eye and ear without which the perceived world would have no one to 
perceive it, the instance, in other words, which constitutes the cinema 
signifier (it is I who make the film). (48)  
Here Metz is attempting to point out that the subject inhales what she or he sees on the 
screen. The active role of the spectator is here happening through perception of what she 
or he is not, through voyeurism, again absorbing a certain ideology. What Metz, Mulvey, 
Baudry and other Althusserian film critics were trying to confirm was that, as Todd 
McGowan observes, “the spectator inhabits the position of the child looking in the 
mirror. Like this child, the spectator derives a sense of mastery based on the position that 
the spectator occupies relative to the events on the screen” (Real Gaze 2). This illusion of 




The purpose of the anamorphotic Real, contrary to what the Imaginary conducts, 
is not simply to run against the idea that ideology is all-encompassing, present 
everywhere. Rather, it proposes that even if we posit such an image for ideology, there is 
always a point of rapture. To quote Todd McGowan,  
To affirm the real is to affirm that the work of ideology never comes off 
without a hitch. Every ideology includes a point within its structure that it 
can’t account for or represent. This is the point, the real, at which ideology 
opens up to the outside. The real thus allows ideology to include new 
phenomena, and at the same time, it marks ideology’s vulnerability. When 
we call ideology into question, we do so from this real point within it. 
(Real Gaze 3) 
In order to identify the Real point of ideology, the post-1990s Lacanian film theorists 
posited a new understanding of the term gaze. As mentioned previously, the Lacanian 
gaze is not subjective; on the contrary, it is located in the object and therefore, it is 
objective. In McGowan’s words, the gaze is “an object, [since it] acts to trigger our desire 
visually, and as such it is what Lacan calls an objet petit a or object-cause of desire” 
(Real Gaze 6). In other words, the object cause of desire, as a “lacuna in the visual field,” 
or “the gap within the subject’s seemingly omnipotent look” is what makes us desiring 
beings (6). The little object, as McGowan points out, is irreducible “to the field of the big 
Other”; it is some kind of small other which “is lost in the process of signification and 




The encounter with the gaze as the objet petit a is what the recent Lacanian film 
theory provides with a special role: to act as the agent of the Real and resist ideology. As 
Todd McGowan puts it,  
Early Lacanian film theory missed the gaze because it conceived of the 
cinematic experience predominantly in terms of the imaginary and the 
symbolic order, not in terms of the real. This omission was crucial because 
the real provides the key for understanding the radical role that the gaze 
plays within filmic experience. As a manifestation of the real rather than 
of the imaginary, the gaze marks a disturbance in the functioning of 
ideology rather than its expression. (Real Gaze 6-7) 
The skull in Holbein’s painting is the best example of the distortion in the field of visible. 
Elaborating on the way that the skull is gazing back our subjective look, McGowan 
points out that as soon as the viewers start looking at the picture they become part of it 
because they are trapped in the objective gaze:  
The gaze exists in the way that the spectator’s perspective distorts the field 
of the visible, thereby indicating the spectator’s involvement in a scene 
from which the spectator seems excluded. It makes clear the effect of 
subjective activity on what the subject sees in the picture, revealing that 
the picture is not simply there to be seen and that seeing is not a neutral 
activity […] the existence of the gaze as a disruption (or a stain) in the 
picture—an objective gaze—means that spectators never look on from a 
safe distance; they are in the picture in the form of this stain, implicated in 




What McGowan specifies here has an important implication as we arrive at the 
conclusion that the location of the gaze is behind the object of art, or, the film itself. This 
gaze, which “is not the spectator’s external view of the filmic image, but the mode in 
which the spectator is accounted for within the film itself” incorporates “a blank point—a 
point that disrupts the flow and the sense of the experience—within the aesthetic 
structure of the film, and it is the point at which the spectator is obliquely included in the 
film” (7-8). The early Lacanian film theorists believed that, similar to the experience of 
the child in the mirror stage, the spectators discovered an illusory mastery, or simply a 
fantasized pleasure over the filmic object, while in reality, to quote McGowan, there is 
only “submission to this object” (10). The Lacanian gaze is not a site of pleasure and 
mastery, but actually a threat to such a stability. As McGowan puts it,                                                      
[T]he gaze is not the vehicle through which the subject masters the object 
but a point in the Other that resists the mastery of vision. It is a blank spot 
in the subject’s look, a blank spot that threatens the subject’s sense of 
mastery in looking because the subject cannot see it directly or 
successfully integrate it into the rest of its visual field [.…] Even when the 
subject sees a complete image, something remains obscure: the subject 
cannot see how its own desire distorts what it sees. The gaze of the object 
includes the subject in what the subject sees, but this gaze is not present in 
the field of the visible. (Real Gaze 11) 
What the recent trend in Lacanian film theory suggests is not to “gain critical distance 
from the scene of cinematic manipulation and view the cinematic experience with an 




barrier to the real” (McGowan, Real Gaze 14). While it is possible that the primary 
function of the film is to instill a certain ideology in the individual, it may also “open up 
the possibility of an encounter with the traumatic real that disrupts the power of 
ideology” (15). The solution to the fantasmatic space of cinema is not critical distance, 
but something else: “Rather than importing the attitude of everyday life (that of conscious 
reflection) into the cinema in order to disrupt its fascinating spell, we should export our 
attitude in the cinema (our openness to the gaze) to our everyday life” (15).  
The encounter with the Real has a traumatic effect for both the subject and the big 
Other: it discovers points of failure in the Symbolic that would let the subject gain 
freedom from all “the constraints of the big Other” (McGowan, Real Gaze 16). If we 
consider fantasy as “an imaginary scenario that fills in the gaps within ideology” in order 
“for the individual subject to imagine a path out of the dissatisfaction produced by the 
demands of social existence” (23), then the function of the gaze of the Real is exactly the 
opposite: to “[deprive] spectators of their symbolic support and thereby [force] them to 
experience their radical freedom” (171). McGowan indicates that the basic feature of this 
kind of cinema, which he calls the cinema of intersection, is to disturb the spectators by 
showing that neither fantasy nor desire gives the subject what she or he lacks. As 
mentioned earlier, ideology works through fantasy to fill in the gaps of its own lack and 
provide the subject with an imaginary satisfaction. In the cinema of separation, however, 
McGowan points out, while we may see this “fantasmatic dimension,” we can 
simultaneously witness the disruption of such an ideological view through uncovering 
“the traumatic excess that is central to the ideology and that ideology cannot publicly 




perception could be viewed in various ways: “as the obscene activity that accompanies 
the functioning of symbolic authority, the enjoyment that authority figures derive from 
the exercise of their authority; and, subsequently, as the unspoken enjoyment that stains 
our everyday social interactions” (42).  
While the Althusserian theory posits that ideology always succeeds in the 
interpellation of subjects, and there is no way to escape this necessity, the recent 
Lacanian theorists point out that it is possible that ideology fails at certain points. The 
cinema of intersection provides two separate paths for fantasy and desire to ultimately 
show that none of which would lead to the lost object of desire. By doing so, the cinema 
of intersection provides an encounter with the Real. As McGowan clarifies, this 
encounter occurs when  
we experience the absence in the Other in a privileged way. Hence, rather 
than producing dependence, the cinema of intersection produces an 
experience of freedom. The encounter with the real is the encounter with 
the Other’s failure, and this encounter traumatizes the subject because it 
deprives the subject of support in the Other. The subject derives its 
symbolic identity from the Other, and as a result, the encounter with the 
Other’s lack leaves the subject without any sense of identity. (Real Gaze 
175) 
This liberating factor is what the cinema of intersection, or the cinema of the Real makes 
happen: it provides the spectator with freedom from the constraints of ideological 
perception by targeting the grounds on which she or he stands. Every ideology has certain 




Transgressing beyond those borders produces an impossible situation which 
would traumatize the subject. The eventual outcome, however, may make such a trauma a 
priceless experience:  
The only way to break from the controlling logic of the ideology is to 
reject the possibilities that it presents and opt for the impossible. The 
impossible is impossible within a specific ideological framework, and the 
act of accomplishing the impossible has the effect of radically 
transforming the framework [.…] By facilitating an encounter with the 
gaze, the cinema of intersection encourages the spectator to identify with 
this object. Though other forms of cinema push the subject in the direction 
of freedom, it is only the cinema of intersection that emphasizes 
identification with the impossible object. In doing so, this cinema allows 
the subject to grasp its own nothingness—to see itself in the nothingness 
of the object. The reduction of the subject to the nothingness of the objet 
petit a is the most extreme form of freedom available to the subject. It 
implies a rejection of the world of the Other and an affirmation of the 
subject’s private fantasmatic response to that world. To identify with the 
object is to insist on one’s particular way of enjoying at the expense of 
one’s symbolic identity. (McGowan, Real Gaze 177-78) 
As we shall see later, in the cinema of Christopher Nolan the spectators are 
provided with the subject’s quest for the objet petit a. Through the gaze of the objet petit 
a, one could find that it is impossible to get fantasmatic reunion with the object cause of 




the subject find what the discourse of capitalism promises (through obsession with 
objects). The path of desire in Nolan’s later films, however, doesn’t imprison subjects; 
rather, we can see more sophisticated characters who are able to manage the essential 
lack in their being.  
 
1.5 Nolan and the Irruption of the Anamorphotic Real 
 
There is a disturbing element in the cinema of Christopher Nolan, which stems 
from the fact that his films show the subject’s attempts to master a traumatic event. The 
subjects desperately initiate a mission to recover the lost object of desire but they don’t 
find it. In his films, Nolan prolongs the path of desire to ultimately show that, like the 
play of signification, it leads nowhere; desire doesn’t provide a fantasmatic moment of 
obtaining the objet petit a. Moreover, Nolan’s art is cunning in the sense that it misguides 
us, fools us, and, in a sense, lies to us, but then exposes its own lies. In other words, in his 
portrayal of the gaze of the objet petit a, Nolan perplexes the spectators by creating a 
hole, or a stain, in their understanding of the familiar world. These two elements (the 
encounter with the gaze of the objet petit a and the structural complexity of the plot) are 
the key features that shape the anamorphotic world of Christopher Nolan.  
The most recurrent traumatic event in the films of Nolan is death. Death is 
associated with the Real because, as something traumatic for the conscious subject, death 
is somehow rejected during the mirror stage. However, it resurfaces at certain moments 
in each individual’s life and destabilizes the Symbolic Order. In Nolan’s films, death 
appears as an overwhelming trauma, which significantly affects the subject’s life. The 




traumatic rape and murder of his wife. The accidental death of Angier’s wife in The 
Prestige initiates his impossible mission to obtain the machine of fantasies. In The Dark 
Knight, the death by explosion of Harvey Dent’s wife-to-be, Rachel, brings about 
massive changes in the second half of the film as Harvey doesn’t find a way to master the 
trauma. Cobb’s essential problem in Inception is to deal with the memories of his dead 
wife, who reappears in his dreams and haunts him until he eventually finds a way to deal 
with it. In Interstellar, there are certain moments when the deaths of certain people break 
into the narrative of the film, creating a point in which the subjects (and the spectators) 
are disturbed.  
In the films of Nolan, when the subjects undergo a traumatic event, they start a 
mission to deal with the experience. Here, the mise-en-scène plays a key role as it depicts 
certain objects that are critical in the relationship between the subject and the desire for 
the objet petit a. Leonard’s Polaroid in Memento, which photographs his victims, reveals 
how his vision is distorted by his desire. It is the object that visualizes and extends his 
desire for the impossible object. Angier’s Machine in The Prestige is a partial object that 
promises to be the one that fills his lack,6 but turns out to be an obsession that brings 
about his destruction. Harvey’s lucky coin in The Dark Knight reveals the obscene core 
of the law. It is this lucky coin that turns Gotham’s best citizen into a serial killer by 
erasing the boundaries between the good and the evil. The paradoxical Penrose Steps in 
Inception, that never moves up or down despite the illusion of doing so, signifies the 
deceitful path of desire. I would like to call this object the staircase of desire because, 
like desire, it never finds its destination. In Interstellar, the bookshelf creates the illusion 
                                                 




that there is an impossible Other, who watches and manipulates our planet. This 
bookshelf triggers the desire to know in Cooper and Murph, and, in a way, sets the story 
in motion by making Cooper accept the interstellar mission to save the world.     
The encounter with the traumatic event, as I mentioned earlier, triggers the desire 
to master the lack. The subjects, then, start a quest to find the object that fills the lack. In 
The Prestige, for example, right after his wife’s death, Angier initiates a mission to find 
the machine that would make him a better magician than Borden. Or, in Memento and 
The Dark Knight, Leonard and Harvey Dent start serial killings to avenge their loved 
ones. One can witness a thirst for jouissance in all these characters: they repeat blind 
attempts to get the ultimate pleasure that they are looking for without knowing exactly 
what they do really want. They cannot figure out that total enjoyment is an impossibility, 
a false promise by the Other. That is why they cannot find a way out of the loop of desire. 
In Inception and Interstellar, Cobb and Cooper (and Amelia, to some extent) eventually 
figure out the truth of desire and the objet petit a. They understand that moving from one 
object to another would not help them fill their lack. The key to such an understanding is 
to be obtained through the encounter with the gaze of the objet petit a: In specific 
moments, these characters realize that desire would not help them find the lost object of 
desire.  
This encounter with the gaze happens for the spectators, too. Nolan’s art of 
anamorphosis makes it possible for the spectators to find the truth of desire. One specific 
way through which Nolan provides such an encounter is through what I would call 
structural anamorphosis. As a temporal encounter with the gaze, structural anamorphosis 




spectators in control of the scene. Structural anamorphosis is a surplus that appears 
through crosscutting (or parallel editing). It is a common feature of Nolan’s films to 
present two or more sets of action in two or more interconnected plotlines. Therefore, 
crosscutting plays a key role in his cinema. Nolan usually starts by incorporating a scene 
which might belong to a different set of actions; in other words, the initial scene of the 
film is not really the point from which the story starts. This scene is a surplus that has two 
key features: first, it is a harbinger of the failure of the fantasy that the subject imagines; 
and second, it is a point that later reveals that the spectators were not actually in control 
of the filmic image. These two elements remind us of Holbein’s The Ambassadors: the 
subjects (those who look at the work of art) encounter a stain that not only highlights 
their nothingness but also tells them that their vision provided them with an incomplete 
look of the work of art. In Nolan, structural anamorphosis, as a stain or surplus, is a 
sequence or scene that belatedly reveals its significance.  
Structural anamorphosis (through crosscutting) is one way through which Nolan 
provides the spectators with the cunning function of desire. Nolan’s cinematography, too, 
has a significant role in presenting the spectators with certain moments to show them that 
they are not in control of the image. Specific shots in Nolan’s films provide us with the 
anamorphotic stain. For example, the sudden appearance of the Dust in Interstellar, is 
recorded in three shots. As Cooper and his son are in the middle of a friendly talk 
enjoying watching the game of baseball, the camera cuts to the baseball field. This first 
cut tracks the ball until a player catches it. In this cut, we can only see the lower part of 
the player’s body. As the camera tilts up, the player removes his sunglasses in wonder: he 




the player, shows the approaching gigantic Dust. These three consecutive shots introduce 
the Dust as a stain in the picture that both the film spectators and the people in the 
stadium were unaware of. Prior to these three shots, both the film spectators and those in 
the stadium imagined that they were in control of the scene, but the approaching Dust 
shatters this illusion. This sudden realization of knowledge, which shows the limited 
perspective at the core of the subject’s vision, is an essential element in the cinema of 
Nolan. It reveals that subjects are only partially in control of the picture they see.  
In the next five chapters, I will discuss Nolan’s films based on the framework that 
I have described in this section. My argument, as I have mentioned before, is that in the 
cinema of Nolan we experience the fact that the objet petit a doesn’t exist. In other words, 
the network of objects that shape the subject’s life in a capitalist society doesn’t lead to a 
definite destination. As we proceed throughout chapters 2-6, we shift from subjects who 
are unable to find the truth of the objet petit a, as we shall witness in chapters 2, 3, and 4, 
to those who are. Leonard Shelby and Harvey Dent in Memento and The Dark Knight 
start an endless killing of people in order to revenge their loss. They imagine that 
annihilating other subjects would help them regain the past. Also, in The Prestige, the 
basic problem of Angier is that he attempts to replace subjects with objects. After the 
accidental death of his wife, Angier starts a life of moving from one object to another to 
master the trauma but in vain. Even after he obtains the impossible Machine, he doesn’t 
find satisfaction. Cobb in Inception, Cooper and Amelia Brand in Interstellar, as we shall 
see in chapters 5 and 6, are examples of the liberated subject in the later phase of Nolan’s 
filmmaking. In these films, the subjects come to know that the objet petit a doesn’t exist. 




despite what contemporary late capitalism suggest, would not provide them with the 
object of their fantasies. Therefore, in our chronological discussion of the films by Nolan 
we move from the imprisoned subject of desire to the liberated subject who knows that 























Chapter 2: The Loop of Desire in Memento 
 
 
2.1 Introductory Statements 
Memento (2000) was Nolan’s first venture into Hollywood. Before Memento, 
Nolan had made his first feature film, The Following (1998), which was produced on 
black and white film stock in London, UK. During his early period of filmmaking, which 
includes a short (3 minutes) film titled Doodlebug (1997), The Following, and Memento, 
Nolan starts with what I would call the local subject or the subject who is limited to a 
room (Doodlebug) or within a very small geography (The Following and Memento). Even 
in Insomnia (2002), which followed Memento, we can witness this geographically limited 
subject. As we shall see in Memento, Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) is highly dependent 
on mapping the small world in which he lives in order to know the spots to which he 
commutes and the people with whom he interacts. Leonard’s system, which includes 
taking notes and Polaroid photos, as well as tattooing some information on his body, is 
what helps him make sense of his surrounding world and map his desire.   
The subject that we see in Memento is the clear example of the subject of desire. 
He moves exactly in the direction of desire in order to get the objet petit a. Despite his 
attempts to move beyond the Symbolic Order, Leonard, however, doesn’t find the path 
out of it because he is unable to see that moving in the direction of desire would not help 
him find the lost object. Leonard is the subject of capitalism who moves from one object 
to another (by annihilating other subjects) in order to discover the fantasmatic moment 
that he has been looking for. In certain moments, Leonard (and the spectator) encounters 
the Real gaze, but he is unable to get the message; that is why he remains imprisoned in 




2.2 The Unconscious Core of Desire 
In “Memento Mori,” Jonathan Nolan’s short story on which Christopher Nolan’s 
Memento is based,7 the major character, Earl, who is later renamed as Leonard in the 
film, elaborates on the human mind in the same way as Lacan does. As we read the short 
story, we find that for Earl, the human mind is a sum of fragments, mostly under the 
control of the unconscious, and, therefore, the subjects are only occasionally in control of 
their thoughts:  
[…] Every man is broken into twenty-four-hour fractions, and then 
again within those twenty-four hours. It’s a daily pantomime, one man 
yielding control to the next: a backstage crowded with old hacks 
clamoring for their turn in the spotlight. Every week, every day. The angry 
man hands the baton over to the sulking man, and in turn to the sex addict, 
the introvert, the conversationalist. Every man is a mob, a chain gang of 
idiots.  
This is the tragedy of life. Because for a few minutes of every day, 
every man becomes a genius. Moments of clarity, insight, whatever you 
want to call them. The clouds part, the planets get in a neat little line, and 
everything becomes obvious. I should quit smoking, maybe, or here’s how 
I could make a fast million, or such and such is the key to eternal 
                                                 
7 During a road trip from Chicago to Los Angeles, Jonathan shares the idea of writing this short story with 
his brother, Christopher. A couple of months later, he sends “a very rough first draft” (Mottram 162) to 
Christopher while continuing to finish the story. The short story is published by Esquire in 2001, less than a 





happiness. That’s the miserable truth. For a few moments, the secrets of 
the universe are opened to us. (189) 
The idea of the subject as fragmented (or split), as I mentioned in the previous chapter, is 
what Lacan proposes to signify that the subject is significantly overshadowed by the 
unconscious. As Lacan declares, “Discontinuity, then, is the essential form in which the 
unconscious first appears to us as a phenomenon—discontinuity, in which something is 
manifested as a vacillation” (Four Fundamental Concepts 25). Leonard Shelby, the focal 
character in Memento, is one of the most concrete examples of the Lacanian subject not 
only in Christopher Nolan but also in the cinema of the early 21st century. Throughout the 
film, it dawns on the spectators that Leonard is mostly under the control of his 
unconscious, and dream predominates in his reality. 
Leonard’s essential problem, as we see the film, is his mind’s inability to create 
new memories because of a condition he calls “anterograde memory loss” or “short-term 
memory loss” (00:28:00-02).8 This is, as he claims, due to a blow on his head which he 
received during a traumatic event, namely the rape and murder of his wife,9 which, we 
are told, he survived, but his wife didn’t. While he cannot remember anything that 
happened after the incident, he can properly recall pre-trauma memories. Leonard’s 
condition forces him to create a system in order to remember. This “systematization” is, 
for Leonard, “the key to productivity, efficiency and success” (Gallego 43). He tattoos 
what he calls “vital” (00:10:51) information on his body, takes Polaroid pictures from 
                                                 
8 While the scientific name for Leonard’s disease is anterograde amnesia—the term that almost all other 
secondary sources use in their discussion of the Memento—he never uses it in the film. Leonard shows an 
implied resistance to the term amnesia when other people use it to describe his condition.   
9 Leonard’s wife (Jorja Fox) is unnamed throughout the film, but is mentioned by Nolan as Catherine 




people he meets (and captions them), and hangs a very large hand-drawn map on the wall 
of the motel room where he stays. Leonard’s only impulse for being alive, he says, is 
revenge. That is why he starts a non-stop serial killing of the supposed murderers of his 
wife. Since, however, he cannot remember if he has taken his revenge, the killing goes 
on. Leonard’s repetitive circle includes identifying a supposed murderer, chasing him, 
and eventually eliminating him in order to revenge the loss that, as he claims, ruined his 
life. Leonard, in this sense, is caught in the loop of desire.  
There is a derelict building,10 where Leonard brings the supposed murderers of his 
wife for revenge recurrently. Natalie (Carrie-Anne Moss) informs him that this building 
is “an abandoned place outside of town” (00:20:53-55). As Leonard has captioned 
Natalie’s Polaroid picture, “SHE HAS ALSO LOST SOMEONE,”11 and she would help 
him “OUT OF PITY.” Although because of his condition Leonard does not remember 
this isolated place when Natalie provides him with the coordinates, we eventually figure 
out that he has already been there, killing Natalie’s lover, Jimmy Grantz (Larry Holden), 
who “used to do bigger [drug] deals there” (00:20:56-58). It is ironic that Teddy (Joe 
Pantoliano), who makes Leonard kill Jimmy, later encounters the same fate when Natalie 
mesmerizes Leonard into believing that it was Teddy who murdered his wife. The 
building, therefore, appears two times in the film: the first time, in the second color 
sequence as Leonard shoots Teddy; the second time, in the last black and white sequence, 
when he strangles Jimmy Grantz and starts fantasizing about his next venture. The real 
chronological order of these two sequences, however, is the reverse, since one of the two 
                                                 
10 I have taken the term derelict building from the original screenplay of the film.  
11 Leonard uses capital letters to caption the Polaroid pictures. There is only one instance that he uses 
lower-case letters. This is when Teddy urges him not to trust Natalie: “Take my pen. Write this down. Do 




plotlines of the film moves backwards: Teddy is killed much later after Leonard throttles 
Jimmy to death. This building, in fact, connects the beginning of the film to its ending. It 
is no exaggeration if we name this building the repository of desire, where jouissance is 
crystalized. It is this place, located nowhere in Leonard’s map, like the unconscious of 
human mind, that conducts his actions.  
In both cases where the building appears, Nolan uses extreme long shots the 
moment that Leonard enters the yard and parks his car there. He doesn’t show us the 
route to the place, but simply casts us into it. If we consider the building as the realm of 
desire, and Leonard the subject of the unconscious, we may gather the extreme long shot 
as an analogous representation of the location of the subject: the subject is only a spot 
surrounded by desire. In other words, the extreme long shot gives us a picture of the 
Symbolic Order within which the subject is then seen in action. In the color narrative, as 
Leonard and Teddy exit the car, Leonard takes a look at another car parked in the yard 
(the car he himself once brought there upon killing Jimmy). There is a medium shot as 
Leonard stands beside the car, which is then followed by an extreme close up of his hand 
as he inspects the inside of the car and finds some bullets there. When Leonard enters the 
building, he takes a few steps (medium shot, then cuts in) as he examines a few Polaroid 
pictures holding in his left hand, and finally pauses right after he finds a picture of Teddy, 
until he reads the caption: “DON’T BELIEVE HIS LIES. HE IS THE ONE. KILL HIM.” 
This shift of perspective from one object (the building) to another (Polaroid photos) 
illustrates the movement of Leonard’s desire; that is why he imagines that he has finally 
achieved the eventual signified: “I’ve finally found him. How long have I been looking?” 




in which the subject’s visual drive makes him see things in a specific order. In other 
words, Leonard’s Polaroid serves as a tool which visualizes his desire. The spectators, 
also, fall in the trap of Leonard’s visual drive, believing what they see, because, after all, 
they are the subjects of desire, too.  
   There is an analogous instance of the building at the end of the black and white 
sequence in which Leonard strangles Jimmy to death. Here again, Leonard is shown as he 
exits the car and looks around (medium shot), then he goes to the door (tracking shot) as 
he curiously turns his head around to view the outside of the building. A few minutes 
later, as Jimmy Grantz car enters the building, the intensity of emotion is increased with a 
close-up of Leonard, paralleled with instant cuts to his murdered wife. Once again 
Leonard’s unconscious desire gets the better of him: in a few seconds, Jimmy Grantz is 
dead. The building, as a crystallization of the unconscious, represents a never-ending 
loop always returning to the same place, similar to the Möbius strip: Leonard finds a 
target, follows him, brings him to this place, and eventually kills him in order to avenge 
the supposed (or imaginary) rape and murder of his wife. This building, therefore, serves 
as the storehouse of desire, as it is never satisfied and is always looking for more, for 
simply continuation of its path, and the suspected victims signify the phantoms or 
fantasies of the objet petit a, as they never give Leonard what he wants, but they simply 
prolong his desire. 
 
2.3 The Objet Petit a and Transgression of the Symbolic Order  
Leonard’s constant movement in the path of desire is directly related to the play 




[t]he function of the pleasure principle is, in effect, to lead the subject 
from signifier to signifier, by generating as many signifiers as are required 
to maintain at as low a level as possible the tension that regulates the 
whole functioning of the psychic apparatus. (119) 
The domain of signifiers that Lacan relates to the pleasure principle applies to Leonard’s 
circular movement. In the repetition compulsion that we witness in Leonard, in his never-
ending cycle of chasing and killing people in order to avenge the supposed rape and 
murder of his wife, we find the quest for abundant jouissance. Leonard’s desire, in this 
sense, is blind since he transgresses constraints of the Symbolic Order and moves beyond 
the limits imposed by the pleasure principle. Leonard searches for people named John G. 
to kill them and to take his revenge. However, John G. is the signifier without a signified, 
reminding us of the endless play of signification. This is how desire works: it is a 
corollary of the non-stop working of language and the lack that it brings about. As Teddy 
tells Leonard nearly at the end of the film, 
I gave you a reason to live and you were more than happy to help. You 
don’t want the truth. You make up your own truth, like your police file. It 
was complete when I gave it to you. Who took out the twelve pages? […] 
See, it was you. To create a puzzle you could never solve. Do you know 
how many towns, how many John Gs or James Gs? (01:45:46-46:10) 
What Teddy says is probably the film’s best way of showing how signification (the 
glissment of signifier over the signified) works. The search for the killer is already 
meaningless because, as Teddy reveals, Leonard identified and eliminated that man a 




living murderer anymore. This absence of the signified is similar to what happens in the 
play of signification: while the one signified is no more present, from one signifier to 
another, there is a never-ending search to find it because, as Lacan confirms, “a signifier 
is that which represents a subject for another signifier” (Four Fundamental Concepts 
207).  
Upon the murder of Jimmy, Teddy arrives to see what happened. Leonard, strikes 
him on the head with his gun, and intends to kill him at the moment although this is 
delayed until the end of the film. Now the question is: why does Leonard allow Teddy to 
stay alive until a certain point in the film? He lets him live longer to fantasize his murder 
first because desire requires a story to continue its path: it triggers the wish to obtain or 
do something, but the very moment that the subject has accomplished the mission, there 
starts a new wish. The new wish is to be first fantasized upon until you reach a point 
where you could obtain the seeming object of desire. While there is no objet petit a, every 
object presents itself to be that which fully fills the lack of the subject.  
The best representation of the nature of the objet petit a is shown in the initial 
sequence of the film, which is photographed in reverse motion (see figs. 2-5). It starts 
from an extreme close-up of a Polaroid showing the dead body of Teddy on the floor with 
splashes of blood on the wall. On the left side of the frame, we see Leonard’s left hand 
holding this picture, located on the right hand side of the frame. He shakes it every few 
seconds so that the picture finds its final form and texture. Since, however, the sequence 
is in reverse order, as we proceed, the clear, complete image of Teddy’s body fades 
gradually until it loses its texture and only a blank paper remains. There is, then, an 




blood on it: The contrast between the object and the individual is important here as the 
former creates curiosity and mystery, but the latter clarifies things. It is only after the 
blankness, in a retroactive (reverse) movement, that it dawns on the spectator that 
Leonard has killed Teddy and this is his body on the ground. The resultant blankness is to 
be seen as the anamorphotic moment because it represents the gaze of the Real object that 
instantly reveals to the spectators how insufficient is their knowledge of truth from one 
moment to the next both in the context of the film and in real life. This fading of the 
texture and the resultant blankness is the reality of the search for objet petit a: as soon as 
you get what you want, it loses its grandeur, its sublime nature. It becomes trivial and 
meaningless as desire never requires a final satisfaction. It is this blankness that serves as 
the gaze, and therefore the embodiment of the Real. That is why the lost object always 
escapes Leonard’s reach. Desire does not remember, it is forgetful. It looks forward and 
defines its object as a mirage, as an illusion of a future to come. In this sense, desire is an 






Figure 2. Memento: shot 1 
 
Figure 3. Memento: shot 2 
 
Figure 4. Memento: shot 3 
 




The forgetfulness that accompanies desire has significant corollaries for the 
subject. For Michael McKenna, the precondition to “heal from the pain of loss” requires 
one to first accept the reality of what has happened to one in the form of trauma (37). 
Leonard is forgetful, though. That is why, McKenna continues, he is unable to grieve 
and, therefore, heal. McKenna goes on to suggest that “the same applies to the desire for 
revenge, which for Leonard can never be quenched” (37). McKenna indicates that 
Even the one meaningful task Leonard seeks to achieve, one that would 
have narrative structure—the hunting down and killing of his wife’s 
murderer—is undermined as something that could be meaningful for 
Leonard once achieved.  Suppose he does leave evidence to himself that 
he succeeded, with a tattoo reading “I’ve done it.” […] He is nevertheless 
easily able to wonder if he had been deceived, and so did not really do it. 
(37) 
McKenna, in the above-mentioned lines, is referring to a scene nearly at the end 
of the film, where Leonard is fantasizing about somewhere in future where he lies in the 
bed, with his wife’s head over the right, and the tattooed “I’VE DONE IT” over the left 
side of his chest. Nolan uses parallel editing to picture this scene of the daydream as a 
projection of Leonard’s mind while he is driving his car, with his eyes closed. The truth, 
however, lies somewhere else. It is not the simple fact that since he will not remember, he 
will not be able to trust his own knowledge about what he has done. In that daydream 
scene, Leonard’s face shows a look of apathy and lack of energy. There is no eventual 
satisfaction in his face because of the encounter with the gaze. This impassiveness results 




Leonard’s nightmare of the destruction of his web of desire? It is actually the working of 
desire and the objet petit a that undermines this goal. Leonard, while dreaming of a 
prospective revenge and a tattooed “I’VE DONE IT” on the left side of his chest, is not 
really looking for that final outcome, as this would devastate him, making his efforts, and 
even more, his existence, meaningless. He needs such a goal to maintain his fantasies. 
Leonard’s essential problem, like most other human beings, is his inability to understand 
the gaze of the objet petit a. That is why he is unable to answer the question ‘what does 
the Other really want?’ In a couple of instances the Polaroid provides an encounter with 
the gaze. Both situations occur as Leonard looks at a Polaroid of his own, which shows 
him smiling as he is pointing his right index finger at the left side of his chest. When 
Leonard understands that he has probably obtained what he is looking for, his face shows 
a combination of dejection and fear (see figs 6-9). In this sense, his face shows the 
encounter with the gaze because it shows the futility of his fantasy. However, Leonard 
doesn’t accept this bitter truth and continues his impossible mission.   
 
 
Figure 6. Memento: shot 5 
 
Figure 7. Memento: shot 6 
 
 
Figure 8. Memento: shot 7 
 
 





Leonard’s sustained desire, therefore, is juxtaposed to certain fantasies, like that 
of “I’VE DONE IT.” But this fantasy is perpetually disillusioned as a result of not 
knowing the precise location of the Other in which desire resides. As Todd McGowan 
says, “The objet petit a—the gaze in the case of the visual drive—motivates the subject’s 
desire, but this desire is not a desire to encounter this object. On the contrary, desire 
wants to sustain itself as desire” (“Vicissitudes” 34). Therefore, it is no exaggeration if 
we see this forgetfulness as part of the plan of the subject’s desire in order to resume its 
path. Leonard’s switching from one object to another places him precisely in the 
discourse of capitalism in the sense that he annihilates other subjects to reach the object 
of his desire. His inability to see the truth that the Other doesn’t exist makes him stick to 
the path of desire forever.   
It is excessive desire that makes Leonard’s life meaningful. As Raymond Martin 
points out, while it is true that Leonard “is not able—at least not in a normal fashion—to 
love, to help others in need, to make discoveries about the nature of reality, to rear 
children, to create most sorts of art, [and] to be autonomous” at least he has “a heartfelt 
purpose in living” (98). Martin is right that Leonard has some purpose: he doesn’t want to 
be a corpse or a vegetable.12 However, there is no purpose in his purpose. In other words, 
this purpose does not know any real destination. The basic question that the spectator 
asks when watching the film is the very essential question of desire: what does Leonard 
                                                 
12 In “Memento Mori,” Earl describes himself as “A corpse. A vegetable who probably wouldn’t remember 
to eat or take a shit if someone wasn’t there to remind you” (187). In Memento, the word vegetable appears 
only once and that is when Sammy’s wife tells Leonard that “When I look into Sammy’s eyes, I don’t see 
some vegetable, I see the same old Sammy” (01:03:32-38). If Leonard is the renamed version of Earl, then 
the metaphor of vegetable applies to him, not Sammy. This transference is due to a displacement that 




really want? The simple answer ‘to avenge his wife’s rape and murder’ does not qualify 
as the proper answer because when he decides to choose Teddy as his next victim, he is 
aware that Teddy is not the one he is looking for. Therefore, his search for new objects is 
always doomed to fail, and does not bring him an absolute satisfaction. For Todd 
McGowan, Leonard’s wild passion to find an eventual object of satisfaction is very much 
like capitalist society:  
Like Leonard, capitalist society believes in the possibility of the future. 
The waste it leaves behind in this quest, like the dead bodies that Leonard 
accumulates in his attempt to move on, is the inescapable product of the 
quest itself. Despite the vehemence of the effort, the traumatic past 
remains present. The future never provides the missing satisfaction—
neither for capitalist society nor for Leonard. Dissatisfaction with the new 
commodity will leave the consumer with an insatiable lust for the next 
commodity, and an inability to remember the vengeance of his wife will 
leave Leonard continually pursuing it. (Fictional 57) 
McGowan is right that the never-ending desire of obtaining something new is the essence 
of capitalism. As a member of capitalist society, Leonard is looking for the future 
regaining of the lost object. Leonard is perhaps as blind as capitalism. He doesn’t know 
that it is impossible to regain idyllic reunion with the lost object. Like capitalism, he 
moves wildly without knowing what would happen in the future. However, we should not 
forget the fact that he suffers from the traumatic blow that has disintegrated his life. This 
means that the very functioning of the Symbolic, on which the pillars of capitalism is 




Christopher Nolan confides the future of Leonard’s past to the spectator of 
Memento. To be more precise, in the first color sequence, in reverse motion, he places the 
answer right at the beginning of the film. The structural organization of the plot 
juxtaposes the past and the future and, therefore, puts anticipation along with retroaction 
in the same path, happening at the same time. To elaborate, the last color sequence, 
which is actually the starting point of the film, shows Leonard killing Teddy, the 
supposed murderer of his wife, and then taking a Polaroid photo of his body on the 
ground. The mystery is already solved. The next sequence, the first in black and white, 
shows Leonard in a motel room figuring out what brought him there, which is actually, as 
we find later, to avenge his wife’s death, whom he believes Teddy has killed. The initial 
sequence of the film does not initiate the story: it is its ending. This first sequence 
retroactively reveals that Leonard doesn’t obtain what he is looking for. The sequence 
sticks out as a surplus that belatedly uncovers the truth about Leonard’s desire. It is the 
gaze of the objet petit a as it reveals its inaccessibility. Besides, as the spectators reach 
the end of the film, they understand that they were not in control of the filmic image. In 
this sense, the first color sequence provides us with structural anamorphosis: a temporal 
surplus as the gaze. This temporal gaze reminds us of the stain in Holbein’s The 
Ambassadors: in this painting, the skull retroactively opposes worldly objects to death 
and reminds the viewers that they were not in control of the image from the start.  
The way that Nolan represents the subject to the spectators is a combination of 
subjective and objective shots. At certain times in the film, the spectators watch 
everything from Leonard’s distorted view, as in the case of the Polaroid. The Polaroid, as 




the direction of knowledge but actually in the direction of desire: the way that Leonard 
casts his look on other subjects (by taking photos) signifies the fact that his desire distorts 
the reality in which he lives (see figs. 10-11). At several other moments, however, the 
spectators look at Leonard from a distance. For example, in the black and white plotline, 
several frames are taken from Leonard in high angle shot from the top corner of the room 
(see figs. 12-13). The question that comes to the mind in the case of these shots is that 
from whose point of view we are looking at Leonard? This is an unusual angle which 
 
 
Figure 10. Memento: shot 9 
 
Figure 11. Memento: shot 10 
 
Figure 12. Memento: shot 11 
 
Figure 13. Memento: shot 12 
 
should be ascribed to the gaze of the objet petit a because it never dawns on us who is 
looking at Leonard from this weird angle. Such conflations of perspective disturb the 
spectators because they reveal clear facts about all other subjects: not only Leonard but 
everyone else moves precisely in the distorted direction of desire. It is exactly this 
distortion at the core of desire that helps the discourse of capitalism to instill certain ideas 




sense that it promises that commodities (or objects) will lead subjects to the eventual 
satisfaction that they desire. Capitalism promises that the final object, or the objet petit a, 
will be obtained if the subject sticks to the path of desire. However, the more the subjects 
invest in the Other, the less they gain because the Other is only a void opened by the lack, 
which is the essence of desire.  
 
2.4 The Big Other and Leonard’s Subjectified World  
Memento, as mentioned earlier, is the realm of desire in the sense that there is an 
intense display of the lack in the subject and a never-ending attempt to obtain the objet 
petit a. The lack, as mentioned before, is the outcome of the emergence of the Symbolic. 
The gaze of the objet petit a, on the other hand, resides in the Real. It is the Real that 
imposes a significant shock to the Symbolic Order in Memento. Based on the information 
that Leonard provides, because of the traumatic event of the murder of his wife, he 
suffers from anterograde amnesia, a condition which disrupts the very functioning of 
memory. That is why Leonard decides to proceed “not by memory, but by instinct” 
(00:32:32-34). We know that memory is a function of language (or the Symbolic Order) 
and, therefore, we may claim that for the post-trauma Leonard the Symbolic Order is 
fractured and disjointed. At certain times in the film, the spectator is presented with the 
fact that Leonard is practicing the passage from the mirror stage to the Symbolic Order (a 
solid Symbolic Order and not a post-traumatic fractured structure).  
In the way that Leonard makes sense of his grotesque body, and the way he 
interacts with other subjects one can witness that the subject is being formed 
ideologically. We are told that Leonard has survived the loss (of the object) and is now 




acknowledges his condition, and the need for creating a method for survival: “You really 
do need a system if you’re gonna make it work” (00:06:57-07:01). Before finishing this 
sentence, the camera shifts from a high angle shot of Leonard (from the top corner of the 
room) to a close-up of a paper note taped to his left thigh, with the handwritten message: 
“SHAVE.” This shift from extreme close-up to an unusual high angle from the corner of 
the room gets the spectator closer to the gaze of the Real because it contrasts a very 
limited perspective with an all-embracing gaze with an unknown origin.  
As we proceed in watching the film, we come to the conclusion that Leonard is a 
function of his notes. To make it more clear, his actions are monitored by the words he 
has tattooed on his body. In the fourth color sequence of the film, there is a scene in 
which as Leonard removes his shirt he notices these tattoos. The camera then tilts, and 
the spectator witnesses an extreme close-up of the tattoos written on the different parts of 
Leonard’s body. We need to consider that language, as the bearer of the Symbolic Order 
writes the subject, and this way ideology is instilled in the subject’s body and mind. 
Leonard, in this sense, is only a function of signification. His being is shown, therefore, 
to be highly dependent on his notes and tattoos. In this specific scene, the camera gives 
point of view shots of Leonard as he examines his body and inspects a piece of paper to 
double-check the information related to the person who killed his wife. Then, he walks to 
the mirror. When he looks at himself in the mirror as he wears his shirt, his focus is on 
something written on top of his chest beneath the neck: “JOHN G. RAPED AND 
MURDERED MY WIFE.” He moves back, as he is looking at the mirror, then writes a 
note under the picture of Teddy: “KILL HIM.” We can read the rest: “DON’T BELIEVE 




showing him talking to somebody through the phone. While doing this, he walks to the 
mirror and focuses on the tattoo: “JOHN G. RAPED AND MURDERED MY WIFE.” He 
is explaining his system to the individual on the phone (Teddy) and compares himself to 
Sammy Jankis as he says: “I have a more graceful solution to the memory problem. I’m 
disciplined and organized. I use habit and routine to make my life possible. Sammy had 
no drive, no reason to make it work. Me, yeah, I got a reason” (00:16:36-56). These 
words are very much like those uttered by the child upon seeing her or himself in the 
mirror; she or he is proud of the very fact that she or he has a separate, seemingly 
coordinated body of her or his own. Then, the camera pans from Leonard’s right shoulder 
to his left showing the tattoo, “JOHN G. RAPED AND MURDERED MY WIFE” (see 
figs. 14-15). During this conversation, in which there are extreme close ups of Leonard’s 
tattoos and medium close ups of his face as he inspects them, the spectator can clearly see 
how forceful is language in shaping the life of the subject. Every time that Leonard 
recognizes a tattooed message on his body he seems to have figured out how to take the 
next step. Briefly speaking, language tells the subject what to do next.  
 
 
Figure 14. Memento: shot 13 
 
Figure 15. Memento: shot 14 
 
Leonard’s tattooed body moves in the direction of the Polaroid because it pushes 
desire forward: the words on his body instill the idea of killing other people in his mind. 




emanates from and forms Leonard’s desire. The tattoos, in a way, tell Leonard that he 
should seek desire anywhere other than his own body and, therefore, confirm that it is in 
the Other that his desire resides. For the spectators of the film, Leonard’s tattooed body 
should also be seen as the location of anamorphosis because not only does it startle them 
but also it represents the subject of desire in search of the objet petit a. One could say that 
in this grotesque, tattooed body the Real gaze invites the spectators to focus on the 
subject of desire and the way his quest for the impossible object is thwarted eventually.  
Leonard creates his system of notes and tattoos because he finds memory 
unreliable. In the seventh color sequence, he tells Teddy, “Memory can change the shape 
of a room. It can change the color of a car. And memories can be distorted. They’re just 
an interpretation. They’re not a record. They’re irrelevant if you have the facts” 
(00:24:09-19). Leonard’s insistence on gathering the facts is what makes him a subject of 
knowledge: “Facts, not memories” (00:24:04-05). Leonard is Cartesian in this sense 
because he suspects almost anything except the most obvious facts. When Leonard 
suspects Natalie’s truthfulness over the case of Dodd (Callum Keith Rennie), she tells 
him, “You can question everything. You can never know anything for sure” (00:33:57-
34:00), to which he answers, “There are things you can know for sure” (00:34:00-34:02). 
He knocks on the coffee table and resumes, “I know what that’s gonna sound like when I 
knock on it” (00:34:05-07). He then picks up a glass bowl, saying, “I know what that’s 
gonna feel like when I pick it up. See! Certainties” (00:34:08-12) Leonard, therefore, is 
not just a subject of desire, as we saw in the previous pages. He cares for knowledge, too. 
However, the Lacanian subject, as we see the example of Leonard, sacrifices knowledge 




Memento shows, however, that we are not simply subjects of knowledge 
seeking to learn about the world in front of us but subjects of desire 
invested in this world though our desire. The conception of the subject of 
knowledge constructs a barrier between itself and its world: this subject 
never sees how the world takes it into account through the world’s very 
structure. Contra what the subject of knowledge necessarily believes, the 
world is not just there to be seen by a knowing subject but is already 
structured around the subject’s look when the subject sees it for the first 
time. It is in this sense that the subject is always a subject of desire rather 
than simply a subject of knowledge. The subject of desire invests itself 
and thus shapes what it knows; it distorts the apparently external world. 
(Fictional 40-41) 
Leonard’s attempt to represents himself as highly interested in the objective world, then, 
is always overshadowed by his subjectivization of it. His system of notes, maps, tattoos, 
and Polaroid pictures, while it seems to be in line with his purpose to records facts only, 
eventually turn out to be only his version of knowledge. In showing us all these 
strategies, Nolan is simply breaking the Symbolic into fragments, as these strategies all 
serve to register the subject within a certain law and order. The proper functioning of the 
Symbolic would result in no fragmentation, it is a unified image only. The spectators of 
Memento are, therefore, able to see behind the magical unifying function of the Symbolic 
in the real life when watching such a fragmentation in the theater.  
Leonard uses tattoos because, he believes, “if you have a piece of information 




answer” because “it’s just a permanent way of keeping a note” (00:10:46-56). Polaroid 
camera is used to record people he meets and places he visits so that future encounters 
become more convenient. He takes Polaroid pictures from Teddy, Natalie, Dodd, and 
Jimmy Grantz. These four people are the major network through which Leonard acts and 
finds meaning for his actions. It is these people who tell Leonard about himself and his 
wife, and it is they who shape his desire. In other words, the function of the Polaroid is 
clearly to channel Leonard’s desire to somewhere other than his own body. It does, 
therefore, make sense if, following Lacan, we claim that it is from the Other that we, as 
subjects, take our existence: “Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always 
constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects” 
(Evans 39). As Leonard confirms, the ego is always shaped in connection with something 
outside: 
I have to believe in a world outside my own mind. I have to believe that 
my actions still have meaning, even if I can’t remember them. I have to 
believe that when my eyes are closed, the world’s still there. Do I believe 
the world’s still there? Is it still out there? Yeah. We all need mirrors to 
remind ourselves who we are. I’m no different. (01:49:33-50:08) 
There are multiple instances representing Leonard’s attempts to shape his 
existence with recourse to some external image or a double. In the scene with Natali in 
the restaurant, he doesn’t prove himself to be so good when reflecting on his own mind. 
When Natalie asks him to talk about his dead wife, Leonard uses trivial words: “She was 
beautiful. To me, she was perfect” (00:19:37-38). That is why she tells him: “Don’t just 




however, is on the world outside: “The world doesn’t just disappear when you close your 
eyes, does it?” (00:19:13-16). This emphasis on the world outside signifies Lacan’s 
theory of mirror stage and the formation of the ego based on something outside the 
subject’s body. Not only does Leonard take his existence from an outside Other, but also 
he posits his own image projected in the mirror as a site of self-formation. Even in 
Leonard’s voice-overs that we see in the color narrative, we can identify a mirror-like 
significance because it is only in relation to such monologues that Leonard shapes his 
world.  
It is no exaggeration if we claim that the mirror plays a key role in Leonard’s 
orientation and adaptation to the world outside after the traumatic incident. While 
Leonard’s reflected image in the mirror is so much different from the one he experienced 
as child in the mirror stage, it still moves in the same direction due to the fact that the 
post-traumatic Leonard has lost his connections to the Symbolic Order considerably. The 
significance of the mirror stage in developing the Symbolic is crystalized throughout the 
film at certain times. Earlier in the film, Leonard, as he is explaining his system, sticks 
notes to a mirror in the room. He proves himself too much dependent on the presence of 
his own image located outside. Every time he finds his reflected image in the mirror, he 
pauses, ponders, and identifies with it.  
Even more, Leonard’s transference of his own actions to Sammy Jankis, the 
double that he talks about, reminds us of the mirror stage in which we create our 
personalities in connection with an image (of someone) outside our bodies. Moreover, 
there is a memorable scene when Natalie unties Leonard’s shirt upper button to inspect 




background. Natalie then moves gently and stands in front of him with her back onto the 
mirror. She removes Leonard’s shirt and starts to gently touch the tattoos on his body. 
The camera then cuts to a medium shot of the mirror reflecting Leonard’s image as he 
experiences weird mixed feelings of self-discovery. A few seconds later, Natalie shows a 
picture of someone she says she has lost, named Jimmy. Later in the film, Natalie, 
knowing about Leonard’s condition, sets him up to get rid of Dodd and Teddy. This 
scene represents how ideology works in general: when the subject is placed into the 
Symbolic Order, then everything moves automatically.  
Nearly at the end of the film when Leonard strangles Jimmy to death, he takes his 
clothes and, in a way, identifies with the murdered. Leonard’s desire to act both as the 
murderer and the victim reveals his narcissist impulses: in this scene, one can clearly see 
both aggressivity and identification. In other words, he wants to both kill Jimmy and, at 
the same time, take his role. Later on (it appears earlier in the reverse story), we see 
Leonard passes the night with Jimmy’s girl, Natalie. We know that for Lacan narcissism 
has direct connections with the mirror stage. As Evans puts, “Lacan thus defines 
narcissism as the erotic attraction to the [specular image]; this erotic relation underlies the 
primary identification by which the ego is formed in the mirror stage. Narcissism has 
both an erotic character and an aggressive character” (123). It would then make sense if 
we see Leonard’s killing of Jimmy Grantz as an action attached to his strong desire to 
define his existence in relation to the other.  
From what I mentioned above, Leonard identifies with some other as a double, or 
an alter ego, to make sense of his condition. At the same time, he believes in an outside 




McGowan suggests that since Leonard connects his actions with the existence of an 
Other, of an arbiter of human deeds, therefore, he is an obvious example of the 
Althusserian interpellated subject: 
Throughout the film, Leonard is unable to avow the lack of support in 
society for the subject’s ethical being. He believes that the meaning of his 
actions lies in social recognition, a recognition that will exist even if no 
one sees these actions or has knowledge of them. In this way, Leonard 
serves as the perfect model for an ideologically interpellated subject 
because his condition has stripped away all the seemingly natural 
justifications for believing in a substantive link between himself and 
society. (Fictional 63)  
But then, there is a question: If Leonard is really looking for social recognition, if he 
believes in an Other, then, why does he kill people without reason? At least, in the case of 
Teddy, he knows that he is manipulating himself to kill Teddy: 
I’m not a killer. I’m just someone who wanted to make things right. Can I 
just let myself forget what you’ve told me? Can I just let myself forget 
what you made me do? You think I just want another puzzle to solve? 
Another John G to look for? You’re a John G. So you can be my John G. 
Do I lie to myself to be happy? In your case, Teddy, yes, I will. (01:47:14-
48:30) 
Leonard is not a thoroughly interpellated subject. At least, he is a grotesque image of a 
subject living under capitalist system. Leonard’s post-traumatic character, without 




basic human feelings and proves to be a callous killer. In this sense, Leonard represents 
partial dysfunction of the system. In other words, because of the encroachment of the 
Real in the form of trauma Leonard could hardly be called a true projection of the 
interpellated subject. However, he is not to be seen as a liberated subject because his 
transgression only confirms his position in the path of desire. In order for a subject to be 
called a free subject, she or he should know the truth of desire and the non-existence of 
the objet petit a. Otherwise, transgression would only produce a more desirous subject.   
 
2.5 The Intrusion of the Real in Death and Dreams  
The incursion of the Real into the Symbolic is mostly seen through the 
representation of death, of its detestable and forceful irruption, specifically of a wife or a 
wife to be, in almost all major films by Christopher Nolan. As mentioned earlier, death, 
as a concept which is connected to the ugly side of human existence, is filtered by the 
defensive ego in the initial stages of the subject’s development. The spectator of Nolan, 
however, feels its overpresence. In Memento, Inception, and Interstellar the wife is 
already dead. In The Prestige, the wives of both magicians, and in The Dark Knight, the 
wife to be die during the action of the film. This uncanny presence of death traumatizes 
the subject severely by disrupting his apparently stable grounds. The dead wife or woman 
signifies an essential lack, or a void in the Symbolic since it imposes a threat to the stable 
worldview with which the spectator comes to the theater.  
In Memento, Leonard’s dead wife, he claims, has been raped and murdered. 
Throughout the film, he attempts vehemently to overcome this traumatic experience. 
Margaret A. Toth argues that the concept of home serves “as a structuring loss” in 




That is why, she believes, “it is fetishized, as in the scene where Leonard hires a 
prostitute to place his dead wife’s belongings around his hotel room in an effort to 
recreate the last moments they shared together” (79). If we take a close look at the 
sequence, we find out that Leonard is not simply trying to remember the last moments 
they spent together; rather, he attempts to remake the scene of the incident. He, in a way, 
attempts to repeat the trauma in order to master the resultant lack. Leonard arranges for a 
blonde escort to come to the motel room in which he resides. When the blonde arrives, 
Leonard prefers not to sleep with her. Instead, he asks for something else: “We just go to 
bed. You wait for me to fall asleep. You go into the bathroom and you slam the door […] 
loud enough to wake me up” (01:01:21-28). Before doing that, however, Leonard gives 
her a paper bag, which contains his wife’s belongings: a book, a hairbrush, a pair of 
underwear, and a teddy bear. He then tells her what to do next: “First I just need you to 
put these things around the room. Just pretend they’re your things and that this is your 
bedroom” (01:01:34-42). When the escort goes to the bathroom, she slams the door, and 
Leonard wakes up. As Leonard opens the bathroom door, parallel scenes of the night of 
the incident resurface in his mind. However, he doesn’t find his dead wife; rather, he 
finds the escort snorting cocaine. Leonard asks her to leave with discontent because she 
fails to build the scene of the incident very effectively.  
Leonard’s attempts to master the traumatic incident make his waking life like a 
dream. The starting point of the black and white narrative seems like waking up: in 
medias res. Here, there is an extreme close-up of Leonard’s chin as the camera tilts up, 
showing his face pictured like a silhouette (low-key lighting), with his voice-over: “So 




room” (00:02:36-42). Like this scene, dreams have no beginning, as they somehow 
position the dreamer in the middle of things. In the last scene of the film, also, Leonard’s 
car screeches to a halt in front of the tattoo parlor as he says, “Now where was I?” 
(01:50:23-24), which signals the end of the film. This is very similar to a scene in the 
middle of the color narrative, where he suddenly wakes up from a dream of the scene of 
the incident, with another voice-over: “Awake” (00:40:22). Such inserts signify the fact 
that the film has no reality but dream. If it is, as Lacan says, always in dreaming that we 
get closer to the Real of our beings and our desires, then should not we interpret the 
structure of the film as a dream, and therefore, as something that brings us close 
encounters of the Real kind?  
What makes the film similar to a dream is the parallel narratives that are 
juxtaposed to and run into each other without any boundaries. There are two major 
storylines along which the film proceeds: the color and the black and white. The 
representation of the unconscious is seen through the interspersion of the black and white 
narrative into the color narrative. The color narrative is the starting point of the film and 
much longer in length than the black and white.13 The color narrative chronologically 
starts when Leonard wears Jimmy’s clothes until his killing of Teddy. The black and 
white narrative pictures a period prior to the color narrative: it starts where Leonard 
suddenly finds himself in a motel room until the murder of Jimmy Grantz and joins the 
color at a certain point nearly at the end of the film. The color narrative moves 
backwards; in other words, the first episode in the color narrative is indeed the ending 
point of the film. The structure of sequences in Memento should be read this way: C23,14 
                                                 
13 Around 85 minutes of the film is in color and 24 minutes in black and white. 




BW1,15 C22, BW2, C21, BW3, C20, BW4, C19, BW5, C18, BW6, C17, BW7, C16, 
BW8, C15, BW9, C14, BW10, C13, BW11, C12, BW12, C11, BW13, C10, BW14, C9, 
BW15, C8, BW16, C7, BW17, C6, BW18, C5, BW19, C4, BW20, C3, BW21, C2, 
BW22, C1. There are also two points in the film which are of importance for these two 
stories to proceed. The first one is the initial color sequence (C23), which is in reverse 
motion and the second one is nearly at the end of the film, where a long sequence, 
starting in black and white (BW22) and continuing in color (C1), joins the two narratives, 
and this is the way the film eventually ends with the color narrative, the same way it 
started. In the black and white narrative, which is much shorter in length, Leonard, 
seemingly more conscious, observes things more objectively. The color plotline, much 
longer in length than the black and white, represents Leonard as somehow delirious and 
unconscious and seeing things more as a subjectivization of his experience. The length of 
the black and white as opposed to the color story is comparable to the ratio of the 
conscious and unconscious states of the mind. As I mentioned before, Lacan believes that 
we live an unconscious life with only occasional resurgences of the conscious mind. The 
fact that parallel narratives in Memento do not have the same weight, brings us to think of 
the film not only as representing the dominance of the unconscious over consciousness, 
but also as a picture of dream work. In other words, this structure reminds us of what 
Freud and Lacan propose about dreams: they work mostly as a function of the 
unconscious. Memento has a structure similar to that of a dream since it gives the 
spectator a storyline which is like a fuzzy puzzle.  
                                                 





This complicated structure of Memento, should not be defined simply as non-
linear narrative. It is a dream that highlights the unreliability of perception. The 
spectators of the film experience “a very unclassical formal mode” (Jackson 55) because 
Memento starts at the end and ends in the middle, thus creating a plot which disrupts 
them from any taken-for-granted knowledge. Memento privileges “ambiguity over 
certainty” (Molloy 80), which results in a disturbing experience for the spectators. The 
spectators feel even more disturbed when several cuts from the scene of the trauma 
constantly resurface in Leonard’s mind. Also, because of the specific positioning of the 
sequences, what happens to the spectators is that they temporarily forget what happened 
before. For example, when C23 is suddenly interrupted by BW1, upon the arrival of the 
next color narrative, which is C22, we seem to have already forgotten what happened in 
C23. As Nolan confirms, this forgetfulness is part of the plan to put the spectator in 
Leonard’s position: “One day I drank too much coffee and said to myself, ‘Well, if you 
tell the story backwards, then the audience is put in the same position as Leonard. He 
doesn’t know what just happened, but neither do we’” (qtd. in Winters). This structural 
organization of sequences dissolves the realist logic of straight timeline, and offers, in 
Lacanian sense, a Realist one, because it disrupts the ordinary logic through which the 
spectator watches a film. The filmic image constantly reminds the spectators that they are 
not in control of the scene.  
Structural formation of Memento is not the only feature that makes it like dreams. 
Throughout the film, we see how characters reflect on the erasure of boundaries between 
dream and wakefulness. For example, there is a conversation between Leonard and Burt 




Burt: What’s the last thing you remember?  
Leonard: My wife  
Burt: What’s it like?  
Leonard: It’s like waking. It’s like just you woke up. (00:08:58-09:12)  
There is another scene, of which I talked earlier, nearly in the middle of the film, where 
Leonard wakes up from a nightmare all of a sudden, with a voice-over: awake. Here, we 
see ten quick shots in less than seven seconds. These parallel shots picture the traumatic 
scene of the rape and murder of his wife. Considering the fact that even in Leonard’s 
wakefulness we see similar sets of quick shots of the same traumatic incident, we may 
conclude that there is no difference between dream and wakefulness in Memento. Nearly 
at the end of the film, Teddy tells Leonard that his life is like a dream: “You’re living a 
dream, kid. A dead wife to pine for. A sense of purpose to your life. A romantic quest 
that you wouldn’t end even if I wasn’t in the picture” (01:46:36-45). That is why the 
whole structure of the film is comparable to that of a dream.  
If Leonard’s life is like a dream, it is most probably because of displacement, 
which is a significant element of dream work, and also a shortfall of memory. 
Displacement of some events and people (especially in case of Sammy Jankis), which is a 
dysfunction of memory, is what affects Leonard’s story considerably. As Deborah Knight 
and George McKnight argue, “the story of Sammy is not what it initially seems to be, 
namely a memory of actual past events concerning Sammy. Rather, on reflection it 
appears to be a story that has displaced Leonard’s memory of the events concerning his 
role in his wife’s death” (159-60). Based on such a displacement, Knight and McKnight 




death by creating the story of Sammy Jankis, the man he exposed as a fraud” (160). In 
addition, when we read Jonathan Nolan’s short story, the term vegetable with which, as 
Leonard claims, Sammy’s wife describes his husband is what indeed Earl uses to express 
his own condition. Leonard conflates his condition with what happened to Sammy Jankis.  
The pure witness to such a transference and displacement is seen in one of the 
black and white sequences, where Leonard is giving a voice-over to what happened to 
Sammy after he killed his wife through overdose of insulin injections. In this sequence, 
we see Sammy on a wheelchair in a mental hospital. There is a very quick shot, less than 
a second, when Sammy is smiling at a doctor who is passing in front of him. The doctor, 
in this scene, stands momentarily between the spectator and Sammy, but when he is gone, 
it is not Sammy, but Leonard who is on the wheelchair (see figs. 16-19). While there is 
no other evidence in the film that Leonard was once in a mental hospital, in “Memento 
Mori,” Earl is shown to have spent some time there. That is why Leonard transfers what 
he himself did, namely murdering his own wife using insulin shots, to Sammy Jankis. In 
other words, Leonard’s mind manipulates part of what really happened in order to 
absolve him of what he did to his wife.  
There is one more scene nearly at the end of the film that pictures Leonard’s 
displacement of the case of Sammy with his own. As Teddy reveals, it was Leonard who 
performed the injection of insulin, not Sammy: “Your wife surviving the assault. Her not 
believing your condition. The torment and pain and anguish tearing up her inside. The 
insulin” (01:42:48-58). There is a quick cut to a scene in the past that shows Leonard 





Figure 16. Memento: shot 15 
 
Figure 17. Memento: shot 16 
 
Figure 18. Memento: shot 17 
 
Figure 19. Memento: shot 18 
 
“That’s Sammy, not me. I told you about Sammy” (01:42:59-43:02). A few seconds later, 
Teddy clarifies that “Sammy didn’t have a wife. It was your wife who had diabetes” 
(01:43:25-31). There is another cut, in parallel editing, to the scene of the incident, 
showing Leonard’s wife on the bathroom floor still alive. Once again, we come back to 
Leonard’s dumbfounded face in close up, but then there is a parallel scene in the past that 
pictures Leonard as he is doing the injection. Leonard tells Teddy that his wife wasn’t 
diabetic at all, to which Lenny answers, “You sure?” (01:43:45). The scene of injection 
then comes back, but now there is no insulin injection, as Leonard’s mind replaces it with 
simply him pinching his wife’s thigh, her telling him, “Ouch! Cut it out” (01:43:51-52). 
The camera then cuts to Leonard’s face as he tells Sammy, “She wasn’t diabetic. You 
think I don’t know my own wife?” (01:43:53-56). Teddy’s next answer shows that 
Leonard is selective in remembering things: “I guess I can make you remember the things 
you wanna be true” (01:43:58-44:02). What Teddy implies is that the manipulation of 




In this unconscious manipulation of memories dream has its own share. In the 
middle of the film, Leonard suddenly wakes up from a dream that repeats the scene of the 
traumatic incident. His dream shows only fragments: Leonard’s hurried movement to the 
bathroom door is paralleled to extreme close ups of his wife’s body on the floor. There is 
also a masked man turning his head to the right, and a crystal bottle that breaks into 
pieces upon Leonard’s falling on the ceramic floor. The lengthiest description of the 
scene of the incident is around 65 seconds starting from where Leonard awakes until he is 
hit by the second assailant and collapses on the floor, unconscious. “I was asleep” 
(01:18:41), says Leonard to Natalie as he is describing the incident. Nolan uses parallel 
editing to picture Leonard’s account of the incident. There is an extreme close-up of 
Leonard’s face asleep, using low key lighting: “Something woke me up” (01:18:44). 
Leonard stretches his hand to where his wife was sleeping, but he doesn’t find her: “Her 
side of the bed was cold. She’d obviously been out of bed for a while” (01:18:50-53). The 
camera then shows Leonard’s face in the dark, wondering where his wife would be now. 
He gets up, finds his way out of the room, until he hears his wife’s vague voice in the 
bathroom. The camera zooms in, as we see the crack underneath the bathroom door, 
where the light, mixed with moving shadows from inside the bathroom, is reflected 
outside. Anxious and frightened, Leonard runs towards the door, preparing his gun to 
shoot. The scene is shot in low key lighting and extreme close-ups. When Leonard hits 
the door open, he faces a masked man sitting over his wife’s body, wrapped in plastic 
bag. The camera then cuts to Leonard’s face showing a close-up of his face: extreme fear, 
with neck vessels protruded, mouth open with teeth grinding together, eyebrows up and 




the Real. He quickly enters to see what happened to his wife, but then a second man from 
behind smashes his head on the mirror, causing him to collapse on the floor. There is then 
a medium close-up two shot, looking down at Leonard and his wife as their heads lie in 
opposite directions: blood from Leonard’s head appears like a stain in the image. The 
camera then pans to the floor as Leonard and his wife disappear from the frame.  
What if there was no second man on the scene? Leonard once says that the police 
believed that there was no second man. We already know that, unlike what he claims, 
Leonard’s wife most probably survived the incident (or most probably there was no such 
incident), but died because of his mistake. What if this dream is only a displacement of 
everything so as to fulfill a wish? What if Leonard accidentally killed her wife, but he 
didn’t want to take the guilt upon himself? Therefore, we could discern two dream 
thoughts in the background of his dream: I killed my wife by accident, but I do not want 
to take the responsibility and guilt. The two assailants on the scene are therefore simply 
ego-identifications or projections of his unconscious mind. The first man, who sits over 
his wife’s body belongs to the first dream-thought: Leonard’s mind replaces him with a 
masked man to signify that it was an outsider, who killed his wife. Leonard’s mind, 
however, has another preoccupation: to absolve him from the guilt of murdering his own 
wife. Therefore, there appears a second man from behind, smashing Leonard’s head to 
the mirror. This is the true essence of dreaming: it is only a site of displacements and ego 
identifications. The one who suddenly wakes up from the dream of seeing someone dead 
(in our case Leonard) wakes up to continue his dream in reality: in his mind, he repeats 
the dream so that he could probably stop the incident: to master the traumatic incident. 




Fundamental Concepts 58). Leonard wakes up in the middle of his dreams to change 
what Lacan calls “the missed reality” (58), which is the guilt that he feels for the murder 
of his wife. It is in dreams that we may get close to the Real of our existence. To quote 
Lacan,  
The real has to be sought beyond the dream—in what the dream has 
enveloped, hidden from us, behind the lack of representation of which 
there is only one representative. This is the real that governs our activities 
more than any other and it is psychoanalysis that designates it for us” 
(Four Fundamental Concepts 60).  
Our psychic reality always escapes our grasp because we are under the control of social 
codes. This is what Žižek says about the true nature of dreaming: “what appears in the 
guise of dreaming, or even daydreaming, is sometimes the truth on whose repression 
social reality itself is founded” (“Freud Lives” 32). Leonard’s ego identifications or 
displacements in the dream are his subconscious attempts to hide the truth or knowledge 
of his Real existence. Filip Kovacevic points out that “It is exactly the anxiety of this 
encounter [with the Real], this trauma that precipitates the escape into the waking life” 
(84). As mentioned earlier, the desire not to know is stronger than the desire to know in 
Leonard. To view things retroactively, it would be enough to consider the initial scene of 
the film once again. Leonard has killed Teddy and holds a Polaroid photo of his dead 
body in his hand. It is only at the end of the film that the spectator, witnessing Leonard’s 
conversation with Teddy, discovers that the beginning of the film was an outcome of 
Leonard’s desire not to see objectively: he eliminates the one who wants to tell him the 




plot has been designed to move in reverse. This retroactive knowledge result from 
structural anamorphosis: the gaze as a temporal encounter, or a narrative component that 
only belatedly reveals to the spectators that they were not in control of the image.  
Noël Carrol argues that “telling the story backwards […] forces the audience to 
make sense of the narrative with heightened self-awareness” and this creates a “process 
of following the story […which is] conscious and deliberate” with the result that we, as 
spectators, “have to think overtly about what we are doing” (137). Contrary to what 
Carrol says, the relationship between the spectator and Leonard is not governed by 
distance or self-awareness of the highest degree. It is a vacillating position, both inside 
and outside of Leonard’s mind: Memento, to quote Todd McGowan, “makes it impossible 
for the spectator to escape the loop of desire” (Fictional 56). In doing so, Nolan is 
showing the spectator the reality of subjectivity, and the fact that like Leonard, the 
spectator may really want not to know. As Todd McGowan says, “By showing the 
spectator a subject of desire lurking beneath a seemingly perfect subject of knowledge, 
Memento aims at undermining the prioritizing of truth that derives from this later form of 
subjectivity, and thereby freeing the spectator from the trap that the cinema has 
historically perpetuated” (Fictional 66).  
The bitter thing for the spectator of Memento is that desire is massive, fantasy is 
incomplete, and the objet petit a seems impossible to locate. That is why Memento fills 
the spectator’s head with innumerable questions regarding Leonard’s life and motives for 
existence. In this sense, the spectators encounter a disturbing experience, both in the way 




The spectator’s lack of satisfaction in Leonard’s revenge separates 
Memento from almost all other revenge films. Most films of this type 
build up to the act of revenge and foreground the spectator’s enjoyment of 
it [.…] Memento denies the satisfaction of revenge by never allowing the 
spectator to know with any certainty who the correct target is or if there 
even is a correct target. As the film develops it, this uncertainty cannot be 
resolved with more facts. The facts that would provide the basis for 
revenge are missing because the film displays an active indifference 
toward them. (Fictional 61-62) 
Leonard’s life is a projection of repetition, of the impossible action of going ahead 
without progress, somewhat similar to the Penrose Steps in Inception, where there is 
movement ahead and above, without any advancement, or like the Möbius Strip of which 
Lacan talks abundantly, a surface with seemingly multiple dimensions, which, in reality, 
is a loop: wherever you start to move, you would come back to the same place. And, it is 
always in paradoxes that the Real is projected. The Symbolic, when encountering such a 
traumatic paradox, provides only a fantasmatic solution, which is doomed to fail if the 
spectators watch things closely. Because of the fact that Leonard is unable to see the truth 
of the objet petit a, because he is imprisoned by the discourse of capitalism that by 
moving from one object to another he would eventually fill the lack, he cannot see the 
lack in the Other, and that is why despite his attempts to reach absolute pleasure he 
doesn’t succeeded in obtaining it. In the next chapter, we shall see that in The Prestige 






Chapter 3: The Unconscious Core of Magic in The Prestige 
 
3.1 Introductory Statements 
The Prestige (2006) marks the shift from the local to the global subject in the 
career of Christopher Nolan. The film is vast in scope as it pictures the subject within a 
geographically larger environment, which makes it significantly different from Memento. 
The Prestige, which is based on Christopher Priest’s novel of the same name,16 depicts 
the life of two rival magicians, Borden and Angier, in late Victorian and early 1900s 
London and America. After the accidental death of Angier’s wife as a result of Borden’s 
mistake, they start an endless rivalry both in life and career, which ends only when they 
die. The film depicts the two magicians’ attempts to outdo each other in performing 
magic tricks as their rivalry turns into hatred and destroys their personal lives.  
 The central argument of this chapter is that the subject’s obsession with objects 
destroys intersubjective relations that are required for the well-being of the society. After 
the traumatic death of his wife, Angier starts a quest for the objet petit a along the path of 
desire. While he imagines that by obtaining the impossible Machine he would reach the 
eventual object of satisfaction, he faces death and disaster at the end of the day. Borden, 
too, sacrifices his body and his wife to find satisfaction in the realm of objects, which, in 
this case, is performing magic tricks. Both Angier and Borden do not get the message that 
objects do not help them get the real cause of desire. That is why, like Leonard in 
Memento, none of them find satisfaction by the end of the film. Angier and Borden stand 
                                                 
16 Christopher Priest’s The Prestige (1995) is the novel based on which Nolan bothers, Jonathan and 




for capitalism itself: they sacrifice everything to get total enjoyment, but they fail 
eventually.  
  Throughout this chapter, I will argue that magic has an ideological function 
because it hides the truth from the audience and keeps telling them to come again to the 
theater in order to find the object of desire. The spectators do not consider the fact that 
there is a point from which the unconscious of the magic is looking back at them. This is 
the point that hides a surplus, namely the Real gaze (of the magic), which is not visible to 
the spectators because of the veil that desire puts in front of their look. Here, the 
backstage of magic, as an ideological location, is similar to capitalism because it hides 
the preparatory process of production from the spectator (or consumer).  
Last but not least, I will consider the layered structure of the film as a 
manifestation of structural anamorphosis because it slows down perception by creating a 
non-linear story and hiding several facts from the spectator’s eye (thus prolonging 
desire), which are revealed only at the end of the film. It is only when the spectators are 
done with watching the film that they come to the (retroactive) understanding that how 
deceitful is the path of desire. I will argue that the anamorphotic image that Nolan 
provides for the spectators, should be adopted in real life to reconsider the relationship 
between subjects and objects.  
 
3.2 Magic Acts and the Annihilation of the Original  
In “Dialectical Clarity versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox,” Slavoj Žižek argues 




Christopher Nolan’s The Prestige are reminiscent of the Hegelian triad (thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis):  
Is this triple movement not the Hegelian triad at its purest? The thesis 
(pledge), its catastrophic negation (turn), the magical resolution of the 
catastrophe (prestige)? And, as Hegel was well aware, the catch is that, in 
order for the miracle of the “prestige” to occur, there must be a squashed 
dead bird somewhere. (286) 
Žižek’s ‘squashed dead bird’ is a reference to a magic trick in which a bird is literally 
killed so that an identical twin be presented to the audience under the name of the 
original.  
In Nolan’s The Prestige, the spectator of magic, like that of cinema, is interested 
in the replica not the original. The witness to such a return of the symbol for the original 
is seen in the sequence where a magician called Virgil (J. Paul Moore) performs an 
illusion. Virgil places a bird in a cage, which is shown in close up, and covers it with a 
shawl. For a second, the shawl consumes the whole frame, signifying that the magician is 
hiding something from the audience. The camera then tilts to Virgil as he raises both 
hands and, then, slams on the covered cage. Everything seems to have disappeared when 
Virgil lifts the cover, as there is no sign of the bird and the cage anymore. A boy, sitting 
among the spectators, starts crying as he points to the magician: “He killed it” (00:18:50-
52). His aunt, seated beside him, tries to calm him down by telling him that “He didn’t” 
(00:18:56-57). Virgil, almost confused at what the little boy says, takes a flower from his 
lapel and covers it with his shawl. When he lifts the shawl again, the flower has turned 




disappear, begin to clap, but the boy continues his weeping. The boy does not stop crying 
by saying, “No, he killed it” (00:19:06-08). When the magic show is finished, Alfred 
Borden (Christian Bale), here assistant to Virgil, approaches the boy with the cage in his 
hand. He shows the bird to the boy and says: “Look, see. He is alright, he is fine. Look at 
him” (00:19:17-21). The boy says softly, “But where is his brother?” (00:19:21-23). 
Borden pauses, smiles, and tells his aunt: “He’s a sharp lad, your son!” (00:19:27-29).  
Later on, when Borden goes to a room backstage, we see a huge number of birds, 
each with its identical twin. Borden puts the bird in a cage, saying, “You’re the lucky one 
today” (00:19:39-40), then taps on the top of the table in the middle of the room. A panel 
is opened and we see a flattened birdcage inside. He brings out the original (killed) bird 
from the cage, in an extreme close up, a scene which is extremely unpleasant to look at, 
and puts it into the garbage can. It now dawns on the film spectator that this is the bird 
that Virgil disappeared to amaze his audience with a replacement. The squashed dead 
bird is then the surplus, which is never visible to the eye of the spectator. Now the 
question is why all other people in the theater clap with joy, but the little boy’s eyes are 
filled with tears? It is this little child who, still in his first encounters with the Symbolic 
and language, is able to look awry and find the hole in the Symbolic. In the network of 
the Symbolic there is always a void, a nonsensical point which is impossible to locate if 
we look straightforwardly (the grotesque body of the dead bird). This void, which 
belongs with the realm of the Real, is not discernible as it is behind the object or act, 
outside the spectators’ vision, staring at them. The spectators’ desire distorts their vision 
and puts a veil between their vision and the point from which the magician’s art 




the Real gaze is staring back at the audience. In other words, the gaze, which falls outside 
the field of vision is at the root of the magician’s trick. However, the spectators miss the 
encounter with the gaze as they are not looking for the truth; rather, they are after the 
desire of the Other.  
Magic, in this sense, has an ideological function. The magician’s role is to hide 
something, to cover part of the reality in order to create a scene of wonder, a moment of 
fantasy. The Lacanian subject, as Žižek confirms, is looking for “identification with a 
specific form of transgression of the Law, of the law’s suspension” (Metastases of 
Enjoyment 55). The illusionist is able to momentarily provide such a moment of 
enjoyment and this fantasized reality is supported by the subject’s desire. As Robert 
Angier (Hugh Jackman) tells Borden at the end of the film,  
The audience knows the truth. The world is simple. It’s miserable. Solid 
all the way through. But if you could fool them, even for a second, then 
you could make them wonder. And then you got to see something very 
special. You really don’t know. It was the look on their faces. (02:02:26-
03:10) 
The spectators come to see the fulfillment of their desire, to obtain the impossible objet 
petit a, and the magician promises to provide that impossible object. However, what a 
magician does, under the name of real magic, is simply to sustain the spectators’ desire so 
that they would come back tomorrow to continue such a dream. Since the Lacanian 
subject is a split one, torn between knowledge and desire, she or he comes back to 
simultaneously know the truth about the magic trick and have her or his desire satisfied. 




to the play of signification, magic replaces the symbol for the original and keeps moving 
forward without ever providing the audience with the eventual signified.  
The magician’s mystification of part of the truth in order to create wonder is 
similar to fantasy film, where the laws of probability are simply challenged in order to 
bring a painless resolution to what desire necessitates. Nolan parallels magic performance 
with the way it is arranged offstage to highlight the function of desire in perception. The 
fundamental law on which magic is based is the fact that the audience doesn’t want the 
truth: the desire not to know is at work here. It is this desire to be deceived, to be fooled 
that governs the relationship between the magician and the spectators. As Alfred Borden 
notes, in Christopher Priest’s eponymous novel,  
The performer is of course not a sorcerer at all, but an actor who plays the 
part of a sorcerer and who wishes the audience to believe, if only 
temporarily, that he is in contact with darker powers. The audience, 
meantime, knows that what they are seeing is not true sorcery, but they 
suppress the knowledge and acquiesce to the selfsame wish as the 
performer’s. The greater the performer’s skill at maintaining the illusion, 
the better at this deceptive sorcery he is judged to be. (37)  
The spectators of magic, we witness, are “not really looking” (00:02:37-38) for the secret 
because they “want to be fooled” (00:02:44-46).  
What the magicians perform on stage in The Prestige, as Nolan shows, has 
another layer offstage, which functions as the key to the secret, or simply the unconscious 
of the magic. This unconscious space is where certain things happen that are hidden from 




reality, the magician, like a film director, provides the spectators with the finished 
product. He eliminates all the work that contributed to the production of his show. As an 
instance, every night, after the performance of The Real Transported Man by Angier, his 
assistants move the tank containing the dead body of Angier’s replica to somewhere 
outside the theater. As Todd McGowan points out,  
One of the chief effects of magic […] is its tendency to focus audience 
attention on the result. If the illusionist […] performs the art well, the 
audience pays attention to what appears […] on stage […] rather than to 
the work occurring outside of the audience’s vision, the work that goes 
into constructing the illusion […. In this sense, it is] like capitalism itself 
[that] hides the fact that labor rather than exchange is the source of value 
[…] (Fictional 109) 
The surplus that stays hidden from the eye of the spectator, the part that, if revealed, 
would undermine the functioning of the act is the core of magic (and the discourse of 
capitalism). 
A deeper level of the impact of capitalism on the socio-economic life of late 19th 
and early 20th century, the period that the film focuses on, could be seen in the realm of 
science which magicians invoke in order to perform the more astonishing magic tricks. 
This is specifically seen in the famous rivalry between Tesla and Edison which the film 
depicts, albeit in passing, signifying the role that science played in those years in 
strengthening the pillars of capitalism. Tesla’s exhibition of alternating current in London 
is introduced as “one of the miracles of our age” (00:44:36-38) and “a technological 




although the exposition is ruined, to quote Tesla’s assistant, as “[p]art of Thomas 
Edison’s smear campaign against Mr. Tesla’s superior alternating current” (00:45:23-29). 
Later in the film, there is a scene that depicts the arrival of electricity as a key step in the 
lives of the people of the era. In this scene, Angier and Tesla’s assistant, Alley (Andy 
Serkis), are looking from the mountains to the town of Colorado Springs. The scene 
pictures the darkness of the night and the faraway lights of the town. Alley tells Angier 
that “Tesla electrified the whole town in exchange for using the generators when we need 
them” (00:43:30-33). As Angier looks back to view the city lights, they disappear 
suddenly. Darkness covers everywhere. When Angier turns his head again to face Alley, 
he finds himself surrounded by an indefinite number of bulbs on the ground which 
produce a very dazzling light. Angier’s only words are “Magic! Real magic!” (00:44:28-
31). The magic Angier talks about is the gift that science brings for the capitalist society 
to help it develop at full throttle. The film depicts, in passing, a pivotal stage of 
capitalism and how it shapes the world of subjects by surrounding them with infinite 
number of objects. The way that science provides magicians with tools to entertain 
people in The Prestige signifies the formation of a wide network of interconnected 
discourses in an era which is of significant importance in the development of capitalism. 
Later on, the sabotage of Tesla’s laboratory by Edison’s men specifically limns the waste 
produced by the competitive market of capitalism, which, in this case, is caused by the 
non-ending rivalry between two poles of electrical innovations of the time.  
Nolan’s depiction of the technological innovation of the period is very much in 
line with his metaphorical representation of magic and its ideological significances. Not 




wonder, but also he conceals the waste of the production. The function of the ideology is 
to hide the truth, to attach the subject to a specific perspective towards viewing the world. 
In The Prestige, every time a magic trick is performed, something is concealed from the 
spectators’ vision: this could be either a dead man or a dead bird. This is a surplus denied 
by the Symbolic, a traumatic point beyond the limit of the spectator, something that 
resides in the Real. In other words, a signifier in the Symbolic Order replaces that 
forbidden Real point in order to construct the subject’s reality because, as Slavoj Žižek 
points out, ideology is “a symbolic field which contains such a filler holding the place of 
some structural impossibility, while simultaneously disavowing this impossibility” 
(Plague of Fantasies 98).   
Nolan’s juxtaposition of the two sides of the world of magic has an autotelic 
function. The realm of magic is to be considered as a metaphor for the art of filmmaking, 
and, at the same time, a microcosm of ideological formations, particularly capitalism. By 
locating the unconscious of magic, especially the labor and waste of production as well as 
explaining the secret of the magic trick, Nolan provides us with the anamorphotic point 
that is hidden from us if we look directly. From this particular perspective, he challenges 
the way we view things and invites us to reconsider it. He dismantles the solid, well-
shaped capitalist ideology in order to make us watch things closer. Nolan inserts 
manifestations of the Lacanian Real throughout the film to undercut the solid, rule-based 
Symbolic, which dominates the world of the spectator of magic as well as that of film. 







3.3 Manifestations of the Imaginary and the Intrusions of the Real 
Like Memento, the story of The Prestige revolves around a central traumatic 
event, which dislocates the subject from the position he holds in the Symbolic Order. 
This traumatic incident, namely the death of Angier’s wife, Julia (Piper Perabo), triggers 
the enmity between Borden and Angier. During a magic trick by Milton (Ricky Jay), 
Borden, who serves as assistant to the magician, ties a complex knot to Julia’s hands and 
she, unable to untie it inside the water tank, dies in front of the audience. The act begins 
when Julia, the voluptuous, beautiful young lady, as the projection of the desire of the 
spectators on stage, is hoisted into the air. She is first shown in close-up side view, with a 
vertical rope separating her from Borden, who is shown in a blurry view from a distance. 
As she is lifted in the air smiling, the camera tilts, then cuts to a view of her from behind. 
We hear the continuous sound of the mechanical rope hoist mixed with diegetic 
marching-style drum as Julia’s husband, Robert Angier, is shown in a close-up with a 
look of admiration and satisfaction watching her raised into the air (see fig. 20). Once 
again, we have a full shot of Julia until she is positioned above the water tank, and 
eventually plunged into it. The tank is locked automatically and is covered with a red 
fabric. The spectators’ expectations shift from hopeful questioning looks to impatient 
anxious murmurs, and they are shown in close-ups with a background of low key lighting 
as it takes longer than usual for the actress to reappear. Cutter (Michael Caine) runs 
towards the tank with an axe in his hand and removes the cover. Beneath the red fabric, 
the most traumatic event is going to happen. There are extreme close ups of Julia’s face 
as she is desperately struggling to untie herself inside the tank paralleled with horrified 




up. Julia’s attempts come to an end and she dies inside the water tank and in front of the 
audience. Extreme close-ups of Julia’s face, as she drowns, and her upright motionless 
body indicate the return of the Real in the disgusting form of death (see fig. 21).  
Once Cutter breaks the glass tank with an axe, Julia’s body collapses on the 
ground, with Angier rushing over her body as the scene shows frightened faces of the 
spectators. Angier’s face, as he bends over Julia’s dead body, shows a mixture of total 
disbelief and extreme fear. The expected fulfillment of desire turns into the most 
disgusting scene: a harsh blow to fantasy in the form of death. It is here that we encounter 
the anamorphotic gaze: Angier’s dejected eyes (see fig. 22) and the downcast faces of the 
spectators (see fig. 23) undermine the way they looked at Julia a few minutes ago. Julia’s 
death signals a critical point in the story because it creates an enmity between the two 
magicians as Angier believes that Borden tied a complex knot that caused her wife’s 
death. It is Julia’s death that serves as the vehicle for the action of the film: it ignites 
desire in Angier, whose only impulse in the rest of the film is to master the resultant lack. 
Like Leonard Shelby in Memento, Angier finds desire and the path to the objet petit a as 
the only option to deal with the trauma.  
The hostility between Robert Angier and Alfred Borden increases with the 
passage of time. This brings forward manifestations of the Lacanian Imaginary Order 
since, as I mentioned in chapter 1, it is in this phase that there occurs a relationship of 





Figure 20. The Prestige: shot 1 
 
Figure 21. The Prestige: shot 2 
 
Figure 22. The Prestige: shot 3 
 
Figure 23. The Prestige: shot 4 
 
with Borden’s private life to see if he has a wife and if he is happy with her. When 
Angier attends London’s Royal Albert Hall, which exhibits the alternating current 
invented by Tesla (David Bowie), he notices that Borden is also sitting in the audience. 
After the abrupt ending of the exhibit, he follows Borden. The scene shows tracking shots 
of Angier and Borden as they are walking in a crowded street. The camera then cuts to a 
full shot of Borden as he approaches his wife, Sarah (Rebecca Hall), who is pushing a 
pram. Borden lifts the baby, and, as he is smiling, he says, “Have you had a nice day with 
mummy, huh?” (00:46:35-37). Then he looks at Sarah, in close up, kisses her, saying, 
“Sarah, I love you” (00:46:40-43). The camera then cuts to the envious Angier with his 
glistening eyes in close up as his voice-over describes his feelings: “I saw happiness. 
Happiness that should have been mine” (00:46:49-53). Later in the film, he tells Olivia 
(Scarlett Johansson), “He has a family now and he is performing again. Borden is out 
there living his life just as he intended, as if nothing has happened. And look at me, I’m 




Borden, displays a mixture of identification—at certain times he admires what Borden 
performs as magic—and otherness, as he envies Borden’s seemingly better life and 
attempts to avenge Julia’s death.  
Angier, then, decides to outdo Borden both in magic tricks and in personal life. 
Despite his efforts, however, he always seems one step behind. He succeeds in purloining 
Borden’s diary, which includes his magic tricks but the key to Borden’s most prestigious 
act, The Transported Man, is missing. That is why Angier kidnaps Borden’s ingénieur, 
Fallon (Christian Bale), in order to extort from Borden the code to his magic trick. Once 
Borden provides Angier with the code (TESLA), he sets off to Colorado to see Nikola 
Tesla and asks him to build him the same machine he made for Borden. However, as 
Angier figures out later (while reading Borden’s diary), Tesla never made such a machine 
for Borden. In other words, there is no signified behind the signifier TESLA. In this 
sense, the machine serves as the objet petit a because it does not exist but it propels 
desire. As Angier comes to the last pages of Borden’s diary, he finds out that his 
assistant, Olivia, whom he had sent to steal Borden’s diary, fell in love with Borden, and 
it was Borden who asked her to give his diary to Angier in order to convince him to 
embark on an impossible mission. In the last few pages of Borden’s diary, Angier faces 
the Real gaze, the gaze that tells the subject that the objet petit a is only a phantom. The 
last few lines of Borden’s diary reveal that Angier was deceived long ago:  
Today my mistress proves her truthfulness. Not to me, you understand. 
I’ve been convinced […] Today, Olivia proves her love for me, to you, 
Angier! Yes, Angier, she gave you this notebook at my request. And, yes. 




part with my secret so easily after so much? Goodbye Angier. May you 
find solace for your forward ambition back in your American home. 
(01:22:32-23:05) 
While reading these lines, Nolan shows us an extreme close up of Angier’s face as he 
reads the lines dumbfounded. The camera then cuts to Angier’s hands crumpling the 
diary.   
Angier’s mission, his long journey to Colorado, turns out not to be “a search, a 
search for answers” (00:07:42-44), as he claims, but to obtain the impossible Machine. 
This is how it works in the cinema of Christopher Nolan: the subject supposed to know, 
or the subject of knowledge, is always a façade for the subject of desire. It is desire that 
functions as the driving force for Angier’s actions: he is never satisfied with what he has, 
and he wants more. When Angier succeeds in his first performance of The New 
Transported Man, he doesn’t find what he has achieved as the final object of satisfaction. 
Right after the show, he thinks that what Borden does for the same trick is much better 
than his: “I need to know how he does it […] so I can do it better” (01:02:13-16). That is 
why he asks his assistant, Olivia Wenscombe, to go and work for Borden so she could 
find his secret. Cutter reveals to Angier the truth behind Borden’s trick, but it doesn’t 
work: “I already know how he does it, Robert. Same way he always has, the same way as 
we do. It’s just that you want something more” (01:16:52-59). However, the desire for 
the impossible objet petit a is a futile endeavor because, as Todd McGowan puts it, 
similar to Memento, here again “the future does not hold the solution to the problem of 
desire and that the destiny of the subject is one of a failed repetition rather than progress 




Angier’s diary has a symmetrical role. Once Borden is found guilty of Angier’s 
alleged murder, which occurred during Angier’s performance of The Real Transported 
Man, he is provided with Angier’s diary by someone introducing himself as Lord 
Caldlow (Hugh Jackman), who later turns out to be Angier in disguise. In the last few 
lines of the dairy, Borden finds out that Angier is not really dead, but alive: “But here at 
the turn, I must leave you, Borden. Yes, you Borden. Sitting there, in your cell, reading 
my diary, awaiting your death, for my murder” (01:31:27-41). Borden’s face, perplexed, 
shows disbelief. Unlike what Borden, Cutter, the Judge, and the spectators of the film 
thought, Angier’s supposed death never happened. Angier’s diary, like that of Borden’s, 
is based on nothing, but, this nothing has a significant effect. It is a signifier without 
signified because it is based on Angier’s death by Borden, which didn’t happen in reality 
and it was actually during the cloning (by the Machine) that the original Angier died.  
The two magician’s diaries instantly serve as agents of the gaze because they 
provide an oblique connection to the truth. They initiate desire and temporarily tell the 
subject (here the magician) that he is in control of the scene (each magician imagines that 
by reading the diary he would be able to discover the truth about the other.) but he 
eventually understands that he is far from the truth. The spectators, also, fall prey to the 
trap of desire as they see everything through the eyes of subjects in the film. In this 
regard, the diaries are similar to Holbein’s painting, The Ambassadors, because in a 
moment of revelation the magicians and the spectators understand that they are not in 
control of the scene. Therefore, there occurs a change of positions: the seemingly all-
knowing subjects (the magicians and the film spectators), who thought themselves to be 




all that time, and such a discovery produces intense anxiety. The diary serves as the agent 
of the Real, because in it there is something they cannot discover, it is hidden, or rather, 
nonexistent. The spectators of the film, then, receive the message that the film is a trap, a 
trap in the sense that it invites their look to eventually surround them with the gaze, the 
gaze which reveals to them that desire is deceitful. The anamorphotic arrangement of the 
diaries and their connection with the truth is the message of the film: it is always from a 
retroactive position that the subjects find out that they were provided with a mirage. 
Therefore, anamorphosis is an attempt to slow down the process of watching the film to 
tell the spectators that not only in the theaters but also in real life there are traps 
(ideologies) that they need to be cautious about. Such a perspective has the ultimate goal 
of reconsidering or revisiting certain ideas or discourses that have already shaped the 
subjects’ realities.  
Although Angier discovers that Tesla didn’t build a machine for Borden, he 
convinces Tesla to make one for him. The Machine that Tesla builds for Angier to 
perform the trick called The Real Transported Man is an excess to desire, because it 
promises that it could bring unlimited enjoyment for the subject. Not only is it real, in the 
sense that it literally exists, but also it moves beyond reality because of its ability to 
create exact same copies of everything. The Machine has a retroactive function in the 
film. Its first emergence is when it is not working anymore, as it is being inspected by the 
Judge (Daniel Davis) to uncover the secret of Angier’s death: it is an extreme long shot, 
using low-key lighting, putting the Machine cabinet in the center of the frame in such a 
way as to emphasize its enormous size. Then, two men appear in the darkness and 




most disappointing of all” (00:22:16-17) tricks because “It has no trick. It’s real” 
(00:22:21-25). The disappointing fact about the Machine is its promise to go beyond the 
limits of the pleasure principle by producing jouissance. However, it only sacrifices the 
original to produce a replica. The Machine, therefore, only provides mirages of the objet 
petit a without ever presenting the audience with the real thing.  
In his first meeting with Angier, Tesla warns him that his obsession (with desire) 
would have consequences. The scene shows Tesla and Angier in shot reverse shot, sitting 
around a table overlooking the valley on the deck of Tesla’s laboratory:  
Angier: I need something impossible.  
[…] 
Tesla: Go home. Forget this thing. I can recognize an obsession. No good   
will come of it.  
Angier: Hasn’t good come of your obsessions?  
Tesla: At first, but I have followed them too long. I am their slave. And  
one day they will choose to destroy me.  
Angier: If you understand an obsession then you know you won’t change  
my mind. (00:50:33-51:57) 
Angier is right about the working of desire: the subject of desire becomes obsessed with 
obtaining the impossible objet petit a. He proves to be the subject (of capitalism) who is 
obsessed with the world of objects. His only impulse is to get the best tools to perform 
the best magic tricks. Such an obsession makes Angier forget about his wife. When 
Olivia tells him that Borden’s diary “won’t get your wife back,” Angier responds, “I 




utters these words, the camera shows an extreme close up of his face, and he realizes 
what he has said. Angier moves away from the world of subjects and devotes himself to 
the Machine.  
When the building of the Machine is finished, Tesla leaves Angier a letter of 
instruction. As Angier is reading the letter, with Tesla’s voice-over, the spectator discerns 
Tesla’s deep concerns: because of the extraordinary ability of the Machine to create the 
same out of the original, Tesla warns Angier against using it:  
The truly extraordinary is not permitted in science and industry. Perhaps 
you’ll find more luck in your field, where people are happy to be mystified 
[.…] I add only one suggestion on using the machine. Destroy it. Drop it 
to the bottom of the deepest ocean. Such a thing will bring you only 
misery. (01:30:17-48) 
The look in Angier’s eyes that we see after reading Tesla’s letter is straight and 
determined, accompanied by his voice-over, “Tesla’s warning is as unheeded as he knew 
it would be” (01:30:53-56). Angier’s obsessive desire is so strong that he doesn’t even 
think about Tesla’s advice.  
 The Machine, which stands for the technological innovations of the industrial 
age, proves to be a complex creation. It consists of a large cylindrical unit the height of a 
long man and the width is so as to accommodate six men. There is a large globe above 
the cylinder which absorbs bolts of electricity radiating from two nearby generators and 
transmits it to the object inside. When an object is placed inside the cylinder, whether it is 
a hat, a cat, or a man, it is reproduced somewhere else as the radiating blots disappear 




the theatrical agent, Ackerman (Edward Hibbert), who expresses extreme wonder at the 
prestige that the Machine (re)produces. For him, the Machine is too real, and that is why 
he asks Angier to makes some adjustments in the Machine’s appearance: “It’s very rare 
to see real magic […] but you’ll have to dress it up a little. Disguise it. Give them enough 
reason to doubt it” (01:37:48-38:11). Angier makes a few adjustments and decorations to 
the appearance of the Machine so that it becomes more acceptable to the vision.  
The Machine’s first performance proves to be eye-dazzling. Angier stands in the 
center of the stage, preparing the spectators for what his magic trick is going to show: “In 
my travels I have seen the future, and it is a strange future indeed. The world, ladies and 
gentlemen, is on the brink of new and terrifying possibilities” (01:41:14-29). As he 
knocks his cane on the ground and spreads his arms, there is a shift from medium to 
extreme long shot, depicting both the spectators and the stage, as a blue spotlight focuses 
on Angier. The audience applauds. The camera then instantly cuts to Borden, who is 
sitting in the audience, but then cuts back to Angier as he continues his introductory 
speech: “What you’re about to witness is not magic. It’s purely science” (01:41:49-55). 
As a few people come on the stage to examine the Machine, Angier closes his eyes. 
When the people on the stage leave, he tosses his cane to his assistant, removes his coat 
and the ring on his left hand, pauses for a second, then gently turns around and moves 
towards the Machine to place himself inside. Bolts of light radiate from the Machine and 
their reflection is seen on the spectators’ faces. Angier disappears in a second. The real 
Angier is drowned in a tank of water beneath the stage; his dead body (or the waste of the 




dead body from the audience is removed, we could see that the motionless body is 
looking (at the audience) with his eyes wide open.  
As the spectators look at each other anxiously, waiting for him to reappear on the 
stage, they hear Angier’s footsteps from behind. The Machine has worked. As everyone 
turns around, Angier is shown in the back, towering over the audience. Cries of wonder 
fill the theater and the sound of the spectators’ claps becomes simultaneous with Angier’s 
final speech: “Man’s reach exceeds his imagination” (01:42:57-43:00). He then spreads 
his hands. The camera cuts to Borden whose look shows disappointment and perplexity, 
then cuts again to Angier whose face shows excitement and satisfaction. Angier’s 
performance of The Real Transported Man appears as a stain in the picture, as an excess 
in desire, since the trick’s prestige appears as a blow to consciousness. The camera is 
placed right above Angier’s head showing him as distinguished from the spectators 
located far from him. Similar to Holbein’s anamorphotic painting, which highlights a 
void in our perception, Angier’s duplicate stands behind the audience, somewhere 
neglected by them. If we recollect everything for a second, there is a dead body under the 
stage with open, motionless eyes. This dead body is the real Angier. The replica appears 
at the other corner of the stage as a stain in the picture, momentarily neglected by the 
look. Angier’s dead body serves as the location from which the invisible gaze is returning 
the look of the audience and the film spectators. The function of this dead body is the 
same as the objet petit a because while it does not exist anymore, it provides the audience 
with a mirage, misguiding them to believe that the replica is the original. Similar to the 




is “only when the landscape is viewed from a certain perspective” that one can see it 
(Žižek, The Parallax View 18).  
 
3.4 Ideological Considerations of Self-Annihilation and Sacrifice   
In The Prestige, sacrifice and self-destruction are essential to most magic tricks. 
When Borden loses two fingers during the bullet catch trick, he has to cut off two of his 
twin’s fingers in order to preserve his cover. Angier’s duplication of himself, too, occurs 
through a process of self-annihilation. In order for a duplicate to appear as the prestige of 
the magic trick, Angier needs to die in the first place. In Christopher Priest’s novel, The 
Prestige, on which Nolan has based the film,17 we can witness the ultimate pain that 
comes with such a sacrifice. During In a Flash,18 while Rupert Angier has stated the 
mechanics of the illusion,19 Borden goes down the stage where he finds the generator that 
produces electricity for the Machine and turns it off: 
The transmission had been interrupted! But it had begun before it was 
stopped, and now I could see an image of myself on the rail; there was my 
ghost, my doppelgänger, momentarily frozen in the stance I had adopted 
when I turned to look, half twisted, half crouching, looking away and up. 
It was a thin, insubstantial copy of myself, a partial prestige. Even as I 
looked, this image of myself straightened in alarm, threw out his arms, and 
collapsed backwards and out of sight into the loge itself! (339-40) 
                                                 
17 Nolan’s adaptation of Priest’s eponymous novel is, to a considerable degree, an innovative move as he 
makes noticeable adjustments to the plot.  
18 In a Flash is renamed as The Real Transported Man in the film.  




The startling outcome of the interrupted procedure is the facsimile of Angier, a ghostly 
creature which is almost invisible in dim light. The original Angier, also, loses a 
considerable weight, becomes a man without soul, and dies eventually because of the 
injury: 
Both I and my prestige were much reduced by Borden’s intervention. We 
each had problems to cope with. I was in a wraithlike condition, my 
prestige was in debilitated health. While he had corporeality and freedom 
of movement in the world, from the moment of the accident he was 
doomed to die; meanwhile, I had been condemned to a life in the shadows, 
but my health was intact.20 (370-71) 
In the film, we are able to witness how traumatic it is for Angier to undergo such a 
sacrificial procedure. Nearly at the of the film, as Angier is dying, he remembers his 
initial test with the Machine as he is talking to Borden: “I’ve made sacrifices […] It takes 
everything” (02:00:36-46). Through parallel editing Nolan depicts Angier’s pale face as 
he is dying, and at the same time, scenes of his recollections with his voice-over. When 
he places himself inside the Machine during the test, he discovers that the it has created a 
double, a twin like himself within a few seconds. He immediately picks up a gun and kills 
his double. The double which is eliminated instantly is the excess that appears as an 
anomaly in the system. It is the unbearable Real which is not understandable by the 
Symbolic Order. When Angier encounters his double for the first time, he feels the threat 
that would disturb his position in the realm of the Symbolic and that is why he kills the 
double. As Angier says, “It took courage to climb into that machine every night, not 
                                                 




knowing if I’d be the man in the box or in the prestige” (02:01:16-32). The Real, here, is 
not simply the identical replica, but actually the void it creates, the instability it brings 
about.  
The subject goes through this painful sacrifice to get something impossible, 
namely the jouissance that comes with the objet petit a. Both in Priest’s novel and 
Nolan’s film, this element of sacrifice crystalizes not to cover a lack in the Symbolic, as 
we may witness in fantasy film, but actually to highlight the impossibility of obtaining 
total satisfaction. Angier’s self-annihilation and reincarnation point to a hole in the 
Symbolic, to a specific view of the world which may be disturbing to watch. As Todd 
McGowan points out,  
Self-sacrifice functions ideologically when it is tied to the promise of a 
recovered wholeness for the subject [.…] An emancipatory self-sacrifice, 
in contrast, works to shatter the image of wholeness. It targets the source 
of illusion of wholeness in order to indicate that there is an opening to a 
beyond within the seemingly closed whole. (Fictional 112) 
The destruction of the subject to get something impossible is at the core of capitalism. 
Capitalism keeps telling the subjects to sacrifice whatever they have in order to get a 
phantasmagoric moment of happiness by obtaining the objet petit a. However, the subject 
never gets the reward for the sacrifice.  
This sacrificial element is also seen in Borden’s actions. When one of the Borden 
twins loses two fingers in the bullet catch trick, the other agrees to share his fate. The 
scene shows the Borden twins in medium shot, with one sitting and the other standing 




hand of the one sitting on the chair. A second later, the one who has lost two fingers, puts 
his hand over the latter’s. The standing Borden places a chisel on the sitting Borden, 
picks up a hammer, and then the other screams as the hammer cuts his fingers. The 
Borden brothers’ profession takes priority over everything else. Borden doesn’t even tell 
his wife, Sarah, that he has a twin brother who assists him in performing magic tricks. 
Sarah does not know that it is not her husband, who is in love with Olivia, but actually his 
twin brother. That is why Sarah, in desperation, commits suicide. The Bordens sacrifice 
their own bodies as well as their loves ones to get what they want and this is the void at 
the core of capitalism: sacrificing one’s own body and intersubjective relations for the 
sake of objects. The rivalry between Angier and Borden starts a quest for the sublime 
objet petit a, a never-ending mission to move beyond the ordinary. Earlier in the film, 
Cutter tells Angier, “You got to get your hands dirty, if you’re going to achieve the 
impossible” (00:35:43-46). Both Borden and Angier are ready to depart with their loved 
ones in order to pursue the path of desire.  
There is another dimension to the ideological considerations of the film: Nolan’s 
treatment of social class which is connected to the concept of doubleness in The Prestige. 
Here, the doubleness creates a space where social classes melt and the lower classes 
triumph over the upper classes. Borden and Angier use doubles to perform their 
teleportation magic trick. Borden has a twin brother who assists him in this magic trick: 
One of the brothers disappears in the turn and the other appears as the prestige. Before 
obtaining the Machine, Angier, too, uses a double called Root (Hugh Jackman). 
Throughout the film, it dawns on us that Robert Angier is an upper-class man with no 




(02:01:58) to build the Machine. Angier’s double, Root, is an alcoholic lower-class 
character with no money, who later blackmails Angier for playing the role of his double. 
Borden twins belong to the working class, and there is a continuous reference to their 
weak financial situation in the first half of the film. During the teleportation trick, we 
witness a temporary removal of class boundaries, which gives us evidence that the film 
plays with the notion of social class. 
Because of his astonishing similarity to Angier, Root is employed to play the role 
of the prestige in The New Transported Man, with the former being the pledge of the 
trick. Every time the trick is performed, Angier disappears from the door downstage and 
Root reappears from the door upstage. The one who finally receives the spectators’ 
applause is not Angier, but to his dissatisfaction, the alcoholic Root. To put it simply, the 
upper-class Angier collapses in order for the lower-class Root to raise. In the rehearsals, 
to Angier’s surprise, Root shows himself to be even better than Angier in playing his 
role. After, their first performance, Angier expresses his discontent with the situation: “I 
spent the ovation hiding under the stage. No one cares about the man who disappears, the 
man who goes into the box. They care about the man who comes out the other side” 
(01:01:15-21). That is why he proposes a solution: “Maybe we could switch before the 
tricks, I could be the prestige, and Root ends up below the stage” (01:01:26-30). His 
proposition, however, is rejected by Cutter, and he continues to hear the spectators’ 
ovation only under the stage. Later on, Olivia tells Borden that such a situation is “killing 
him [Angier]. He is obsessed with discovering your methods. He thinks of nothing else, 




spectators may see the upper-class Angier in the pledge, but the prestige is always the 
working or lower class.  
When Borden goads Root into blackmailing Angier, he accepts it. Later, Borden, 
with Root’s assistance, ruins Angier’s performance of The New Transported Man. In this 
specific sequence, Angier, as usual, introduces the show, then, a trap door opens and he 
goes underneath the stage. However, there is no cushion under the stage as Borden has 
removed it. When Angier looks to the other side, he doesn’t find Root. To his surprise, it 
is Borden who has replaced Root. He goes up through the trap door, ruining Angier’s 
performance. Once again, then, the working class replaces the upper-class in the magic 
trick. 
While Angier’s plot to get Borden killed seems successful with Borden’s trial, 
imprisonment, and eventual hanging by neck, with one of the Borden twins still alive, 
there is a reversal of fortunes. In the last few scenes of the film, Borden’s twin shoots 
Angier and leaves to pick up his brother’s little daughter, Jess (Samantha Mahurin), who 
is with Cutter. Through crosscutting we also see that Angier’s dead body lies on the 
ground, surrounded by flames, and the film ends with a side view of Angier’s dead 
replica in a water tank. The ending, therefore, signifies that even after spending a fortune 
the upper-class Angier fails to create replicas of his social class and while Borden dies, 
his generation survives through his brother and Jess.  
 
3.5 Narrative Structure as an Anamorphotic View of Filmic Image 
There are several narrative lines running through The Prestige. The film’s 
complicated plot reminds us of Memento and its layered structure. The arrangement of 




facts. While there are no more black and white or color narratives at work to emphasize 
the chronological distinction of plotlines (as we saw in Memento), still the nonlinear 
layers of the plot are the codes to understanding the film. However, it is not simply 
because of its nonlinear plot that The Prestige is a rather difficult film to follow. Nolan’s 
manipulation of events works in complex ways to retroactively ask the spectators to 
rearrange every scene in their minds. As Bordwell and Thompson point out, “The plot 
shuffles story order, plays with levels of knowledge, replays some scenes, and cuts off 
others, withholding their consequences [to misdirect] our attention” (Film Art 300). Like 
Memento, The Prestige depicts events mostly from a retroactive view of time. In other 
words, the narration occurs after most of the action has occurred. This retroactive 
perspective cuts through the more chronological, anticipatory standpoint. Lacan’s view of 
time is not different from the way that Nolan arranges the plots for his films. Lacan 
rejects “a linear notion of time” because “in the psyche time can equally well act in 
reverse, by retroaction and anticipation” (Evans 209). For Lacan, history is a “synthesis” 
of the past and the present or the past as lived in the present (Freud’s Papers 36). Such a 
synthesis of retroaction and anticipation means that Lacan is actually providing us with a 
model of time which occurs in the unconscious. The past is not dead because there are 
certain memories that reappear to affect our present. At the same time, the present is here 
to shed light on the past and give us a clue about what to expect in the future. It would 
make sense to consider Nolan’s layered plot in The Prestige from what Lacan proposes 
about time to see how retroaction and anticipation shape the plot of the film.  
There are three interdependent plotlines discernible in The Prestige: The first 




those running in the present. This layer is a synthesis of the two more plotlines: it 
connects the other two by going to and fro, using flashbacks and flash-forwards, to propel 
the action of the story. It starts with Borden’s trial for the alleged murder of Robert 
Angier and ends with Borden’s death by hanging and Angier’s murder by Borden’s twin. 
The central plotline also updates us on the two magician’s unfinished diaries by giving us 
information on Angier’s performance of The Real Transported Man as well as Borden’s 
aggravated relationship with Sarah. This focal plotline is interspersed with two more 
narratives: (1) Robert Angier’s diary read by Alfred Borden, which starts from Angier’s 
intention to travel to Colorado to have Tesla make a special machine for his magic tricks 
until his initial tests with the Machine to see if it is working as promised; (2) Alfred 
Borden’s diary read by Angier, which recollects events that happened earlier than those 
recorded in Angier’s diary. It starts with the two magicians working together as young 
talents, then moves to their later hostility after Julia’s death, and ends when Borden gives 
Angier’s assistant, Olivia, his notebook of tricks, but asks her to pretend that she really 
stole it so that Angier embarks on a mission to find its truth. The central plotline joins 
these two narratives and brings things to an end. Since, however, these three plotlines are 
treated concurrently, editing plays a considerable role in the film.  
Editing becomes a demanding task when the past and the present mingle together. 
As David Bordwell says,  
In The Prestige, embedded stories permit Nolan’s crosscutting to become 
more audacious. Crosscutting juxtaposes the two men’s life stories, at the 




Moreover, the discovered-manuscript convention motivates not only trips 
into the past but a brisk alternation of past and present. (Labyrinth 37) 
Like in Memento, parallel editing has a central role in juxtaposing the different layers of 
the plot in The Prestige. The initial sequence of the film establishes these parallel worlds 
and, in a way, prepares the spectators for such a complicated experience. The film starts 
with a scene of a bunch of hats on the ground in the woods, which the spectators will 
retroactively discover to be the one witnessed by Angier outside Tesla’s laboratory. This 
scene, which is later repeated in Angier’s diary, has a voice-over, clearly Borden’s voice, 
saying, “Are you watching closely?” (00:00:57-58), thus anticipating the narration of his 
diary as an integral part of the film. Therefore, this very short scene, which is less than 
fifteen seconds, heralds the intense rivalry between the two magicians as the essential 
feature of the story of the film. Right after this very short scene, there is a sequence 
which includes shots of the film’s last sequence—which is actually the ending point of 
the central plot—where Cutter performs a magic trick for Borden’s little daughter, 
paralleled with shots from Angier’s first performance of The Real Transported Man. 
Therefore, in the very first sequence of the film, Nolan informs the spectator of all the 
layers of the film through crosscutting. However, as it is common with his filmmaking, 
he withholds certain important facts—in this case, the prestige of The Real Transported 
Man—from the spectator until later in the film. The key to structural anamorphosis is 
precisely here: the spectators only belatedly discover the futility of Angier’s quest for the 
impossible object. In these introductory shots, we are not provided with Angier’s tragic 
ending; however, quick shots from a later sequence (The Real Transported Man), which 




retroactively that the film spectators come to comprehend concealed information. The 
gaze, in the form of a narrative component, exposes itself as an unnoticed surplus. The 
film, therefore, serves as a trap, a puzzle which eventually reveals to the spectators that, 
unlike what they imagined, they were not in control of the scene.  
It is interesting to see that even characters defer meaning by hiding information 
from each other. One clear example occurs after the death by drowning of Angier’s wife, 
Julia. During Julia’s funeral inside the mausoleum, as Cutter and Angier stand over 
Julia’s open coffin, the former, seeing the latter’s predicament, tells him an anecdote: “I 
knew an old sailor once. They told me he went overboard, tangled in the sails. They 
pulled him out, but it took him five minutes to cough” (00:26:04-16). Angier stares 
blankly at Julia’s body in extreme close up waiting for the rest of Cutter’s sentence. 
Cutter continues, “He said it was like…” (00:26:18-19); he pauses, looks at Angier in less 
than a second, then resumes, “going home” (00:26:20-21). These last words, like 
Lacanian point de capiton, bring a temporary resolution to Angier’s agony. Nearly at the 
end of the film, Cutter tells Angier the same anecdote: “I once told you about a sailor 
who described drowning to me” (01:56:41-46). Angier replies, “Yeah, he said it was like 
going home” (01:56:47-48). Cutter continues, “I was lying. He said it was agony” 
(01:56:50-53). What distinguishes these two scenes is the lighting. In the mausoleum, the 
scene is bright, with all the background being white, while in the latter, there is low key 
lighting displaying only Cutter’s face. This playing with words by some characters does 
not happen by chance: it sets the default template based on which the film’s overall 
structure stands. By doing so, the film escapes any straightforward narration, and this 




Nolan demands from the spectators to look carefully at the film and watch for the 
traps that might distract them. This is precisely in line with what we know from 
anamorphosis: it is a picture, a parallax object, which is decoded from one specific angle. 
The sentence ‘Are you watching closely?’ is repeated several times in the film. It implies 
the fact that in watching the magic tricks as well as in watching films, the spectators are 
blind to something, or simply, to the secret of the seemingly impossible magical act. 
They are deceived into taking an impossible illusion as real. As Patricia Pisters points 
out,  
Here Nolan acknowledges that vision is a mental operation, with a partial 
(in any case open and dynamic) relationship to the external world, and that 
illusionist filmmakers, as neuroscientists with different means, show us 
how the nature of the brain and the nature of the filmic image call 
perception’s relation to reality into question. (84) 
The spectators of magic and film, in other words, are looking for the impossible object of 
their desire and that is why they are unable to discover the truth. While the secret of 
magic, unlike what it seems to be, is simple, it should remain hidden at all costs. As 
Borden says, “Never show anyone. They’ll beg you and flatter you for the secret, but as 
soon as you give it up, you’ll be nothing to them” (00:20:12-19). Magic, therefore, acts 
like desire because it conceals the fact that there is nothing sublime, no objet petit a 
behind it. The sentence ‘Are you watching closely?’ is not simply an address to the 
audience of magic, but actually a reference to the relationship between the spectator of 
cinema and the filmic image. For example, part of what Nolan does, the way he shows 




right side, is a trick: he doesn’t want to reveal that Fallon is Borden’s twin. Therefore, the 
way he steals information from the film spectators moves parallel to what magic does to 
the spectators. As Ann Heilmann puts it, “The Prestige proffers an explicit invitation to 
reflect on its constructedness by invoking our knowledge of and interest in Victorian 
science and yet succeeds in deceiving us, just as Victorian conjurors did their audience in 
the very act of displaying all the Props” (39). In other words, we could say, what Nolan 
represents as magic is only a world within the world of cinema. The film, therefore, 
becomes an autotelic picture, something that reveals the truth about itself. It is only 
belatedly and retroactively that the film spectator figures out the truth about Borden 
twins. 
The mingling of the past and the present, therefore, creates a story, which is not 
easy to grasp. In the beginning of the film, the spectators are presented with the film’s 
closure, which is to suggest that they have already seen the film’s ending. However, 
important facts are revealed later. Since the beginning of the film is its ending, the 
structure is similar to the Mobius strip, which, as Lacan says, like desire “has no 
underside, that is to say, that in following it, one will come back mathematically to the 
surface that is supposed to be its other side” (Four Fundamental Concepts 235). In other 
words, if you start from a certain point in the strip, you would reach the same point at the 
end because the starting point and the end are the same. Besides, the three 
chronologically different layers of the film flow into each other to create an atemporal 
space, where perception loses its connection with direct, realistic storytelling. What 
Nolan does here is to suggest that his filmmaking is similar to magic because, like 




impossible. The final scene of the film makes it exactly like Holbein’s The Ambassadors: 
the frame shows Angier’s dead body on the ground, surrounded by flames in his 
underground storage (see figs. 24-27). On each side of this large space there are several 
empty water tanks. We, as spectators, imagine that we are in control of the scene. 
Suddenly the camera pans to the left: there is a dead body in a water tank, which belongs 
to one of Angier’s clones. The body is in upright position in side view with protruding 
eyes. Now we come to understand that it was this dead body that served as a trap for our 
 
 
Figure 24. The Prestige: shot 5 
 
Figure 25. The Prestige: shot 6 
 
Figure 26. The Prestige: shot 7 
 
Figure 27. The Prestige: shot 8 
 
look. In other words, it was the gaze of the objet petit a which was shaping our desire. 
The film, therefore, reveals to be where one could find the anamorphotic gaze of the 
object cause of desire. 
Nolan’s portrayal of the anamorphotic image implicitly asks the spectators to look 
awry in order to find the truth, to uncover the fantasized position that they are always 




magic to make them more conscious of the ways that certain things are arranged without 
their knowledge in real life. What if the filmic image is only a microcosm for the way 
that we see the world around us? It would make quite a bit of sense, then, to look again to 
the world we are situated in to reconsider our relationship with subjects and objects. In 
doing such a task, we need to slow down perception and change the angle from which we 
have always been looking at the surrounding world. 
While in Chapters 1 and 2, I focused on narrative time and the arrangement of 
events in the plot to talk about Nolan’s anamorphotic art, in the next chapter, I shall 
discuss the way that mise-en-scène creates a space where the anamorphotic Real distorts 

















Chapter 4: The Dark Knight and Radical Politics of the Real 
 
4.1 Introductory Statements 
 
Christopher Nolan’s direct preoccupation with politics appears only in The Dark 
Knight Trilogy. The Dark Knight (2008) is the second film in this trilogy, the first one 
being Batman Begins (2005), and the last one, The Dark Knight Rises (2012). The Dark 
Knight depicts the rivalry between Batman (Christian Bale) and the Joker (Heath Ledger) 
as symbolic representations of good (or law) and evil (or chaos) in the fictional city of 
Gotham. The film does not end with the flawless triumph of good over evil: the Joker 
doesn’t die and Batman escapes the city, with police dogs on the hunt. Moreover, the 
Joker leaves his impact on the social order by turning Gotham’s best citizen, Harvey Dent 
(Aaron Eckhart), into a vengeful monster.  
In this chapter, I will argue that Nolan’s representation of Batman, as the 
projection of the (distorted) desire of the spectators, is constantly undercut by the Joker, 
whose role is to highlight the void in the Symbolic Order and the essential lack in desire. 
While Batman serves as the fantasy that forms the spectators’ desire, the Joker, I will 
argue, is the anamorphotic stain, which projects the nightmarish fears of the society, or 
the Real core of desire. By particularly focusing on the mise-en-scène (especially make-
up and costume), I will discuss the ways that Batman and the Joker prove to be the two 
sides of capitalism: while Batman’s ultimate power and wealth is what capitalism 
promises, the Joker’s violent, unruly actions project the underside of capitalism, the 
senseless core on which it stands.    
The Joker, I shall propose, provides us with the anamorphotic gaze of the Real. 




massive threat to stability and order. The Joker’s disruptive impact on the social order 
will be discussed especially in connection with Harvey Dent’s metamorphosis and the 
video footage that he prepares and sends to the world. I will ultimately suggest that the 
Joker is a foreclosed surplus, whose (re)appearance is a means to undercut capitalism and 
subvert the film as a medium of presentation (or perception).  
 
4.2 Gotham’s Dark Knight and The Fantasy at the Core of Capitalism 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss how Nolan’s revitalization of the DC Comics 
character the Joker provides the spectators with a space for rethinking the social order 
and the film. Before elaborating on the Joker’s appearance and actions, however, it would 
make sense to examine Batman as the fantasy that shapes the spectators’ dreams. We 
need to look at Batman and his secret identity, Bruce Wayne (Christian Bale), in order to 
understand why we should consider him as a subject of capitalism. In this section, I will 
argue that Batman (or Bruce Wayne), as a complicated character, creates a paradoxical 
picture for the spectators: while he presents himself as the ultimate fantasy of the 
spectators, the one with whom they can identify, he proves to be inaccessible (like the 
objet petit a) in different ways. In my discussion, I shall also consider Batman as the 
agent of power whose vigilante quests serve to maintain order in Gotham.     
In The Dark Knight, the most political scenes occur nearly at the end. In the last 
sequence of the film, the spectators are presented with the way that ideology (or power) 
functions by misrepresenting events in order to maintain order in society. In this 
particular scene, Gordon (Gary Oldman) makes a brief memorial speech at Harvey 
Dent’s funeral. Here, the mise-en-scène is familiar to the spectator of the film since it 




picture of the deceased behind the person who is at the podium making a speech, a 
number of attendants listening to the speaker respectfully, a flag of the United States in 
the right, and a flag of the city (here Gotham) in the left. Gordon’s speech is too short, 
and at the same time, too far from the truth: “A hero. Not the hero we deserved, but the 
hero we needed. Nothing less than a knight. Shining!” (02:22:27-36). The spectator’s task 
to uncover the truthfulness of such a memorial statement does not seem to be a tough 
one: it would be enough to take a look at the preceding dialogue between Gordon and 
Batman over the dead body of Harvey Dent. The low-key lighting effect is the dominant 
feature here as the two men are shown in the middle of the night with close-ups of their 
faces as they talk to each other. Here, Gordon tells Batman that “The Joker won. 
Harvey’s prosecution, everything he fought for, undone. Whatever chance you gave us of 
fixing our city dies with Harvey’s reputation. We bet it all on him. The Joker took the 
best of us and tore him down. People will lose all hope” (02:21:00-21). Batman’s answer 
is probably the most cynically ideological sentence of the film: “They won’t. They must 
never know what he (Harvey Dent) did” (02:21:22-28). As Batman is talking to Gordon, 
he bends over the body of Harvey Dent and turns his revolting, burned face, which is 
shown in extreme close-up, to the good side. This way power creates a narrative of 
history and of truth. No matter what the fact is, power always feeds subjects with a 
skewed version of reality in order to maintain its seemingly impeccable façade. The task 
of the subject is to find a specific angle from which such ideologies are uncovered.  
There is another big lie that we witness at the end of The Dark Knight. In the 
above-mentioned sequence, Batman decides to take the blame for the killings of a 




villain of the town: “I’m whatever Gotham needs me to be. Call it in. You’ll hunt me. 
You’ll condemn me. Set the dogs on me, because that’s what needs to happen, because 
sometimes truth isn’t good enough” (02:22:18-58). Batman’s voice-over coincides with a 
scene that would happen in the future with Gordon standing on the roof of Gotham 
Central with an axe in his hand, destroying the bat symbol, while a number of the police 
crew and reporters are watching him. There is then a cut to the present as Batman runs 
away and the dogs are unleashed to follow him. Gordon’s little son asks him, “Why’s he 
running, Dad?” (02:23:34-35), to which Gordon answers, “[b]ecause we have to chase 
him.” (02:23:37-38). Therefore, Batman becomes the Christ-like hero who sacrifices 
himself (another cliché) to serve as the object of desire of the people of Gotham.  
Bruce Wayne and Batman, the two sides of the same coin, who stand for wealth 
and power respectively, are the fantasies in the heart of capitalist ideology. Bruce Wayne 
is the real man behind the masked Batman. The message is clear: in order to become an 
icon of power (Batman) one first needs to become an icon of wealth (Bruce Wayne). In 
Batman Begins, in reply to Rachel (Katie Holmes), who asks for his identity, Batman 
says, “It’s not who I am underneath, but what I do that defines me” (01:57:42-48). 
Contrary to what Batman says, it is important to know the man underneath. As Bane 
(Tom Hardy) tells Batman in The Dark Knight Rises, he “merely adopted the dark” 
(01:14:13-16) to conceal his real identity. It is this hidden identity that reveals important 
facts about Batman.        
Bruce Wayne has many characteristics that define him as a perfect subject of 
capitalism. From Batman Begins, we know that he was born to a rich father, Thomas 




After Thomas Wayne’s death, Bruce inherits the company. Wayne Enterprises is a 
multinational company whose headquarters are located in the city of Gotham. The 
skyscraper which accommodates the company is shown only once in aerial shot: as one 
of the highest buildings of the city, it towers over most of the surrounding structures. 
Bruce Wayne himself is a billionaire, a philanderer, and a philanthropist, too. Whether 
we call him Batman or Bruce Wayne, he has no choice but to defend the city of Gotham 
against criminals because they would threaten the system in which he has a big share. His 
major attempt throughout the film is to cancel out the immense effect of the Joker’s 
traumatic invasions to eventually fill in the void of the Symbolic. The vigilante 
operations that Batman undertakes are beyond an individual’s attempts to protect his own 
interests; rather, they are the symbolic representation of the way that the established order 
maintains its power. It would therefore make sense to claim that Bruce Wayne is the 
unconscious motive behind Batman’s nocturnal activities.  
Batman creates desire and provides the spectators with a fantasized future. While 
he seems to be too close—in the sense he is on the screen in front of the spectators—he 
is, in fact, too far because his wealth and power are beyond the reach of (nearly all of) the 
spectators. Batman introduces himself as the one who is able to provide the spectators 
with the object(s) they have been looking for desperately in real life. As we watch the 
film, however, we understand that Batman is an impossibility both in wealth and power. 
In the beginning of the film, he presents himself as the only one who has the right to be 
the Batman. He considers himself to be irreplaceable as he disapproves of those 
volunteers who masquerade as Batman by calling them “copycats” (00:12:54). In this 




lies in the territories of the criminals where drug dealers meet in certain locations. When 
the Mob is doing an underground deal inside a parking garage, a fake Batman arrives to 
stop them. The two sides of the deal are the Scarecrow (Cillian Murphy) and the Chechen 
(Ritchie Coster). The two fake Batmen’s desperate attempts fail: one of them is punched 
by the Scarecrow, and the other is dragged into the ground by a few strong dogs after the 
real Batman bends his gun barrel and slaps him in the face. When one of the fake Batmen 
tells him that “We’re trying to help you” (00:10:21-23), Batman shows his discontent by 
telling him that “I don’t need help” (00:10:23-24). The fake Batman asks him, “What 
gives you the right? What’s the difference between you and me?” (00:10:26-29). Here, 
Batman’s reply is remarkable as it distinguishes him from the rest: “I’m not wearing 
hockey pads” (00:10:30-31). In this sense, Batman introduces himself as the eventual 
signified, the signifier with only one signified. In other words, Batman has no alternative 
and no one can even imagine to replace him.  
Right from the start, Batman proves himself to be the one superhero: he has his 
unique Batsuit, and the advanced Tumbler he drives is a superb technology, a flawless 
vehicle capable of flying as well as converting into a smaller Batpod. Among all these, 
Batman’s mask has a special role because it enables him (as Bruce Wayne) to temporarily 
move away from his true identity and enter the realm of the unconscious, where he could 
play endlessly with the Joker. As Slavoj Žižek points out in talking about Batman in The 
Dark Knight, “The Mask is thus the asexual “partial object” which allows the subject to 
remain in (or regress to) the pre-Oedipal anal-oral universe where there is no death or 
guilt, just endless fun and fighting” (Living in the End Times 60). Batman’s Batsuit and 




color of the (k)night (or the unconscious): Batman seems promising for the film 
spectators because he creates the fantasy of liberation from the constraints of the law or 
the Symbolic Order. However, we should be reminded that this apparel isn’t affordable 
(both literally and metonymically) for an ordinary film spectator. Also, throughout the 
film we are told that there is only one Batman. That is why Batman is not an accessible 
target.   
Batman’s exclusively designed suit and vehicle are not the only things that 
distinguish him from everyone else. He owns a secret underground facility which makes 
his whereabouts impossible to track down. There is only one man who is allowed in his 
bunker: his loyal butler, Alfred (Michael Caine). For Bruce Wayne, Alfred is more than a 
butler. In Batman Begins, when Bruce’s parents are murdered, he is raised by Alfred, 
who symbolically replaces his father. Alfred plays a significant role in handling Bruce’s 
traumatic experience; he is the father figure, who restores Bruce’s loose connections with 
the society. That is why he is the only one who has the right to penetrate Bruce’s hideout. 
The bunker is the place where Batman prepares himself for his vigilante operations. 
Inside this spacious underground haven, there are a few monitors (through which Batman 
oversees certain spots in the city), his Tumbler Batmobile, as well as his Batsuit and guns 
in a cabinet. This hidden location could be identified as the unconscious of Gotham 
because it is here that Batman is revealed to be Bruce Wayne: the protector of the city 
turns out to be the billionaire businessman. The secret facility provides us with another 
perspective, which runs parallel to Batman’s nocturnal adventures. Like the offstage 
provisions of the magicians in The Prestige, the bunker in The Dark Knight is the 




operations. However, such locations are always kept hidden from the eyes of the ordinary 
people to maintain their sublime appearance. In providing the spectators of the film with 
these parallel worlds, Nolan attempts to uncover the triviality (or closeness) of such 
seemingly sublime facades in order to uncover their ideological constructions.     
As the film proceeds, Batman’s control over the city increases. Nearly at the end 
of the film, Bruce Wayne (or Batman) proves himself to be an agent of power by creating 
a special surveillance system. He manages to monitor Gotham’s phone communications 
by turning all cell phones into a microphone in order to locate the Joker. By doing so, he, 
as Lucius (Morgan Freeman) says, “can image all of Gotham” (01:56:08-09) and 
therefore spy “on thirty million people” (01:56:33-34). As they are talking to each other, 
we hear a babble of an unlimited number of voices in the background. Batman is 
watching over the whole city without anyone noticing it. If, as Lucius tells Batman, 
“[t]his is too much power for one person” (01:56:26-27), then how could one justify it in 
a democracy? Batman’s initially self-appointed position as Gotham’s vigilante has turned 
into a consensus because it strengthens the pillars of power. There is a scene in a 
restaurant owned by Bruce Wayne, where Harvey Dent, Natascha (Beatrice Rosen), 
Rachel (Maggie Gyllenhaal) and Bruce himself discuss Batman’s ultimate power and its 
justification:  
Natascha:  How could you want to raise children in a city like this? 
Wayne: Well, I was raised here. I turned out OK. 
[…] 





Harvey: Gotham City is proud of an ordinary citizen standing up for 
what’s right. 
Natascha: Gotham needs heroes like you—elected officials, not a man 
who thinks he’s above the law. 
Wayne: Exactly. Who appointed the Batman? 
Harvey: We did. All of us who stood by and let scum take control of our 
city.  
Natascha: But this is a democracy, Harvey. 
Harvey: When their enemies were at the gates, the Romans would suspend   
democracy and appoint one man to protect the city. It wasn’t 
considered an honor. It was considered a public service. 
Rachel: Harvey, the last man they asked to protect the republic was named  
           Caesar, and he never gave up his power. (00:20:03-51) 
From what Harvey Dent, as Gotham’s district attorney, says, absolute power is justified 
once performed for the protection of the city. Dent’s idea of the suspension of democracy 
in the name of public service shows the way that the discourse of power manipulates 
language in order to mislead people into believing that a threat is beneficial to the society.  
Batman’s wealth and power make him an exception. He performs vigilante 
operations against criminals as part of his public service for Gotham. These missions are 
always shown in aerial shot, implying Batman’s unlimited control not only over the city 
of Gotham but also over the rest of the world. During his nightly attack on Lau’s 
company in Hong Kong,21 he is shown in particularly sublime angles. The camera first 
                                                 
21 This remind us of the U.S so-called anti-terrorist actions in certain countries, like those in Afghanistan, 




shows a skyscraper in aerial shot. Then, it moves 180 degrees until we see Bruce 
Wayne’s long shot in a Batsuit from a distance. He then puts on his Batman’s hood (or 
mask) as he crouches to fire four timed bombs at the building of LSI Holdings. Our next 
shot is that of Batman in high angle subjective shot as he is standing over the skyscraper 
overlooking LSI Holdings. He then drops from the supertall building as he spreads his 
wings. The next shot is from underneath, portraying Batman as he is flying, but then cuts 
to an aerial shot, to finally depict him in an extreme long shot from a far distance, 
magnifying the huge skyscraper he drops from. Batman breaks into the building, kills 
almost all guards, drags Lau (Chin Han) by his shoe in an extremely humiliating manner, 
brings him to the broken windows, flies into the air with him, and disappears. What is 
particularly significant about this sequence is the super-intelligent technology that 
Batman uses in penetrating LSI Holdings. Although he doesn’t show any superhuman 
powers, his expensive apparel and guns put him beyond an ordinary man. In other words, 
Bruce Wayne’s wealth makes him an impossible superman.    
The domestic parallel to the Hong Kong incident happens over the rooftops of 
Gotham. The scene shows Batman standing atop another supertall skyscraper towering 
over the whole city. Here again, the scene starts with an aerial shot but then pans to a low 
angle shot of Batman, as he is listening, through his expensive earpieces, to the 
conversations of the whole city (see figs. 28-29). Such sublime shots highlight Batman’s 
exceptional powers as a superhero at the service of the society. At the end of the day, 
however, Batman’s missions are only a means to support the established order. To sum 
up what I have mentioned, the spectators identify with Batman because he provides them 




exceptionally empowered (to perform his vigilante missions). The paradoxical point 
about this fantasy is that the spectators are told that there is only one Batman: nobody is 
permitted to do what Batman does.  
  
 
Figure 28. The Dark Knight: shot 1 
 
Figure 29. The Dark Knight: shot 2 
 
Not only does Batman consider himself to be the one without substitution, but 
also the one who would never be accessed, or the one who, as himself says, “has no 
limits” (00:13:35-38). At the end of the film, he tells Gordon that Gotham is not yet ready 
to accept him. That is why he runs in the streets of Gotham in order to be followed. In the 
scene where dogs are unleashed to chase him, Gordon’s voice-over romanticizes and 
idolizes him: “[H]e’s the hero Gotham deserves, but not the one it needs right now. So 
we’ll hunt him because he can take it. Because he’s not our hero. He’s a silent guardian, a 
watchful protector, a dark knight” (02:23:52-24:25). Batman is running with a broken 
leg, and the camera shows him in tracking shots in a low-key setting as the dogs, in long 
shot, are hunting him. He eventually climbs on his Batpod along the underground streets 
of Gotham. Then, we witness high-key lighting as he approaches the end of the tunnel, 
and the low-key lighting fades. A second later, a flash of light makes Batman disappear 
and the film ends. 
Batman’s fast-paced movement towards the source of light at the end of the film, 




scene of the film, though in a reverse form. This initial scene, which takes around 10 
seconds, pictures enormous flames in dark azure and black consuming the frame, out of 
which a bat symbol arises which gets closer until its blackness devours the whole frame 
and the bat itself disappears. Once you get closer to the sublime, it loses its sublimity, it 
becomes trivial, and super-ordinary. That is why the final scene depicts Batman as he is 
attempting to escape, to be unattainable, to become impossible. The abrupt arrival of 
Batman out of darkness in the beginning of the film eventually leads to his sudden 
departure (or disappearance) at the end. Initially Batman seems to be too close to the film 
spectators (as a projection of their fantasies) but he is in fact too far from them as the film 
ending proves (desire never allows the subject to obtain the objet petit a). Thus, the 
sublimity of desire lies in its paradoxical nature: it misguides the subjects into believing 
that they will reach the object that fills their lack, but it doesn’t guide them to that object. 
This complicated character of desire is also evident in Batman: his appearance in the film 
is not simply to serve as the bulwark of capitalism (we already know that he owns Wayne 
Enterprise) or to defend the Symbolic Order; rather, he is a lure for the film spectators in 
the sense that he shapes their fantasies.    
The abovementioned initial scene anticipates the trauma that the spectators would 
experience in watching the film. The devouring flames are repeated once again as the 
Joker explodes Gotham General Hospital. Here, the explosion causes gargantuan dark 
azure and black flames as the building collapses on the ground. From the beginning to the 
end, the explosion takes 60 seconds, which is a considerable length, magnifying its 
effects on the people of Gotham. The cross-cutting employed here shows the Joker’s 




detonator in his right hand: simultaneously, we see the horrified faces of the people in the 
school bus near the building as a piercing blast makes them cover their ears with their 
hands. When the explosion causes the destruction of the building, the camera cuts to 
Gordon’s face who dumbfoundedly hears the roaring of the explosion. The role of 
parallel editing here is to prolong the impact of the horrifying explosion on individual 
people of Gotham: while the whole action in reality wouldn’t take more than 10 seconds, 
in the plot it takes around a minute. The slowing down of the explosion through 
crosscutting shows the real impact of the resultant trauma on the people. The significance 
of the two explosions in the film is immense because they introduce massive changes to 
the set of events in the story. One particular change takes place in the character of Harvey 
Dent.  
Batman’s only possible alternative to maintain order in Gotham is Harvey Dent. 
He is Gotham’s district attorney, and a man with strict discipline and order. In the 
fundraiser sequence at Bruce Wayne’s mansion, in a conversation between Rachel and 
Bruce in the balcony, the latter tells the former: “You know that day you once told me 
about, when Gotham no longer needs Batman. It’s coming. It’s happening now—Harvey 
is that hero. He locked up half of the city’s criminals, and he did it without wearing a 
mask. Gotham needs a hero with a face” (00:45:45-46:05). Here, Bruce Wayne is 
referring to Harvey’s apprehension of a number of criminals associated with the 
underground Mob, bringing them into the court, and charging them with several felonies. 
Before going through such a critical operation, the Mayor (Nestor Carbonell) warns 
Harvey of the possible consequences: “They’re all coming after you, now. And not just 




you up to it?” (00:41:26-35). Harvey Dent simply smiles at this, implying that it wouldn’t 
be a hard task for him. In the fundraiser sequence, Bruce Wayne expresses his strong 
belief in Harvey’s capability to redeem the city from its current conditions. The scene 
shows Bruce, Harvey, and Rachel, all three in different points in the center of the hall, 
creating a triangle as they are surrounded by the attendants. The camera portrays single 
shot close-ups of each and a dim view of the background people, as Bruce praises 
Harvey: “I believe in Harvey Dent. I believe that on his watch, Gotham can feel a little 
safer, a little more optimistic. Look at this face. This is the face of Gotham’s bright 
future” (00:45:09-24). 
 Bruce Wayne’s anticipatory remark about Harvey’s face and Gotham’s future, 
however, turns into the exact opposite with the passage of time: after Rachel’s death, 
Harvey turns into a monster who attempts to avenge her loss by murdering select people 
from the Mob as well as the police crew. Such a shift from a hero to a villain reminds us 
of what Harvey says nearly at the beginning of the film: “I guess you either die a hero or 
you live long enough to see yourself become the villain” (00:20:54-57). In the next 
section, I will elaborate on Harvey Dent’s change of character, which is caused by the 
Joker’s plans.   
 
4.3 When the Real Betrays the Void of the Symbolic 
 
 It is mere accident that the actor who played the role of the Joker in The Dark 
Knight is the namesake of one of the greatest literary characters of English literature. The 




Wuthering Heights (1847).22 It is even more interesting to note that Heathcliff in 
Wuthering Heights and the Joker in The Dark Knight are not so different from each other: 
they are both violent and beast-like whose actions causes only disasters for the people 
around them. In The Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson argues that Heathcliff is not 
an ordinary character or a human being; rather, he stands for “an impersonal process” or 
“the locus of history” which introduces a new phase of capitalism (113-14). For Jameson, 
history is very much like the Lacanian Real because it is not expressible in language any 
more: it is an “absent cause” responsible for certain socio-economic changes (19-20). 
What if we consider the Joker as another Heathcliff whose emergence in the film is 
caused by the anamorphotic gaze of the Real? In this section, I argue that the Joker has 
several features that buttress the idea that his appearance in Gotham (and in film) is made 
by an absent cause, namely the Real. This absent cause, I claim, reminds the spectators 
that fantasies are fragile dreams shaped by the machinations of desire. The presence of 
the Joker in the film is, like the anamorphotic stain, to highlight the distorted vision of the 
spectators and to show them the limitations of the Symbolic Order. In my discussion, I 
shall particularly focus on the Joker’s unknown origins, his weird face, and his 
unsystematic, violent actions to propose that his existence should be attributed to the 
order of the Real.  
The first important point that makes us claim that the Joker is an impossible 
phenomenon is the fact that he literally comes from nowhere. He is not the type of 
criminal that we could find in real life as he “defies explanation” (Cocksworth 542). As 
Gordon informs the Mayor when they trap the Joker, he has nothing to be identified with: 
                                                 
22 In 2009, Heath Ledger received a posthumous Academy Award for the best supporting actor for his role 




“Nothing. No matches on prints, DNA, dental. Clothing is custom, no labels. Nothing in 
his pockets but knives and lint. No name, no other alias” (01:24:00-12). The Joker is to 
be considered as “a larger than life symbol” (Bott 242) or, to quote Jesse Kavadlo, “less a 
character than a cypher” (170). He is an anomaly, a grotesque figure whose actions, like 
the anamorphotic stain, introduce excess into the film. For Slavoj Žižek, because of its 
traumatic nature, the Real is experienced as a nightmare: “precisely because it is real, 
that is, on account of its traumatic/excessive character, we are unable to integrate it into 
(what we experience as) our reality, and are therefore compelled to experience it as a 
nightmarish apparition” (Desert of the Real 19). The Joker’s appearance and actions in 
the film are no less than a nightmare because of their traumatic effect on the people of 
Gotham (and the spectators). Another particular feature in his character, which makes us 
claim that the Joker’s presence in the film is caused by the absent Real, is his weird face: 
some people call him a freak because his face is an exception that exceeds the norm. He 
has hideous scars on both sides of his face, which start from the corners of his mouth and 
run roughly symmetrical to the ears, making his appearance look like smiling broadly at 
all times. His face, monstrously disfigured, is a stain in the picture. It is curious to see 
how he tells different stories about his face: the more the Joker tells us about his scars, 
the less we know about their origins. The Joker’s story, which he narrates several times, 
move in the opposite direction of the rather simple structure of the film: it is a signifier 
with no signified. His narrative introduces certain breaks in the film’s overall pace, thus 
creating a twisted form of storytelling. Three times in the film the Joker tells anecdotes 
regarding the origins of the scars on his face (to Gambol, Rachel, and Batman). Every 




he tells his story to Gambol (Michael Jai White) in a pool hall. He puts a blade on 
Gambol’s mouth, in an extreme close-up, and narrates his tale in cold blood as Gambol’s 
fearful eyes glisten with tears:  
You Wanna know how I got these scars? My father was a drinker and a 
fiend. And one night he goes off crazier than usual. Mommy gets the 
kitchen knife to defend herself. He doesn’t like that, not one bit! So, me 
watching, he takes the knife to her, laughing while he does it. He turns to 
me and he says, ‘why so serious?’ He comes at me with the knife, ‘why so 
serious?’ He sticks the blade in my mouth, ‘let’s put a smile on that face’. 
And, why so serious? (00:30:09-31:08) 
The very moment that he articulates the last three words, he kills Gambol in cold blood. 
Until now, we as spectators accept what the Joker says but our trust doesn’t take long 
because the next time that he talks about his scars, he provides us with a different version.  
The Jokers’ scars are the signifier without a proper signified. The second time that 
he begins explaining the reason for his gruesome cuts, he narrates to Rachel another 
story. The scene is inside Bruce Wayne’s mansion and the occasion is the fundraiser 
party. He moves towards Rachel, turns around her as the camera is turning with him 360 
degrees. Rachel’s face shows her intense feelings. As he grabs her face, he says,  
You look nervous. Is it the scars? Wanna know how I got them? […]  I 
had a wife, beautiful like you, who tells me I worry too much, who tells 
me I ought to smile more, who gambles and gets in deep with the sharks 
[.…] One day they carve her face, and we have no money for surgeries. 




I don’t care about the scars. So I stick a razor in my mouth and do this to 
myself. And you know what? She can’t stand the sight of me. She leaves! 
Now I see the funny side. Now I’m always smiling. (00:50:45-51:52) 
 The third time that the Joker attempts to tell the story of his scars, this time to 
Batman, happens nearly at the end of the film. Here, Batman and the Joker are inside the 
penthouse of a skyscraper fighting each other. The Joker pushes Batman over a glass 
window, and as it breaks, Batman falls on his back, and the steel window frame crashes 
down on his neck. The Joker bends over him and pushes the steel beam over his neck. 
The scene shows extreme close-ups of both in a setting with low-key lighting. The Joker 
tells Batman: “It’s a funny world we live in. Speaking of which, you know how I got 
these scars?” (02:12:59-13:01). As he is halfway through his sentence, Batman answers, 
“No. But I know how you got these” (02:13:01-04). Batman suddenly fires a few blades 
from his gauntlet which hit the Joker’s neck, and then grabs his chest and frees himself 
by kicking the Joker out of the building. This time the Joker finds no opportunity to 
resume the story of his scars, and therefore, his story never ends. The Joker, therefore, 
has no specific origins. As Slavoj Žižek indicates, “the Joker has no back-story and lacks 
any clear motivation: he tells different people different stories about his scars, mocking 
the idea that some deep-rooted trauma drives him (Living in the End Times 60). In this 
sense, the Joker’s scars hang endlessly in the play of signification, and the signifier never 
finds a signified. In other words, he imposes his own rules on the Symbolic Order and 
flows freely in and out of it without limitations. The Joker’s stories halt the film’s 




symbols. In this sense, the Joker’s narratives serve as the anamorphotic excess that raises 
the curiosity of the spectators and makes them aware of their limited perspective.  
The Joker’s first appearance in the film happens at the beginning, during the bank 
heist. He is standing next to a traffic light, waiting for the other gang members to arrive 
and drive him to the bank. He is initially shown in full shot from the back, then the 
camera gets closer to him in low angle shot, but the emphasis is not on the stature, but 
actually on the mask he is holding in his left hand. While we have not yet seen the 
Joker’s face, his mask, which he keeps tight to his left foot above his knee, is staring at 
us. Initially, the mask falls in the lowest possible spot in the frame; eight seconds later, 
however, it becomes the center of attention, the focal point of the frame returning the 
gaze of the spectators (see figs. 33-30 ). This is reminiscent of the anamorphotic point that 
Lacan finds in Holbein’s The Ambassadors: the object of our vision always already gazes 
back at us without our conscious knowledge.  
 
 
Figure 30. The Dark Knight: shot 3  
 
Figure 31. The Dark Knight: shot 4 
 
Figure 32. The Dark Knight: shot 5 
 





We see the Joker’s face for the first time inside the bank, as he is getting ready to 
leave the building with the huge amount of money that he has packed in large bags. He 
crouches over the half-dead body of the bank manager and slides a smoke grenade into 
the manager’s mouth after he shouts, “What do you believe in?” (00:05:35-36). The 
Joker, in an over the shoulder shot, answers, “I believe whatever doesn’t kill you, simply 
makes you stranger” (00:05:37-44). When he finishes this sentence, he removes his mask: 
the camera suddenly shifts to an extreme close-up of his face, magnifying the milky-
white makeup and the scars, creating a disgusting terror in the spectator which is clearly 
reflected in the bank manager’s face who gasps with extreme fear. Such a magnification 
of the repulsive features of the Joker’s face anticipates the traumatic experience of the 
spectators in watching the film.  
The third feature in the Joker that makes him an extraordinary, or rather unearthly 
character, is his actions. The Joker doesn’t rob banks for money as he shows total 
disregard for profit. He doesn’t kill people to get rid of them: he wants to (sadistically) 
relish their agony as they die. He is not an ordinary criminal, but a specifically unusual 
villain. In one occasion, inside Bruce Wayne’s underground bunker, Alfred advises Bruce 
to take the Joker seriously, and not a simple criminal. In this scene, as Alfred and Bruce 
are shown in shot reverse shot, close-up, the Joker’s face is displayed in one of the 
monitors in an extreme close-up, laughing. Batman says, “Criminals aren’t complicated, 
Alfred. We just need to figure out what he’s after” (00:54:07-11). Alfred tells him an 
anecdote in response, which reminds us of the nature of the Joker’s actions: 
A long time ago, I was in Burma and my friends and I were working for 




by bribing them with precious stones. But their caravans were being raided 
in a forest north of Rangoon by a bandit. So we went looking for the 
stones. But in six months, we never met anyone who traded with him. One 
day I saw a child playing with a ruby the size of a tangerine. The bandit 
had been throwing them away [.…] Because he thought it was good sport. 
Because some men aren’t looking for anything logical, like money. They 
can’t be bought, bullied, reasoned or negotiated with. Some men just 
wanna watch the world burn. (00:54:18-55:11) 
 The bandit’s purpose in throwing the rubies away is clear: trivializing the 
sublime. The sublime object, in the Joker’s case, is money. For him, too, money or 
numbers are meaningless. He takes pleasure from watching everything burn because he is 
“the bringer of anarchy as chaos for the sake of chaos” (Bordoloi 93). There is a scene 
where the Joker is shown atop a huge pile of cash, which is around 8-10 meters high. The 
pile is shown from a low angle as the Joker slides down and, as a corollary of his 
movement, numerous bundles of money fall over. He leaves Lau on the top of the pile. 
When the Chechen asks him, “what you do with all your money?” (01:42:34-36), the 
Joker answers “I’m a guy of simple taste. I enjoy dynamite, and gunpowder, and 
gasoline” (01:42:37-46). Then, one of the Joker’s assistants brings a gasoline can and 
splashes it on the pile of cash. The Chechen is enraged and attempts to interfere. The 
Joker aims a gun at him, sets the pile on fire, saying, “And you know that the thing they 
[the Mob] have in common? They’re cheap [.…] All you care about is money. This town 
deserves a better class of criminal, and I’m going to give it to them [.…] This is my city” 




background, their shadows falling on the Chechen’s desperate face. When the pile of 
money is almost burned, the Joker continues, “It’s not about money. It’s about sending a 
message. Everything burns” (01:43:58-44:06). The Joker, in this sense, introduces 
himself as the Real side of capitalism, his actions being an immense blow to the laws of 
the established order. As Patricia Pisters points out,  
The Joker does have a political message. He is not interested in the piles 
of money that the heavily organized crime factions in the city are after—
he just burns it, ridiculing criminal forms of capitalist greediness. He 
similarly derides the false forms of safety that come from obeying rules 
and upsets the established order to show the chaos underneath it. (94) 
We should remind ourselves, once again, that the Joker is the anamorphotic stain (of the 
Real) that is imposed on the discourse of capitalism. He trivializes the sublime object of 
money and fights the idolized Batman (who stands for power). The Joker’s role is 
therefore to disturb the spectators’ fantasies, and to show them how fragile is the 
Symbolic Order.  
It is not the sadistic pleasure of watching people in agony that defines the Joker. 
He also takes masochistic enjoyment from being the object of torture. In the scene when 
Batman beats him in order to find information on the whereabouts of Harvey and Rachel, 
the Joker seems invincible. The more the torture is intensified, the more the Joker’s 
satisfaction becomes: he laughs hysterically and continuously, saying, “You have 
nothing. Nothing to threaten me with. Nothing to do with all your strength” (01:30:14-
21). Even at the end of the film when Batman kicks him out of windows of the 




Gotham’s white knight [Harvey Dent]. And I brought him down to my level. It wasn’t 
hard—madness is like gravity. All it takes is a little push” (02:14:53-15:09). The Joker 
proves himself to be fond of dying. In the middle of the film, in a scene where Batman 
gets closer to him with his Batpod at full speed, the Joker doesn’t budge an inch, 
repeating, “I want you do it. Come on. Hit me” (01:22:08-10). The Joker, in this sense, 
proves to take pleasure from being beaten or killed, which are signs of his masochistic 
character.  
 The Joker’s actions, once started, produce a domino effect, an unbroken chain of 
never-ending traumatic events that wreak havoc on the city of Gotham. The burning of 
the pile of money is followed by the explosion of the hospital, and then, his threatening to 
eliminate anyone who wouldn’t join him, which results in the whole population deciding 
to leave the town. The Joker’s radical actions produce a big void, a nonsensical empty 
space in the Symbolic Order, which disrupts the normal functioning of the affairs. He 
adopts an anti-humanistic approach to challenge the very basic values of individual 
people in the society. For example, a few times in the film he sets his plans based on 
survival, the most essential instinct of all living beings. In the pool hall, after he 
eliminates Gambol, he offers two alternatives for Gambol’s men: to die or to join his 
team. However, as he mentions, “there’s only one spot open right now, so we’re gonna 
have tryouts” (00:31:28-33). As he articulates the last word (tryouts), the Joker is shown 
in extreme close-up, breaking a pool cue into two halves. He keeps one half, but throws 
the second in front of Gambol’s three men, who are staring fearfully at each other. The 
scene ends abruptly, but it is implied that only one of the three would stay alive after he 




resultant dead bodies), which is not allowed in the Symbolic Order. This surplus is the 
unethical core or the underside of the discourse of capitalism: the hidden rivalry for 
survival and the subsequent waste.    
The Joker insists on revealing the instinctual, selfish side of humanity. After the 
incident of the explosion of the hospital, he sends another message asking the people of 
the city to either join him or leave the city. The Joker’s threat creates an uproar in 
Gotham as the people swarm into the bridge to leave the town. They are shown in 
extreme long shot, to emphasize their magnitude, and extreme close-up, to magnify their 
anxiety. Two giant boats, one accommodating the criminals and, the other, innocent 
citizens, leave the city by the evening. It doesn’t take a long time to find out that there are 
“a hundred barrels down there [in the engine room] rigged to blow” (02:00:36-37). The 
Joker’s trace is here once again. He has placed bombs and one remote detonator in each 
ferry. A few minutes later, there is a telephone message from the Joker:  
Tonight, you’re all gonna be a part of a social experiment. Through the 
magic of diesel fuel and ammonium nitrate, I’m ready right now to blow 
you all sky-high. If anyone attempts to get off their boat, you all die. Each 
of you has a remote to blow up the other boat. At midnight, I blow you all 
up. If, however, one of you presses the button, I’ll let that boat live. So 
who’s it gonna be? Harvey Dent’s most wanted scumbag collection or the 
sweet and innocent civilians? You choose. Oh, and you might want to 





There is an uproar in the boats right after the end of the Joker’s phone call. After an 
intense argument over blowing up the other boat or doing nothing, the so-called ‘innocent 
citizens’ decide to put it on a vote, to democracy. Once the voting is over, the results are 
declared: “The tally is 140 against, 396 for” (02:07:31-36). This means that those who 
support elimination of the people in the other boat are about three times as great as those 
against it. In the other boat, one of the criminals of the city throws the detonator into the 
sea. This “blurring of boundaries” between good and evil signifies “the instability of 
oppositions and the shades of grey between black and white” (Brooker 207). The Joker’s 
plan succeeds because he deconstructs the ethical values of the society as well as the 
politics of democracy.  
 The Joker’s actions run spontaneously in the film as we are always already 
trapped in them without knowing about their origins. In all cases, the spectator becomes 
aware of the Joker’s plans only in medias res. One of such plans happens earlier in the 
film as he kidnaps Rachel and Harvey Dent. He keeps each in a different location, and 
places two bombs (in both locations) that would detonate at the same time. While death is 
a most recurrent motif in the films by Christopher Nolan, in no other film than in The 
Dark Knight the subjects await it with such a tremendous anxiety. Here Nolan doesn’t 
use split screen, but employs parallel editing, allowing each character to speak at a 
moment, thus prolonging the agony. What makes the experience even more distressful for 
Rachel and Harvey is the fact that the Joker has embedded microphones in both locations, 
so they could hear each other’s most excruciating moments. Rachel and Harvey are 
shown in extreme close-up (in a low-key setting) in order to magnify the terror inside. 




marriage proposal, tells him that “I don’t want to live without you and I do have an 
answer for you. My answer is yes […] Listen, somewh…” (01:35:25-56). Before going 
ahead to continue her sentence, a massive blast stops her, and we see a flash of red light 
on her distraught face, and then the explosion kills her. Rachel’s last words picturing a 
fantasized future with Harvey come to nothing seconds later. This way the Real forces 
itself on the stage, annihilating any prospect for the fruition of a promised fantasy. The 
Real is always traumatic: it comes abruptly from nowhere and it suppresses the voice: it 
is an absent cause that “intrudes as if from an outside radically unassimilable to the logic 
of the signifier,” threatening the subject’s relationship with the Symbolic Order (Eyers 
80).  
 The metamorphosis of Harvey Dent, both mental and physical, therefore takes 
place in a traumatic encounter. Like Leonard Shelby in Memento, I argue, Harvey Dent 
becomes a violent psychopath who destroys other subjects in order to avenge his wife’s 
death. He, in other words, imagines that there is total satisfaction in (jouissance of) the 
Other, which, for him, appears in the form of revenge. Harvey’s problem is that he is 
unable to see that in reality “jouissance, enjoyment, is always only a half-enjoyment” 
(Zupančič 108). To clarify, the subject can never find total enjoyment in real life. As I 
mentioned earlier, Harvey Dent, who was once considered to be a future ‘Batman in 
daylight’, turns into a serial killer after the death of Rachel. Harvey’s disfigured face and 
violent actions betray the void at the heart of the Symbolic Order. They project the 
anamorphotic gaze of the Real returning the look of the film spectators. In other words, 
Harvey’s grotesque face and destructive actions exhibit the core of desire of the film 




can get from the post traumatic Harvey Dent is a Real message: the ugly side of Harvey 
Dent is his (desire for) excessive jouissance. It would make sense to take a close look at 
Harvey’s face and actions to see how they signify the Real gaze.  
Harvey’s mutilated face is not a pleasant scene to look. While the right side of his 
face seems neat, the other side, grotesque as it is, makes the spectators shiver with 
disgust: the eye has lost its upturned oval shape and has become a protruding circle 
because there are no eyelashes or eyebrows. One could easily see the area inside located 
under the eyelids. The skin on the left side of the face is removed for the most part, and 
that is why one could observe the teeth and the gums as well as the inside layers beneath 
the cheeks. The nose, too, on the left is burnt and there is a visible crack on the tip. The 
hair on the left side of the forehead is lost and the skin is torn in some parts. The first 
time that Harvey finds out what has happened to his face, he is shown in extreme close-
up as he inspects the bandage over his face. He shrieks with rage, but we do not hear his 
voice probably because it is so loud that the spectators cannot bear it (we don’t hear him 
because Nolan replaces it with a low-pitched sad score.). When Gordon comes to visit 
him in the hospital, Harvey is lying in the bed, staring at an ambiguous point on the left. 
As Gordon is in the right side, to him everything seems normal as he is yet unable to see 
Harvey’s left side of the face. As the camera zooms, Harvey turns his face. Since the 
camera cuts to Gordon’s face in less than a second, the spectator is unable to see a clear 
shot of Harvey’s face. However, Gordon’s facial expressions, his dumbfounded eyes and 
wide open mouth, put him in the position of the spectator. If we recall Holbein’s The 
Ambassadors, the anamorphosis lies in the fact that a certain spot in the painting is not 




why we need a specific position to decode the geometral object, or the skeleton. Here 
again, Gordon’s position, as well as that of the film’s spectator, makes him unable to 
have a clear view of Harvey’s face. All of a sudden, however, Harvey turns the left side, 
and therefore, Gordon views the whole face (see figs. 34-37). In this sense, Harvey’s left 
side of the face functions as the anamorphotic point in the picture because it introduces 
an excess which is not palatable to the eye.  
 
 
Figure 34. The Dark Knight: shot 7 
 
Figure 35. The Dark Knight: shot 8 
 
Figure 36. The Dark Knight: shot 9 
 
Figure 37. The Dark Knight: shot 10 
  
 Harvey Dent’s ugly side of the face reveals the obscene side of his actions. Since 
he regards himself as a victim, he decides, like Leonard Shelby in Memento, to destroy all 
those people he believes are responsible for the death of his fantasized love object. He 
loses his connection with the pleasure principle because he becomes an agent of 
jouissance, and this is why he starts a serial killing which only ends with his own death. 
In the first half of the film, Harvey’s lucky coin signifies the divide in his mind and 




Harvey shows that he is torn between his adherence to the law and his fondness of the 
violation of the codes of normal life. In one particular scene when Rachel asks him not 
jeopardize his life to trap the Joker, he tosses his lucky coin to decide. She begs him, 
“This is your life. You can’t leave something like that to chance” (01:14:10-14). Harvey 
smiles, but doesn’t change his mind.   
 The Harvey Dent that arrives after the traumatic incident of the death of Rachel is 
a serial killer. He kills a police officer named Wuertz (Ron Dean), as well as the Mob 
Italian boss, Maroni (Eric Roberts), and his driver. The Two-Face’s next kill never 
happens because of his sudden death. Even the death of Harvey Dent does not change 
anything, and his monstrosity, which is the outcome of the Joker’s successful attempts, 
introduces a void in the Symbolic Order. Harvey Dent’s serial killing, like that of 
Leonard Shelby in Memento, is doomed to fail. In the path that he takes, he is looking for 
an ultimate satisfaction that he would find by obtaining the object of desire. His basic 
problem is that he doesn’t get the true message of the Joker. In the hospital, the Joker 
tells him why he is different from everyone else in Gotham: 
Do I really look like a guy with a plan? You know what I am? I’m a dog 
chasing cars. I wouldn’t know what to do with one if I caught it. You 
know I just do things. The Mob has plans. The cops have plans. Gordon’s 
got plans. You know, they’re schemers. Schemers trying to control their 
little worlds. I’m not a schemer, I try to show the schemers how pathetic 
their attempts to control things really are [.…] It’s the schemers who put 




that got you. I just did what I do best—I took your little plan, and I turned 
it on itself. (01:48:12-49:44) 
By creating such a distinction, the Joker differentiates between those who search for an 
ultimate object of desire and himself, who lives in the moment. Harvey Dent and the rest 
of Gotham imagine that there is an Other, which would give them what they desire. This 
(nonexistent) Other is at the core of ideology (especially capitalism). Capitalism forces its 
subjects to be schemers, to make plans to get more. When the only purpose of the subject 
is “to achieve some ultimate object” through scheming, his or her act “enslaves one to the 
object of one’s scheme” (McGowan, Fictional 134).  
To sum up what I discussed in this section, the anamorphotic gaze of the Real 
thus lies in the image of the Joker and Harvey Dent. While Batman promises that the path 
of desire would lead to fantasy—a straightforward promise at the heart of capitalism—in 
the paralleled world that appears in the second half of the film, we witness that investing 
in the desire of the Other wouldn’t give the subjects what they want. This anamorphotic 
gaze is addressed to the spectators to ask them to reconsider the world around them to see 
how fragile is the Symbolic Order and its constructions.  
 
4.4 The Anamorphotic Surplus and the Subversion of the Film  
 
  The way that the Joker communicates with the surrounding world moves in the 
same direction as his actions: it signifies disorder and chaos. A couple of times, he sends 
recorded video messages informing the society of his actions, plans, and demands. While 
these videos are broadcast by GCN (Gotham City Network), they do not resemble the 
professional videos one could follow in such TV channels; rather, they seem like 




earthquake is occurring. If we take The Dark Knight as an artwork produced after a long, 
iterative process of cinematography and editing, then the existence of such an alternative 
video footage is the anamorphotic point which produces a void at the heart of the work of 
art. My argument is that the Joker’s amateurish videos serve as the point from which the 
Real returns the look of the spectator: his video footage deconstruct the spectator’s vision 
and the film (as a seemingly continuous process).  
The spectator is presented with the Joker’s first video message through the 
television set in Wayne’s Enterprise and it catches the attention of Alfred and Bruce 
Wayne. While we are watching the video, there are repeated cuts to Bruce Wayne’s and 
Alfred’s disturbed, dejected faces, shocked by the content. Before playing the video, 
GCN shows a hanging dead body in Batsuit being pulled down by a crane. We later 
discover that the body belongs to a man, whom the Joker killed after using him in his 
footage. The Joker’s video starts with a man (in Batsuit) tied to a chair. The Joker asks 
him to introduce himself and the fake Batman calls himself Brian Douglas. The Joker 
laughs as his handheld camera shakes with a harsh noise, which is caused by his 
movements. The camera gets closer and the Joker asks him if he is the real Batman, with 
Brian saying no. There are repeated shakings of the camera once again as the Joker 
removes the fake Batman’s mask, asking him, “Then why do you dress up like him?” 
(00:42:42-43). The camera, then, moves back, with the Joker’s hand hanging Batman’s 
mask in the air, as he bursts into a grotesque laughter. The fake Batman replies, “Because 
he is a symbol that we don’t have to be afraid of scum like you” (00:42:47-50). Here, the 
camera gets too close to Brian’s face as the Joker pulls his hair, slaps him in the face, and 




violently twice, “Look at me!” (00:43:04-05). The very moment that Brian looks at him, 
the Joker cuts to his own face, saying, with a trembling voice, “You see, this is how crazy 
Batman’s made Gotham. You want order in Gotham, Batman must take off his mask and 
turn himself in” (00:43:10-20). The camera gets closer to the Joker’s face as he is moving 
around the room, saying, “And every day he doesn’t, people will die, starting tonight. I’m 
a man of my word” (00:43:22-29). Then he once again roars into laughter. The camera 
shakes several times and turns upside down: this weird movement of the camera is so 
quick that we can see no clear image (see figs. 38-41), as we hear Brian shouting 
desperately. The Joker’s obsession throughout the film appears to be the unmasking of 
Batman and show his face to the world. In a sense, he is looking for the truth. Slavoj 
Žižek believes that “paradoxically, the only figure of truth in the film is the Joker, its 
supreme villain” (Living in the End Times 59).  
 
 
Figure 38. The Dark Knight: shot 11 
 
Figure 39. The Dark Knight: shot 12 
 
Figure 40. The Dark Knight: shot 13 
 





The occasion of the second video message is immediately after the explosion of 
the hospital, this time inside a bar as people are watching GCN news. Before playing the 
Joker’s video, GCN is showing the aftermath of the explosion of the hospital, with the 
news host saying, “People are still missing, including GCN’s own Mike Engel” 
(01:53:30-33). A second later, the news host’s voice-over announces that “I’m now being 
told that we are cutting to a video GCN has just received” (01:53:34-37). As the Joker’s 
video starts playing, there are again repeated cuts to the people in the bar with shocked 
faces, as they start leaving the place before the end of the Joker’s message. The video 
starts with a close-up of Engel (Anthony Michael Hall), as we notice a hand-written 
“BREAKING NEWS” and a few splashes of red paint on the wall behind him. Engel 
starts reading the Joker’s message with glistening, frightened eyes: “What does it take to 
make you people wanna join in?” (01:53:40-42). As Engel continues, we see the Joker’s 
shadow on his face repeating the last word of each sentence that he reads:  
I’ve gotta get you of the bench (the Joker repeats, “bench.”) and into the 
game (the Joker repeats, “the game” and laughs.). Come nightfall, this city 
is mine (the Joker repeats, “mine.”) and anyone left here plays by my rules 
(the Joker repeats, “rules.”). If you don’t wanna be in the game (the Joker 
repeats, “game.”), get out now! (the Joker repeats, “get out now!”) 
(01:53:45-54:02).  
When he finishes reading, the camera starts shaking, and we see a glimpse of the Joker’s 
face, laughing in extreme close-up.  
 Not only does the Joker’s alternative video footage create traumatic moments for 




providing an alternative view of filmmaking. Through giving us raw, unedited videos 
recorded with a handheld, continuously shaky camera, the Joker turns the film on its 
head. By doing so, by trivializing the sublime, he challenges our perception of the film 
we watch. The Joker adds the monstrous to his videos by representing torture and 
violence in the screen. This is synonymous with replacing the copy with the original by 
giving us a representation of action not as it might happen in reality but with the Real 
action as it is. The way that the Joker makes the spectators confront the limited nature of 
vision is important as it makes them aware of the distorted view that is essential to vision. 
The Joker provides the spectators with a surplus which is denied in the Symbolic Order. 
This surplus is shown to us through the anamorphotic gaze of the Real. Here, the gaze 
should be seen in the horrified faces of the people that watch the Joker’s videos. This 
surplus provides us with the ways through which we can find a better view of the world 
around us.  
  In Chapters 4 and 5, we are able to see a major change in the subject as presented 
by Nolan. While in the previous films, the subjects move in the path of desire to find the 
objet petit a, in Inception and Interstellar the subjects cut this illusion and come to 
understand that there will be no ultimate object that would satisfy desire. The subjects, as 
appear in Nolan’s later films, realize that in the realm of the Other there is no total 
enjoyment. They accept the fact that the fantasized image that the discourse of capitalism 
promises leads them to no eventual object of desire. Thus, in Inception and Interstellar 






Chapter 5: Inception’s Impossible Encounters 
 
 
5.1 Introductory Statements  
 
 Inception (2010) is the first film in Nolan’s repertoire that provides us with a 
significant change in the relationship between the subject and the objet petit a. While in 
Nolan’s previous films, as I discussed in chapters on Memento, The Prestige, and The 
Dark Knight, the subjects resist the fact that the objet petit a is inaccessible, in Inception 
(and Interstellar, as we shall see in the next chapter) the subject realizes that such an 
object is impossible to obtain. This understanding has an important consequence: the 
subject finds that the underlying fantasy at the core of ideology (especially in the 
discourse of contemporary late capitalism) brings no ultimate object of satisfaction. 
Although (contemporary late) capitalism advocates constant greed for objects and obliges 
subjects to seek enjoyment in every form, it hides the fact that there is no way to access 
such a moment of jouissance. In Inception, as I will argue in this chapter, the subject 
ultimately finds a way to free himself from the machinations of desire: this is possible 
through the subject’s encounter with the gaze of (or as) the objet petit a. In the depths of 
his mind, Cobb (Leonardo DiCaprio) finds the impossibility of union with the object 
cause of his desire: he finds happiness in partial enjoyment. In this sense, therefore, 
Inception provides a significant contrast to Nolan’s previous films.   
Inception’s portrayal of the impossibility of (obtaining) the objet petit a and the 
deceitful path of desire, I will claim, could be seen especially when the film exposes the 
limits of the Symbolic Order (on which the discourse of capitalism stands). First and 
foremost, the priority of illusions over reality and the maze-like structure of the film 




reality, but then shatters this imaginary picture by revealing that even in the deepest layer 
there is no lost object of desire. Second, the subject’s encounter with repeated trauma (the 
case of Cobb and the haunting memories of his dead wife) initially misleads him into 
believing that he would need the objet petit a to fill his gap but then he finds that there is 
no such absolute object to invest in. Finally, the appearance of certain paradoxical (or 
impossible) objects and images in the film is an indication of the lack or incompleteness 
at the core of the Symbolic Order. The contradictory nature of paradox reveals an 
important point about the play of signification: something that exists in a particular way, 
turns into its opposite, to nonexistence in another way. The nonsense that is always 
included in paradox is what we require to question the status quo of the social reality.  
Along the way in this chapter, I will highlight the notion of inception as the film’s 
reflection on how ideology works on the subjects’ unconscious to make them desire (or 
think) in a certain way. As I will argue later, Inception doesn’t merely reflect on the 
functioning of ideology; rather, it asks the spectators to examine the authenticity of the 
reality they are experiencing and look for the moments that would provide opportunities 
for the revision and rethinking of their surrounding world.  
   
5.2 The Endless Core of Dreams and the Endless Path of Desire 
It goes without saying that Christopher Nolan’s Inception is the realm of 
hyperreality. It would be no exaggeration to claim that the whole film is a prolonged 
dream, although the narrative may seem to alternate between dream and reality. Inception 
starts in the middle of a dream but its ending is ambiguous, without clarifying if the 
spectator is represented with reality or another dream in the final sequence. The seeming 




where one could experience the deepest, almost inaccessible layers of the unconscious. 
While the preliminary design of incepting an idea into the subject’s mind takes place in 
reality, the major action of the film, including the operation of inception, occurs in the 
multiple layers of dream. Since in Inception dreams provide a space to simulate reality, it 
is almost impossible (for both the target subject of the trick and the spectators) to 
distinguish between illusion and reality. In other words, dream becomes the reality of the 
subject. As Nolan confirms in an interview, “one of the key lines in the film is dreams 
feel real while we’re in them” (“Inception Interview” 00:01:05-08). The disappearance of 
the boundaries between dreams and reality is at the heart of Inception.  
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan argues that 
the art technique known as trompe l’œil, which uses optical illusion to present an image 
as a three-dimensional object, is “the soul” of the objet petit a because “it pretends to be 
something other than what it is” (112). Lacan talks in particular about a trompe l’œil 
painting by the ancient Greek painter, Parrhasius: a veil which is so real that creates the 
(illusory) perspective that there is something behind it. For Lacan, the message of 
Parrhasius is that “if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him is the 
painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask what is behind it” 
(112). In other words, because of its illusory nature, trompe l’œil, like desire, deceives the 
eye into taking a non-existent object as really existing. Christopher Nolan’s Inception 
resembles the art of trompe l’œil in two ways: first, it creates the illusion that dreams are 
real; and second, its puzzle-box narrative makes the spectators believe that in the deepest 
level (Limbo) they can witness the projection of the objet petit a. At the same time, the 




anamorphotic stain: like Holbein’s skull, “the inverted use of perspective” (Lacan, Four 
Fundamental Concepts 87) produces an excess, which reveals the Real gaze: the objet 
petit a as an inaccessible surplus that falls beyond the Symbolic Order. In this section, I 
discuss how trompe l’œil and anamorphosis produce a hyperreal and distorted 
(dreamlike) structure, which is based on the logic of desire: an endless path that promises 
an eventual obtaining of the object cause of desire but then no fruition at the end. I will 
elucidate the plotlines of the film to argue how Nolan depicts the workings of ideology 
through his concept of inception.  
The central action of Inception, i.e., the mind heist, is strongly connected to 
Cobb’s hope of reunion with his children, Philippa (Claire Geare, Taylor Geare) and 
James (Jonathan Geare, Magnus Nolan).23 A Japanese businessman called Saito (Ken 
Watanabe) hires Cobb and his team of highly-skilled professionals to implant, in Robert 
Fischer’s mind, the idea of dissolving his father’s company so that Saito would acquire a 
fair share in the market. As Saito clarifies to Cobb, “We’re the last company standing 
between them and total energy dominance. And we can no longer compete. Soon, they’ll 
control the energy supply of half the world. In effect, they become a new superpower. 
The world needs Robert Fischer to change his mind” (00:45:01-18). In return, Saito 
guarantees that he would clear Cobb’s charge of murdering his own wife and, therefore, 
enable him to return to the United States to live with his children permanently. The 
central action seems simple enough as it is common with a classic heist film: to get what 
you want, you need to go through a seemingly impossible quest. However, the puzzle-
box plot of Inception creates an intricate pattern, a complicated story which is in sharp 
                                                 




contrast to a classical film in this genre. The arrangement of the events in the plot, which 
is accomplished through cross-cutting, takes the form of a maze, a labyrinth that leads to 
no definite destination. The story shuffles between dream and reality in a sense that one 
cannot find the borders: the film becomes a trompe l’œil that raises the curiosity of the 
spectators because they want to know what is hidden in the deepest level.  
The structure of the film is anamorphotic. The plot doesn’t proceed 
straightforwardly; rather, it provides us with a non-linear (or broken) narrative time. As it 
is common with Nolan, the film’s beginning is not actually the starting point of the story, 
but a sequence, which belong to a plotline that happens much later, nearly at the end. 
Inception starts with Cobb’s dream in a weird situation: huge waves of water collide and 
consume the whole frame. When Cobb is lying on his chest, the camera shows an 
extreme close-up of his face as he raises his head to see his own children playing at a 
distance along the shore. The scene is in slow motion (probably signifying the fact that 
this is a dream), showing Cobb’s daughter joining her brother, digging the muddy ground 
near a cliff. Cobb, then, falls asleep due to exhaustion when one of the children screams 
and runs along with the other following. As we later learn, this dream happens down in 
Limbo, in the second dream narrative. This structural anamorphosis plays with our 
perception of time and reality as it shuffles various plotlines to provide a distorted image 
of the action of the film. The initial scene is the anamorphotic stain as it later reveals to 
us that we were not actually in control of the image. In other words, while in this 
particular scene we mistakenly think that we are in Cobb’s dream, we eventually find that 
it was happening in Limbo. Anamorphosis, therefore, has a retroactive function as the 




What makes Inception an exception in Nolan’s filmmaking is the depth in each 
layer: Inception is not simply a layered film; each layer includes several other layers, 
which makes the structure like a puzzle box. The narrative in Inception flows like a fluid 
as it doesn’t clearly distinguish the several layers that run simultaneously through the 
film. The film consists of two layered dreams, one with a shorter length (around 15 
minutes) at the beginning, and the other, a prolonged dream (75 minutes), starting before 
we reach the second half, and ending nearly at the close of the film. What is common 
with both dreams is that they include various interconnected dream layers that break into 
each other without chronological order. There is one more plotline which connects these 
two narratives. It depicts reality and it takes about 49 minutes of the running time of the 
film, but it is inserted with several short dreams, and that is why its actual time is less 
than 40 minutes. The difference between the two dream plotlines, on the one hand, and 
the reality narrative, on the other hand, lies in the fact that dreams are cut mostly by other 
dreams (and rarely by external reality), but reality is always intervened by various short 
dreams. This priority of dreams over reality reminds us of the priority of illusion over the 
real object in the art of trompe l’œil: the illusion presents itself as the real to entice the 
look of the viewer: it promises more than what it actually does. In this sense, trompe l’œil 
has an ideological function because “every ideological field produces a surplus indicating 
the existence of more knowledge that can be told from within its frame” (Cho 31). As we 
reach the second half of the film, the maze-like feature of the dreams intensifies the 
illusion that by following the path to the deeper layers we should finally be able to find 




we witness in the upper levels. In other words, the deepest level shows the same degree 
of illusive hyperreality that we see in the previous levels.  
In Inception, the initial plotline (or the first dream narrative) consists of four 
interconnected layers of which only the last one, which is chronologically the first, takes 
place in external reality. The first three layers are all dreams that flow into each other 
through cross-cutting. The reality sequence in this plotline shows that the layered dreams 
are based on the initial plan (of Cobb and his team) to infiltrate into Saito’s unconscious. 
The three dream levels here are Limbo, Arthur’s dream, and Nash’s dream. The first level 
occurs deep inside Limbo with Cobb intending to kill Saito in order to bring him back to 
the real life. We should remind ourselves that this initial dream doesn’t belong to the rest 
of the dreams in the first plotline: it is the initial scene of Limbo in the second dream 
narrative. Arthur’s dream is the second one, which pictures Cobb and Arthur (Joseph 
Gordon-Levitt) inside Saito’s mansion as they plan to steal an important document from 
Saito’s unconscious safe. And finally, Nash’s dream shows all the team members 
investigating Saito to unravel his secrets. This last stage is later revealed to be Saito’s 
audition to hire the team in case they succeed. Limbo level, which serves as the film’s 
introductory sequence, as I mentioned before, is not actually related to the other two 
dream layers in terms of the story, but belongs to the second dream narrative. To make it 
more clear, the initial sequence of the first plotline serves as the starting point of deepest 
layer in the second dream plotline. This complicated structure takes the form of a puzzle: 
an intricate plot with no clear initial point and constant shifts of perspective. If we see the 
film with a straightforward logic, we miss the point: like Holbein’s The Ambassadors 




The first dream narrative in Inception is not simply an introduction to the other 
plotlines, but mostly a tutorial or training for the spectators to familiarize themselves with 
the basics of the concept of inception in order to make sense of the film as they proceed. 
Such tutorials for the spectators have an anti-ideological function because they serve to 
demystify and unravel the hidden codes of a complex concept. In Arthur’s dream, for 
example, there is a scene where Cobb and Arthur are clarifying the function of inception 
to Saito. The three are sitting around a rectangular table, with Cobb and Arthur in the two 
opposite lengths, talking in turns, and Saito at one end, listening while eating. Here, Cobb 
uses a metaphor to describe the situation when an idea is ingrained into someone’s mind: 
“What is the most resilient parasite? A bacteria? A virus? An intestinal worm? An idea. 
Resilient. Highly contagious. Once an idea has taken hold in the brain, it’s almost 
impossible to eradicate. An idea that is fully formed, fully understood. That sticks right in 
there somewhere” (00:02:46-03:13). During this conversation, the camera cuts several 
times between close-ups of Cobb and Saito. As Saito continues eating, he curiously asks, 
“For someone like you to steal?” (00:03:13-15). Arthur resumes what Cobb left 
unfinished: “Yes. In the dream state, your conscious defences are lowered and that makes 
your thoughts vulnerable to theft. It’s called extraction” (00:03:15-22). Cobb, then, offers 
his proposal to Saito: “We can train your unconscious to defend itself from even the most 
skilled extractor […] because I am the most skilled extractor. I know how to search your 
mind and find your secrets. I know the tricks and I can teach them to you, so that even 
when you’re asleep, your defense is never down” (00:03:23-42). The way Cobb 
introduces extraction and inception of ideas into someone’s mind is analogous to the way 




At the core of contemporary late capitalism, there exist an inception of the highest 
degree: by pretending that the next object to reach is what the subject requires to fill his 
lack, the hyperreal world of capitalism produces a plethora of illusions. To clarify, in the 
discourse of capitalism objects promise more than what they seem: every object that 
triggers the subject’s insatiable thirst for the objet petit a simply acts to prolong desire 
without ever fulfilling such an expectation. In the film, what makes the idea of inception 
even closer to ideology is the fact that dream is not simply a dream: the subject conceives 
this hyperreal or imaginary situation as real but the extractor knows that this is a dream 
only; the extractor is aware (or conscious) that he is there to implant an idea or extract a 
very important piece of information, to quote Cobb, from “a safe full of secrets” 
(00:03:55-56) in the subject’s unconscious. This situation reminds us of Louis 
Althusser’s thesis in his “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus”: “Ideology 
represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” 
(162). To expand, although ideology seems to relate the subject to the external reality 
very straightforwardly, it is in fact nothing but a dreamlike quality, a distortion of reality, 
or a hyperreality which the subject accepts as truth. Inception shows us that ideology 
works unconsciously in a way that one is always already trapped in it: several times in the 
film the subjects find themselves in the middle of dreams (or ideological thinking). The 
idea is that the world we live is surrounded by hyperreal images that contain us without 
our knowledge.  
Inception is not simply a film that reflects on how ideology functions through 
mystification of dream and reality. It moves beyond such a reflective task by calling for 




tutorials and trainings (for both the team members and the spectators), which provide 
“constant exposition” (Bordwell, Labyrinth 43), move exactly the opposite of the maze-
like formation of the plot. In other words, as we are introduced to the various layers of 
the narrative, we are provided with more details and explanations about the rules that 
govern the functioning of inception. If we take the concept of inception as a metaphor for 
ideology, then the film’s exposition, which is sustained throughout the work, does the 
opposite: it is revelatory and clarifying.  
The exposition, in a way, counterbalances the ideological function of the trompe 
l’œil. It marks the distinction between dream and reality by establishing some rules. Back 
to the first dream plotline and the workshop, there is an important rule about the workings 
of inception that is revealed in Arthur’s dream: an extractor would end the dream in case 
it doesn’t develop as expected. In the scene where Cobb is caught in the middle of 
opening the safe inside Saito’s mansion, Saito and Mal (Cobb’s dead wife) urge him to 
put down the weapon and return the envelope he has stolen. Mal (Marion Cotillard) aims 
the gun at Arthur to make Cobb do as Saito says, but he resists: “There is no use 
threatening him in a dream. Right, Mal?” (00:08:42-45). Mal’s answer reveals the secret: 
“That depends on what you’re threatening. Killing him would just wake him up. But 
pain?” (00:08:46-53). She shoots Arthur in the leg and continues, “Pain is in the mind” 
(00:08:57-58). Cobb jumps in the air over the table where his gun lies, takes it, and 
shoots Arthur in order to wake him up. Seconds later, Arthur wakes up in the previous 
dream layer, which is actually Nash’s dream. The simple lesson here is that one needs to 
get killed in order to wake up: to regain one’s position in reality, one is always required 




reminds us of what Žižek points out in Looking Awry: “in our unconscious, in the real of 
our desire, we are all murderers” (16). To elaborate, even in real life, when we dream, 
our mind creates a killing scenario in which we either play the role of the murderer or the 
victim. The sacrifice included in Inception is reminiscent of Angier’s replicating Machine 
in The Prestige. The rule is different though: while in The Prestige reproduction always 
necessitates the original to be destroyed, in Inception the original remains intact but the 
copy vanishes whenever required. 
In the first dream plotline, Arthur’s level reveals one more feature about dream 
instability—and ideology as well. If, by any chance, the subject whose mind is going to 
be extracted becomes aware that this is only a dream, it would become unstable or, even 
more, it could collapse. Is not this rule a code of ideology in the sense that any form of 
ideology remains an ideology as long as it is absorbed by the subject unconsciously? If 
the subject becomes aware of the secret, the sublimity of ideology loses its grandeur and 
becomes trivial. In Arthur’s dream, when Cobb offers Saito to become his extractor, he 
smiles mysteriously and leaves the room after saying, “Enjoy your evening gentlemen, as 
I consider your proposal” (00:04:05-09). Arthurs shows his suspicion by saying, “He 
knows” (00:04:12-13). Seconds later, there is a tremor and everything in the room starts 
to tremble. Here, the camera cuts several times between close-ups of objects in the room 
(lights or the glass on the table) and the individual subjects (Cobb and Arthur) as their 
faces shows extreme anxiety. Later on, when Cobb kills Arthur to wake him up (because 
he is in pain), the dream starts to collapse even further and everyone wakes up abruptly. 
The extractors (here, Cobb and Arthur) would face the consequences if the dream fails. 




message is clear: if the subject figures out the unconscious codes of ideology, it loses its 
grandeur and the subject could act against it.  
The idea of inception depends significantly on the art of trompe l’œil: the 
hyperreal world that Cobb and his teams create for the subjects needs to seem as realistic 
as possible. It should also seem quite familiar to the subjects. It is the responsibility of the 
dream architect to design the dreamspace so close to reality that it would be impossible 
for the target to tell the difference. If such a trick works, then the subjects would give 
away their secrets; otherwise, the subjects would suspect the situation and everything 
would fail. In the first plotline, we can witness such a problem in Nash’s dream. The 
team has made a hyperreal, quite familiar world for Saito (his apartment) and he is about 
to be deceived into taking it as reality. Almost deceived, Saito still resists and does not 
provide them with the information they demand. Excited, Cobb leaps forward and grabs 
Saito on the back of his neck and pushes him downwards. Saito’s face hits the carpet on 
the floor. Cobb angrily shouts, “Tell us what you know. Tell us what you know, now!” 
(00:13:25-27). Suddenly Saito start to laugh, saying, “I’ve always hated this carpet. It’s 
stained and frayed in such distinctive ways, but very definitely made of wool. Right now, 
I’m lying on polyester, which means I’m not lying on my carpet in my apartment. I’m 
still dreaming” (00:13:31-14:05). Cobb, Nash, and Arthur look at each other blankly. 
When they wake up in reality, Arthur angrily accuses Nash of designing the dream 
improperly. Nash answers, “I didn’t know he was going to rub his damn cheek on it!” 
(00:14:48-50). In presenting the subject with an almost exact copy of the real world, 
Cobb and his team create illusions that seem to be real. Such an imaginary world is 




seems to be true and too close, yet biased and too far if it is looked at from a specific 
angle.  
 The film’s exposition and training for the spectators continues as we enter the 
second major plotline or simply the reality narrative. Here, we are introduced into the 
idea of inception as a chance to create objects that might seem impossible in reality. In 
the reality plotline, Cobb visits his father-in-law, Miles (Michael Caine), who is a 
professor of Architecture, on the chance that he might be able to find him a dream 
architect to replace Nash (Lukas Haas). Throughout the conversation, we figure out that 
Miles was once Cobb’s mentor and the one who taught him how “to navigate people’s 
minds” (00:22:59-23:01). Here, Cobb describes inception as “a chance to build 
cathedrals, entire cities, things that never existed, things that couldn’t exist in the real 
world” (00:23:38-46). Cobb’s description clarifies the essence of the theory of inception. 
In this sense, he reminds us of what Baudrillard indicates in his Simulacra and 
Simulation that in today’s world, “Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential 
being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a 
hyperreal” (1). Inception, in fact, is a dreamspace where the subjects could experience 
fantasies, it is where they could dream infinitely. It is, in fact, the art of trompe l’œil that 
makes such simulacra possible.   
Designing a dreamspace by a dream architect is similar to the art of trompe l’œil 
because it creates a simulacrum of the real world and presents it to the dreamer as reality. 
During Cobb’s training for Ariadne, there is a scene which shows both as they are 
walking along the street. Ariadne tells Cobb, “My question is, what happens when you 




sentence, something impossible happens that makes her perplexed. The street starts to 
fold from a far distance until we witness a complete symmetrical pattern: the city looks 
like a cube. The newly-shaped structure becomes a cubicle on which movement is 
possible in all directions. There is no gravity, and that is why the people and cars move in 
all dimensions. This way, as Cobb reveals to Ariadne, dream becomes the reality of the 
subject. In “Dreaming Other Worlds: Commodity Culture, Mass Desire, and the Ideology 
of Inception,” Martin Danyluk argues that “The film’s spectacular suspension of natural 
laws works to obscure its tacit endorsement of hegemonic social meanings and values” 
(602). For Danyluk, Nolan’s “playful sense of space and time” as well as “[the] radical 
uncertainty about the nature of reality” lead to nothing but “a utopian current” that shall 
account for the film’s “mass appeal” (607). The basic problem with such a criticism is the 
fact that it posits that the relationship between the spectators and the film is a matter of 
identification: the spectators imagine themselves as living the life of the characters. In 
fact, Nolan’s art of filmmaking makes it impossible for the spectator to simply identify 
with the image; the broken narrative that Nolan provides creates space for both 
identification and distance. Nolan doesn’t simply suspend natural laws to justify the 
status quo; he, in fact, unravels how ideology functions, and, in a way, dismantles it by 
providing us with the way that an ideology works to mesmerize its subjects.   
The level of exposition in Inception is not limited to the first two plotlines. In the 
second dream narrative, the spectators confront an exception regarding the rule of getting 
killed in order to wake up. Initially in this plotline, Saito is shot in the first dream level as 
the team members are spotted by projections from Fischer’s unconscious. When Eames 




excitedly stops him. When Eames describes his intention by saying that “He’s in agony. 
I’m waking him up,” Cobb says, “It won’t wake him up” (01:08:23-27). Yusuf (Dileep 
Rao) explains the reason: “We’re too heavily sedated to wake up that way” (01:08:32-
34). If someone uses a very strong sedative, killing her or him wouldn’t wake her or him 
up. Instead, it would push her or him into the deepest dream level known as Limbo. When 
Ariadne (Ellen Page) asks for clarification, Arthur explains that Limbo is 
“[u]nconstructed dream space” or, to put it another way, “[r]aw, infinite” unconscious 
(01:08:40-45). Located in the deepest level of the unconscious, where everything seems 
topsy-turvy, Limbo is the Real of the subject’s psychic life, it is where one loses 
complete connection with reality. Arthur resumes, “Nothing is down there except for 
what might have left behind by anyone sharing the dream who’s been trapped there 
before” (01:08:46-51). As Yusuf says, only when the sedation ends, it might be possible 
for someone to come back, and this could take “decades” or “it could be infinite” 
(01:08:59-09:01). In this particular scene, the way everyone takes turn in clarifying 
hidden rules, in another level of exposition, is an indirect address to the spectators to 
familiarize them with the essentials of inception.   
The last plotline in Inception, which is actually the longest, records the events 
happening in the dream during the ten-hour flight from Sydney to Los Angeles. We are 
told that Robert Fischer’s father is dead, and he is accompanying his body for the funeral. 
This ten-hour flight would give Cobb and his team the opportunity to incept the idea of 
dissolving his father’s company into Robert Fischer’s mind. The second dream narrative 
is where the art of trompe l’œil works better than the first dream plotline. First, it 




in all three levels works flawlessly and the target subject (Robert Fischer) doesn’t find 
out that it is all a dream. In this second dream narrative, each level leads to another, 
promising both the dreamer (Robert Fischer) and the spectator that there is more 
knowledge down there. It moves exactly along the path of desire because in the deepest 
level there is Limbo only: an infinite space without clear answers. Second, we are 
introduced into another form of trompe l’œil: impersonation. Eames impersonates 
Fischer’s godfather, Browning (Tom Berenger) to get closer to him and access his 
secrets. It is nearly at the end of the film that Nolan confides in spectators that Eames was 
impersonating Browning all the way through the second plotline. As Browning 
(impersonated by Eames) and Robert Fischer are sitting on the shore, the latter tells the 
former that he is going to dissolve his father’s company: inception has worked. Now 
Eames realizes that there is no need to keep his identity secret. As the camera pans to the 
back, Browning turns into Eames. This is how trompe l’œil creates an illusion of objects 
and human beings: reality and illusion are so close that one cannot easily tell the 
difference. 
In Inception, trompe l’œil erases the boundaries between dreams and reality in 
order to depict the ubiquitous discourse of capitalism. Capitalism has created a non-
ending world of objects which are only shadows of the objet petit a. The endless network 
of illusions contributes to machinations of desire by telling the subjects that by following 
the path of objects they would be able to find the eventual object of satisfaction. In the 
film, the art of trompe l’œil acts mostly as an ideological tool that deceives the subjects 
(and the spectators) by making them accept a shadow as the real object. The 




sequence of the film that depicts Limbo is an episode that occurs later, breaks the plot 
into pieces and demands careful attention from the spectators. The empty space of Limbo 
is the anamorphotic gaze as the objet petit a, which the spectators only retroactively 
comprehend. Moreover, the sustained exposition serves as Nolan’s anti-ideological 
strategy, which unravels the truth about the deceptiveness at the heart of trompe l’œil.  
 
5.3 Traumatic Encounters with the Missed Reality   
In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan provides us 
with his interpretation of a dream known as The Burning Child, which appears in Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams. The description of the dream, as it is narrated by Freud, is as 
follows: 
A father had been watching beside his child’s sick-bed for days and nights 
on end. After the child had died, he went into the next room to lie down, 
but left the door open so that he could see from his bedroom into the room 
in which his child’s body was laid out, with tall candles standing round it. 
An old man had been engaged to keep watch over it, and sat beside the 
body murmuring prayers. After a few hours’ sleep, the father had a dream 
that his child was standing beside his bed, caught him by the arm and 
whispered to him reproachfully: ‘Father, don’t you see I’m burning?’ He 
woke up, noticed a bright glare of light from the next room, hurried into it 
and found that the old watchman had dropped off to sleep and that the 
wrappings and one of the arms of his beloved child’s dead body had been 





Freud indicates that this dream serves to fulfill the father’s wish to see his child alive 
again because what is most evident in the father’s dream is the fact that his child has 
physically returned to life:  
And here we shall observe that this dream, too, contained the fulfilment of 
a wish. The dead child behaved in the dream like a living one: he himself 
warned his father, came to his bed, and caught him by the arm, just as he 
had probably done on the occasion from the memory of which the first 
part of the child’s words in the dream were derived. For the sake of the 
fulfilment of this wish the father prolonged his sleep by one moment. The 
dream was preferred to a waking reflection because it was able to show 
the child as once more alive. (Interpretation of Dreams 514) 
For Lacan, unlike Freud, dreaming is not necessarily “a phantasy fulfilling a wish” (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 59); rather, it is “an act of homage to the missed reality—the 
reality that can no longer produce itself except by repeating itself endlessly, in some 
never attained awakening” (58). The missed reality that Lacan mentions above, occurs on 
the part of the father in two ways: first, he could have done better in order to avoid his 
child’s death; second, he could have appointed the right man to watch over the child’s 
body. Therefore, when the child says, ‘Father, don’t you see I’m burning?’, he is 
reproaching the father for neglecting his duty as a father: the father’s sense of guilt is the 
Real of his desire. As Slavoj Žižek confirms,  
The subject does not awake himself when the external irritation becomes 
too strong; the logic of his awakening is quite different. First he constructs 




awakening into reality. But the thing that he encounters in the dream, the 
reality of his desire, the Lacanian Real - in our case, the reality of the 
child’s reproach to his father, ‘Can’t you see that I am burning?’, implying 
the father’s fundamental guilt - is more terrifying than so-called external 
reality itself and that is why he awakens: to escape the Real of his desire, 
which announces itself in the terrifying dream. (Sublime Object 45) 
  Lacan relates this dream to trauma by indicating that “the insistence of the 
trauma” is a way to make us “aware of its existence” (Four Fundamental Concepts 55). 
He insists on the repetitive function of the trauma in a clearly exposed form: “The trauma 
reappears, in effect, frequently unveiled” (55). Although the traumatic event might seem 
repressed (or non-existent) in the subject’s reality, it would “emerge repeatedly” to prove 
that “it is still there behind” (55). In Nolan’s Inception, Cobb’s traumatic encounter with 
his deceased wife, Mal, occurs several times and it is not resolved until nearly at the end 
of the film. Cobb’s ‘missed reality’ is Mal’s suicide for which he feels remorse. As Cobb 
confesses to Ariadne, he was somehow responsible for Mal’s death because he incepted 
in her mind the idea that her world was not real: she decided to kill herself to wake up in 
reality ignoring the fact that her world was already real. Mal’s appearance in Cobb’s 
dreams, I claim, is both a traumatic encounter as well as a support for desire: Mal signals 
the missed reality in Cobb’s life and takes the form of a partial object that seduces him to 
move along the path of desire in order to find the real cause of his desire.  
Inception is where the impact of non-existent objects on the real life is felt more 
than everywhere else in Nolan’s cinema. As I discussed in the previous section, the art of 




real in order to implant a certain idea into the subject’s mind. The return of the repressed, 
in the form of Cobb’s traumatic encounter with hallucinatory images of Mal, is another 
way in which we witness the influence of the non-existent on real life. For Todd 
McGowan, the “real focus” of the film is “the subject’s relationship to trauma, a 
relationship that the dream often facilitates and reality enables us to avoid” (Fictional 
149-50). In this section, I will discuss the role of Mal, whose over-presence in the form of 
trauma (nightmarish memories and hallucinations) significantly affects Cobb’s life. My 
argument is that Mal’s appearance is the return of the Real because it portrays Cobb’s 
most hidden desires. But we should keep in mind that, according to Lacan, “The real has 
to be sought beyond the dream—in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us, 
behind the lack of representation of which there is only one representative” (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 60). Mal is not the Real or the object cause of desire: rather, she 
represents them by providing Cobb with a traumatic encounter with the missed reality 
that he is desperately trying to change. The more Cobb gets closer to her, the more he 
feels the imminence of jouissance. However, she is only an image representing the 
distorted gaze on the side of the objet petit a. I claim that although Cobb initially 
imagines that he could probably be able to reunite with Mal, he ultimately finds out that 
she is only a “shade” (02:08:20) of the objet petit a; that is why he decides not to invest 
in an inaccessible object and opts for reunion with his children. Cobb, in this sense, is the 
first subject in Nolan’s films who learns that he is unable to access the object cause of 




For Todd McGowan, Mal is “the object-cause of Cobb’s desire” or simply “the 
obstacle that bars the realization of his desire” (Fictional 158). In other words, Mal stands 
as a barrier between Cobb and his children. McGowan goes further to point out that 
Throughout the film, Mal plays the part of obstacle that prevents any 
realization of Cobb’s desire, but the film reveals that the obstacle is the 
real object. Cobb’s guilt stems not from his failure to attain the object of 
desire but from his betrayal of the obstacle. The obstacle is the subject’s 
real object, the object that demands the subject’s fidelity. (Fictional 167) 
Contrary to what McGowan says, I claim, Mal isn’t the objet petit a (or the object cause 
of desire); rather, I consider Mal as a partial object whose traumatic emergence reminds 
Cobb of the missed reality for which he feels remorse. We should keep in mind that Mal 
was once living in material form; in other words, she was all too human. She was married 
to Cobb when she was still alive: for each side of the relationship (Cobb and Mal) the 
other side was supposed to serve as the objet petit a: the object that would give them 
ultimate satisfaction (that desire promises). But then they both came to the realization that 
the other part was only a partial object soon after they got married (partial objects lose 
their sublimity soon after they are obtained.). Mal and Cobb became dissatisfied with 
reality and decided to reside in Limbo. How could then a bodily image serve as the objet 
petit a? As McGowan himself points out in The Real Gaze: Film Theory After Lacan, the 
objet petit a “lacks any substantial status” and “doesn’t fit within the world of language 
or the field of representation” (6). Nearly at the end of the film, when Cobb decides to 
deal with the trauma, he calls Mal “a shade of [his] life” who is “not good enough” 




be counted as the objet petit a. In this particular scene, Cobb’s disappointed face finds 
that it is impossible to access Mal in reality (see figs. 42-43). Mal stabs Cobb with a 
kitchen knife to prove the impossibility of the fantasy. Mal, in a way, reminds Cobb of a 
lack that is essential to every subject: she acts as a mirage or a shadow which carries the 
gaze of the objet petit a. Mal’s presence is the same as the emptiness that is characteristic 
of the discourse of contemporary late capitalism. The subjects are told to follow the path 
of desire to get the ultimate pleasure (or jouissance). The very moment that the subjects 
find themselves at the threshold of enjoyment, they encounter its impossibility. That is 
why today’s subjects are obsessed with a plethora of objects on the illusory promise that 
they would eventually get what they want, but in vain.  
 
 
Figure 42. Inception: shot 1 
 
Figure 43. Inception: shot 2 
 
Mal is specifically present when Cobb’s projections are involved in a dream. She 
mostly interrupts dreams and destroys Cobb’s plans. At times, however, she depicts 
herself as a caring mother and a passionate lover. In her first appearance, she tells Cobb, 
“Tell me, did the children miss me?” (00:06:20-24) or “I thought you might be missing 
me” (00:05:52-53). Throughout the film, Cobb shows mixed feelings of desire and 
avoidance towards Mal. For example, when Cobb goes into a dream inside Yusuf’s 
underground facility, he finds Mal. What we see is an extreme close-up of the left side of 




close shot of the railway and the sound of coming train, the camera once again cuts to 
Mal’s face, now in full: the right side of the face is shown in low-key lighting. There is 
then a flashback to a scene (again in low-key lighting), where Cobb and Mal are sitting 
close to each other. Once again, Mal’s face on the rail-track, then the camera cuts to the 
scene where they are sitting together. Mal tells Cobb, “You know how to find me. You 
know what you have to do” (00:43:49-55). Cobb suddenly wakes up from the dream. The 
fact that Cobb desires Mal and, at the same time, evades her confirms the idea that he is 
divided between the past and the present. Mal’s repetitive presence in Cobb’s 
unconscious acts to trigger desire: however, the more Cobb follows Mal, the less he finds 
satisfaction: behind Mal’s image, there is the gaze of the objet petit a, which is returning 
the look of the subject. Cobb once imagined that Mal would give him the ultimate 
enjoyment that he was looking for but now her presence, in his unconscious mind, 
resurfaces as a missed reality that haunts Cobb’s mind.  
Cobb deals with the missed reality as trauma in three levels. In the first level, he 
opens his mind to Ariadne (in the second dream plotline) and provides the details of 
Mal’s obsession with reality and her decision to escape it: 
We were working together. We were exploring the concept of dream 
within a dream. I kept pushing things. I wanted to go deeper and deeper. I 
wanted to go further. I just didn’t understand the concept that hours could 
turn into years down there, that we could get trapped so deep, that when 
we wound up on the shore of our own subconscious, we lost sight of what 
was real. We created. We built the world for ourselves. We did that for 




gods. The problem was that none of it was real. Eventually it just became 
impossible for me to live like that [.…] She had locked something away, 
something deep inside her. A truth that she had once known, but chose to 
forgot. Limbo became her reality [.…] I knew something was wrong with 
her. She just wouldn’t admit it. Eventually she told me the truth. She was 
possessed by an idea. This one very simple idea that changed everything. 
That our world wasn’t real. That she needed to wake up to come back to 
reality. That in order to get back home, we had to kill ourselves. 
(01:15:59-18:11) 
That is why Mal is obsessed with the idea of killing both Cobb and herself to get rid of 
the illusion. But Cobb doesn’t accept to do as she wishes and she decides to commit 
suicide by jumping down from the windows of the hotel room, where they had planned to 
celebrate their anniversary. The hotel scene is repeated a couple of times in the film, 
signifying the impact of the traumatic encounter on the subject (Cobb).  
The second level of Cobb’s dealing with the traumatic encounter occurs when 
Ariadne urges him to confront Mal once and for all. In another dream, Cobb remembers 
what happened that made Mal like that. Cobb and Mal are sitting face to face around a 
table; the setting is low-key lighting and each of them is shown in single shots, implying 
their impending separation. Cobb tells Mal that he was responsible for her situation: “I 
feel guilt, Mal. And no matter what I do, no matter how hopeless I am, no matter how 
confused, that guilt is always there reminding me of the truth that the idea that caused 
you to question your reality came from me” (02:02:30-52). Although Mal insists that he 




her anymore because she doesn’t exist” (02:07:52-55). Then he tells Mal that “I can’t 
imagine you with all your complexity, all your perfection, all your imperfection” 
(02:08:08-13). Therefore, Cobb is eventually able to let Mal go and free himself from her 
bonds. Cobb’s success results from that fact that he understands that Mal is only an image 
of the past or simply a shade which has lost its sublimity.  
The third level of Cobb’s management of the trauma occurs in the last sequence 
of the film. Throughout the film, Cobb uses his Spinning Top to know if he is in dreams 
or reality. The rule seems simple enough: If Cobb spins it and the rotation never ends, 
then Cobb is dreaming; if it stops rotating after a few seconds, then Cobb is in reality. 
Once Cobb departs with Mal, he sets off for home. When he arrives at his home, he pulls 
out the Spinning Top and spins it on a table in the room. As it is rotating, the camera tilts 
to a medium close-up of Cobb. He is anxiously staring at somewhere, which is revealed 
to be his children playing outside in the garden. Cobb doesn’t wait for the Spinning Top 
to see if he is dreaming or not. In other words, he doesn’t wait for an object (or an Other) 
to dictate if what he is looking at is real or imaginary. He runs towards James and 
Philippa and they do the same. The camera, then, pans to a long shot of the Spinning Top 
on the table. As the camera starts to zoom on the Spinning Top, we hear James telling 
Cobb that “[w]e are building a house on the cliff!” (02:20:33-36). The Spinning Top is 
still rotating until the film ends, highlighting the fact that this is most probably happening 
in reality. This way Cobb ignores the role of objects, solves the trauma, and returns to his 
children. Cobb gets the true message from his encounter with the gaze of the objet petit a: 
to move from one object to another (as desires dictates to the subject) would ultimately 





5.4 Paradox as a Hole in the Symbolic Order 
 Although in Inception, the art of trompe l’œil is mostly used as a way to deceive 
the subject into taking illusion as reality, it simultaneously shows the limits of the 
Symbolic Order. When the design of a dream employs paradox, the spectators encounter 
moments which are impossible through the logic of the Symbolic Order. Paradox, in this 
sense, disrupts normal perception because it doesn’t fall within the field of representation. 
In this section, I elaborate on some of the paradoxical moments that occur in the film in 
order to show the impact of the Real on the Symbolic Order. Although the Real doesn’t 
exist in material form, it can be felt once the senseless core of the Symbolic Order is 
portrayed.    
The first instance of paradox in the film is observed in one of the rules of 
inception: in order to wake up from the dream, the dreamer needs to die. Such a statement 
cancels out a rule in the real life: if you want to stay alive, you need to avoid death. In the 
middle of the film, there is a scene in Mombasa, where Eames takes Cobb to Yusuf who, 
he says, “formulates his own versions of the compounds” (00:36:50-52). Yusuf owns an 
underground facility where people come to dream. This is a spacious place which is 
shown to the spectators in low-key lighting. There are a dozen people, each in their 
individual beds, connected to each other to “share the dream” (00:42:47-48). When 
Eames says, “They come here every day to sleep?” (00:43:18-20), and old man answers, 
“No, they come to be woken up. The dream has become their reality” (00:43:23-29). The 
paradox here lies in the fact that these people have based their lives not on reality but on 
dreams. They only occasionally return to reality. While there seems to be a paradox here 




Real: you get closer to your psychic reality only in dreams. If you wake up from the 
dream, you will get too far from reality.  
 Another form of paradox, again in the realm of dreams, could be seen in the 
difference between existence and nothingness. During Ariadne’s training in a dream in 
the middle of the reality plotline, as Cobb and Ariadne are walking, a wooden bridge 
appears suddenly and they climb on it. When they reach the end of the bridge, they face 
two enormous mirrored doors, created by Ariadne’s mind. Ariadne moves towards them, 
closes both doors to make them face each other. Now Cobb and Ariadne stand between 
the two mirrors to create the illusion of infinity: there are infinite same images of Cobb 
and Ariadne along a straight line. The infinite path then suddenly breaks as Ariadne 
touches the mirrors: the infinite turns into nothingness in the blink of an eye (see figs. 44-
47). Although the thousand images seem to have depth, they prove to be a shade in less 
than a second. Is not this infinite path the same as the path of desire which leads the 
subject to nothingness although it promises too much at the first glance?  
 
 
Figure 44. Inception: shot 3 
 
Figure 45. Inception: shot 4 
 
Figure 46. Inception: shot 5 
 





 Perhaps the best instance of paradox in Inception is the Penrose Steps (or the 
impossible staircase). There is a scene where Arthur takes Ariadne along to show her 
“some paradoxical architecture” (00:39:51-53). He tells her that she would need to learn a 
few techniques to “build three complete dream levels” (00:39:55-56). They start climbing 
up the stairs, move into all four directions without actually going up; wherever they go, 
they reach the same starting point. As they move, Arthur says, “In a dream, you can cheat 
architecture into impossible shapes. That lets you create closed loops, like the Penrose 
Steps. The infinite staircase. See?” (00:40:01-14). Arthur’s last word is simultaneous with 
a crane shot that starts from above their heads but then cuts to a low angle to highlight the 
real distance between the starting point and the ending point of the staircase. Arthur 
continues, “Paradox. A closed loop like this helps you disguise the boundaries of the 
dream you’ve created” (00:40:19-24). Like the Penrose Steps, desire never aims for a 
final destination, it moves to and fro, but there is no actual movement. Desire never looks 
for an eventual satisfaction; that is why with the passage of time the subject doesn’t find 
the object that would fill the lack. The Penrose Steps doesn’t exist in reality, but it shows 
the vulnerability of the Symbolic Order by showing the absurdity of its laws. The 
paradoxical structures in dreams, as Arthur says, “have to be complicated enough that we 
can hide from the projections […like] a maze. And the better the maze…” (00:40:31-37). 
Before he continues, Ariadne says, “Then the longer we have before the projections catch 
us” (00:40:37-39). Later on, Arthur uses the trick of Penrose Steps to deceive a projection 
(a man with a gun) into believing such an illusory structure (see figs. 48-51). In this 
scene, as Arthur is running with the projection chasing him, he opens the door, takes the 




projection opens the door and takes a few steps forward to shoot at him, Arthur appears 
from behind him and pushes him down. While a high angle shot creates the illusion that 
the steps to downstairs are located right in front of the door, a low angle shot reveals the 
truth: there are no steps in front of the door; the steps are far lower and there is only a 
wide crack when we open the door. Such an optical illusion repeats the lesson of Lacan in 
talking about the anamorphotic image: we, as subjects, need to better situate ourselves in 




Figure 48. Inception: shot 7 
 
Figure 49. Inception: shot 8 
 
Figure 50. Inception: shot 9 
 
Figure 51. Inception: shot 10 
 
The last important object with paradoxical features is the Spinning Top. Several 
times in the film we are presented with this object as a totem that reveals something about 
Cobb’s experience of dreams. As I mentioned in the previous section, the rule seems 
simple: once Cobb spins it, if it stops rotating after some time, then he would make sure 




dreaming. The first time that the Spinning Top appears in the film is in the workshop. 
Arthur explains to Ariadne that she would need a totem to tell if she is in her own dream 
or in someone’s else: “So a totem. You need a small object, potentially heavy, something 
you can have on you all the time that no one else does [.…] That way when you look at 
your totem, you know beyond a doubt that you’re not in someone else’s dream” 
(00:33:51-34:16). Later on, Ariadne tells us something different: a totem is “an elegant 
solution for keeping track of reality” (00:48:35-38). For Ariadne, therefore, a totem 
would tell the difference between dream and reality. While Arthur is talking to Ariadne, 
there is a cut to the next room where Cobb spins his Spinning Top to see what happens. 
Here the totem is shown alternatively with close-ups of Cobb’s face. It stops after a few 
seconds, confirming that Cobb is in reality. Cobb closes his eyes in relief. We are told 
that a totem is a unique object that should be never touched by anyone other than the 
owner; otherwise, it would not be reliable. Later on, it is revealed that Cobb’s Spinning 
Top originally belonged to Mal. Therefore, Cobb’s Spinning Top proves to be a 
paradoxical object in the film. It is an unreliable object that hides the limits of the Real 
and the Symbolic, or dreams and reality. That is why it is the most recurrent object of the 
film.  
 Nolan uses paradox to ask the spectator to examine every image closely not only 
in the theater but also in reality. As I discussed above, paradoxical objects in Inception 
serve to show several important facts. First, the field of the representation, or the 
Symbolic Order, is too limited although it might not seem so at first. In the example of 
the Penrose Steps, we witness how a two-dimensional shape can turn into a three-




ideological discourse by looking straightforward; one always needs to look awry to 
uncover the void at the core of ideology. And finally, desire is too paradoxical to be 
relied on: desire promises more than what it can actually do. It tells the subjects that they 
would be able to find the objet petit a by moving from one object to another; however, 
the more the subjects are obsessed with objects, the less they can get. As Žižek points 
out, “it is in desire that the positive object is a metonymic stand-in for the Void of the 
impossible Thing; it is in desire that the aspiration to fullness is transferred to partial 
objects” (The Parallax View 62). 
 To sum up what I have elaborated on in this chapter, Inception shows the 
shallowness of the discourse of capitalism by using the art of trompe l’œil, which 
eliminates the boundaries between reality and illusion. Contemporary late capitalism 
makes the subjects take illusion as reality and misleads them by telling them that behind 
the veil of illusion, there is much more to discover while there isn’t. The structural 
anamorphosis in Inception reveals the truth albeit retroactively: the spectators find the 
truth about the deceptiveness of trompe l’œil only when they put the different pieces of 
the plot together. The initial sequence of the film depicts Limbo: the empty space that has 
nothing to present to the subject. Only at the end of the film we find the truth about the 
emptiness of Limbo. Also, Inception shows the deceptiveness of the path of desire 
through the gaze of the objet petit a: the more Cobb follows Mal, the more he becomes 
disillusioned to access the object cause of desire. Cobb’s traumatic encounter with Mal 
indicates the fact that if the subjects get too close to the objet petit a, they feel too much 
anxiety because they are unable to endure jouissance. That is why Cobb decides to 




ultimate pleasure. And finally, the paradoxical objects and images that appear in 
Inception are a means to show the senselessness of the Symbolic Order and the 
deceptiveness of desire. Paradox is a means to persuade the spectator to examine the 
Symbolic Order closely to discover its emptiness. Such an understanding would help the 
spectators not to invest in desire which is the essence of the discourse of contemporary 
late capitalism. If, like Cobb, the spectators know the limits of desire, then they would be 
able to live a free life.  
 In the next chapter, which will be the last chapter of this dissertation, I will 
elaborate on Nolan’s Interstellar. Interstellar follows the lead of Inception, I will argue, 
to show one more example of the subject(s) who is not slave to the path of desire. I shall 
particularly focus on the relationship between the subject(s) and the big Other to show 















Chapter 6: The Blurred Vision of the Real in Interstellar 
 
6.1 Introductory Statements  
Interstellar (2014) provides us with a picture of the universal subject: the subject 
travelling from Earth to space for a certain purpose. If we track Nolan’s filmmaking 
chronologically, we notice a gradual expansion in the locale of the subject. As I noted 
previously, in his earlier films, starting with Doodlebug (1997), Nolan portrays the 
subject in a limited locale but then shifts to the global subject with Batman Begins 
(2005). In Interstellar, Nolan expands the locale of his film to space. This change in the 
portrayal of the subject produces a considerable difference in the way the subject relates 
himself to desire and its object. As I discussed in Chapter 5, in Inception we can witness 
the way that the subject (Cobb) ignores the non-ending path of desire and finds the truth 
of the objet petit a. The basic argument of this chapter is that Interstellar moves in the 
direction of Inception in its portrayal of the subject by showing that the only way to 
escape the endless path of desire is to lose hope in the objet petit a. Also, it highlights 
how capitalism alienates subjects by reducing them to cogs in the machine in order to 
achieve its ambitious goals: under the guise of NASA, the capitalist system induces 
several astronauts to sacrifice their intersubjective relations for the supposed future of 
humanity.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will elaborate on the return of the Real, which 
appears as an external traumatic force, namely the Dust, which devastates life on Earth: 
the Dust, similar to the birds in Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963), is an omnipresent, 
massive force, which severely damages the ecology and agriculture of the world. It 




spectators that they are not in control of the scene: the Dust is in fact the anamorphotic 
gaze that demands careful attention from the spectators.  
As the argument goes on, I will expand on the ideological role of NASA, 
especially in the image of Professor Brand (Michael Caine), a scientist and a father 
figure, who tells a big lie to make the interstellar mission possible. Professor Brand hides 
the truth and implicitly asks Cooper and the rest of the crew members to ignore their 
desire. Also, he fabricates an imaginary they or other(s) to provide significance for the 
space travel: this illusory Other, as I shall explain, is Lacan’s master signifier (or point de 
capiton), which is an attempt on the part of ideology to fill the lack in the subject. The 
role of this absent Other is to ignite the desire to know in the subject. However, the 
subject ultimately finds out that this Other was nothing but a human construct.  
The last part of this chapter highlights how Nolan creates anamorphosis in terms 
of time (the part that sticks out in the plot), space (dead body as a tiny spot in horizon), 
and sound (the image that is incongruous with the sound). I will discuss the ways through 
which Nolan provides us with a surplus which facilitates our encounter with the gaze. 
The spectators’ encounter with the gaze is significant as it shows them the limits of the 
Symbolic Order: it includes a moment that reveals the impossibility of the fantasy (of 
obtaining the objet petti a) promised by desire.  
 
6.2 The Dust as a Stain in the Picture 
In the post-apocalyptic world of Interstellar, the Dust, as a natural disaster, 
paralyzes every aspect of human life. It is presented as an overwhelming, life-shattering 
event, more destructive than any other catastrophe ever to occur on Earth. The Dust is 




products over the years throughout the world. In this sense, the blight and the Dust are 
what Timothy Morton calls “hyperobjects”: ecological disasters, “massively distributed 
in time and space, exhibiting nonlocal effects that defied location and temporality, 
cuttable into many parts without losing coherence” (Hyperobjects 47). In this section, I 
will elaborate on the Dust as the anamorphotic stain with two important functions: first, it 
tells the people in the film and the spectators in the theater that they are not in control of 
the scene; in other words, it implies that the look is always already preceded by the gaze. 
Second, it proves to be an abrupt traumatic force that produces fear in people by instilling 
the idea that they are in the imminent danger of being consumed. The Dust, therefore, is 
on the side of the Real because it creates moments which are not expressible through the 
logic of the Symbolic Order.  
In Interstellar, the Dust is taken twice in extreme long-shot, as an enormous grey 
and black mass with considerable speed. Early in the film, it interrupts a game of 
baseball: as Cooper (Matthew McConaughey), Murph (Mackenzie Foy), Tom (Timothée 
Chalamet), and Donald (John Lithgow) are seated in the stadium and watching the game, 
the Dust appears suddenly. Before the arrival of the Dust, the scene shows several 
medium close-ups of the family as they are chatting about everyday matters with 
occasional cuts to the game. However, in one particular cut to the baseball game, the ball 
is shown as it lands in front of a player. The camera shows only the lower part of the 
player’s body until the he lets the ball pass between his legs. Until now, the people in the 
stadium and the spectators of the film imagine that they know exactly what is happening 
because they trust vision and consciousness. All of a sudden, this imaginary knowledge 




looks at something distant in wonder. The direction of the player’s eyes towards the sky 
implies that something with a gigantic height is approaching. The next shot is an over the 
shoulder of the same baseball player which magnifies the impending Dust: it is a massive 
combination of brown, grey, and black colors (see figs. 52-55). Here, three shots function 
to reveal the fact that the characters in the film and the spectators are under the gaze of 
the Dust: first, the shot that shows the lower part of the baseball player and the ball that  
 
 
Figure 52. Interstellar: shot 1 
 
Figure 53. Interstellar: shot 2 
 
Figure 54. Interstellar: shot 3 
 
Figure 55. Interstellar: shot 4 
 
passes between his legs; second, the tilting up of the camera to show the dumbfounded 
face of the player as he removes his sunglasses; and finally, the over the shoulder that 
depicts the abrupt emergence of the Dust. It is here that we understand that we were 
never fully in control of the scene; although, as spectators, we might think that we know 
more than the characters in the film, in this particular scene we are as ignorant as they 




it is a stain in the picture, with the retroactive functions of reminding us that our look is 
contained by the gaze; as Lacan points out, the gaze “circumscribes us” as it “makes us 
beings who are looked at, but without showing this” straightforwardly (Four 
Fundamental Concepts 75). 
In the above-mentioned scene, when people become aware of the looming Dust, 
they start to leave the stadium in excitement and haste. The next shot shows that the 
whole city is covered with dust, making people wear special eyeglasses and masks to 
prevent health problems. In such close-ups, the Dust seems like a ubiquitous storm: as 
Cooper, his children, and the grandfather are driving through the dust-ridden city, 
visibility is significantly reduced in a way that nothing is seen except for a few people 
who are shown as they run for shelter. What is most significant in these scenes is the fear 
of being swallowed up by the Dust. The Dust is not simply a lifeless form of soil; rather, 
it is an uncanny monster, a hyperobject “more real than reality itself” (Morton, 
Ecological Thought 130), which is able to contaminate and destroy life on Earth. It is a 
surplus with mysterious origins which creates unthinkable moments that cancel the 
functioning of the Imaginary and the Symbolic Orders in the subject; in other words, it is 
a traumatic encounter that arrives suddenly and makes the subject wonder.  
Shortly after the end of the dust storm, we are presented with several shots from 
the interior and exterior of Cooper’s house showing the accumulation of the dust over the 
floor, the rooftop, the truck, and the corn. The house is in absolute silence, although the 
entire Cooper family is awake. Close-ups of Cooper and Murph signify their perplexity 
and mental devastation. Such a massive natural event would never find a clear 




Lacan says, “superimposes the reign of culture over the reign of nature” (Écrits 229), it 
always lacks the required material to describe it. It is precisely in such moments of 
speechlessness that the trauma of the Real appears. Post-traumatic moments in 
Christopher Nolan’s films (and certain other directors) are the best scenes to record the 
Lacanian Real. In the instance of the Dust, the Real is not the Dust in itself, but actually 
the impotency of the play of signification, or simply the Symbolic, to clarify its massive 
presence for the subject. It is this lack at the heart of the law that creates certain blind 
moments in the existence of the subject. The fact that the Dust impairs visibility signifies 
that we are looking at things through the lenses of the anamorphotic Real.  
It is precisely because of the emergence of the Real that the subject notices that 
there is a lack at the core of the Symbolic Order. This essential lack within the Symbolic 
accounts for the subject’s desire to know. In other words, the anamorphotic Real raises 
the curiosity of the subject to decipher its secret. It is only because of this curiosity and 
the thirst for knowledge that Cooper embarks on the interstellar mission. Early in the 
film, as Cooper and his children accidentally find and chase the Indian Air Force drone, 
we are introduced very briefly to modelling of the interstellar mission. Their following of 
the drone is a harbinger of the overall course of the film’s story. It is by following this 
unmanned aerial vehicle that Cooper is directed to the NASA hidden facility. When 
Cooper tells Murph that talking about ghosts is “not very scientific” (00:03:58-04:00), 
she answers, “You said science was about admitting what we don’t know” (00:04:00-03). 
The pace of the film moves around this thirst for things that we don’t know. The Dust, 




The functionality of the Dust is not restricted to trauma only. Shortly after the 
massive dust storm in the stadium, when Cooper and the rest of the family return home, 
Murph finds her father in her room. He is sitting cross-legged, with a coin in his right 
hand, which he tosses on the floor, where a few lines of dust run parallel to each other. 
The way the coin moves in the air to fall on the floor suggests that there is a magnetic 
force in the room. Cooper, shown from behind in subdued lighting, says, “It’s not a 
ghost” (00:20:55-56). He smiles, turns his head back towards where Murph is sitting, and 
resumes, “It’s gravity” (00:21:02). Here, the Dust serves as a guide, as the object that 
leads Cooper to the NASA facility by providing the required coordinates. This is the only 
time in the film that the Dust has a positive significance: it leads the subject to the 
whereabouts of NASA’s hidden facility, where he is persuaded to go on a mission to save 
the world. However, as the narrative goes on, the Dust appears as the most threatening, 
formidable force of the film, which endangers the very fundamentals of human existence.  
Later on, as we reach the second half of the film, there are several brief cuts to the 
life on Earth amidst the dominant interstellar-travel plotline. In almost all of these 
accounts, the Dust appears as a ceaseless, frightening reality that has created famine and 
depopulation. There is one more instance of the redoubtable arrival of the Dust about 
halfway in the film. The significance of this scene is that we witness the absence of a 
point-of-view shot. In this scene, the Dust appears from far behind Cooper’s house, again 
in a gigantic, formidable shape. The target of this scene is the spectator because there is 
no sign of any human being when the Dust consumes the frame. Although the spectators 
are not physically present in the scene of a massive presence like this, they get involved 




What makes such an arrival even more overwhelming is movement of the camera: as the 
Dust gets closer, the camera steps back, signifying the resultant fear of the spectators (see 
figs. 56-59). Therefore, the Dust is not simply a traumatic force for the characters in the 
film; rather, it haunts the spectators because it provides an encounter with the impossible 
Real. 
The Dust sustains its impact throughout the film. When we reach the end of the 
film, the Dust is no longer an unexpected phenomenon. It is part of the everyday reality 
of the world. As several years pass with the interstellar mission taking too long without 
any sign of progress, the Dust continues storming into the cities. There is one particular 
scene in which the grown up Murph (Jessica Chastain) is shown driving along a street, 
where there is no sign of a living object except for a long queue of cars, piled high with 
belongings, intending to leave. The visibility in this scene is considerably reduced, and it  
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is almost impossible to find people in the streets. There is a tiny moment when Murph 
stops the car, then starts talking to Getty (Topher Grace), who is seated beside her. As she 
is talking, she looks out of the windows where there are a couple of children in the back 
of the truck on top of their belongings as they try to remove dust and dirt from their faces. 
As later sequences show, with the prolonged trauma of the Dust, the Real starts to 
become the reality of the life on Earth. 
 
6.3 Science as an Accomplice of Capitalism  
 In Écrits, Jacques Lacan raises a critique of the discourse of science by claiming that 
although it promises to shed light on the mysteries of light, it “does-not-want-to-know-
anything about the truth as cause” (742). For Lacan, capitalist discourse has had “curious 
copulation with science” (Other Side 110) and has made science no more than an 
ideology “for the repression of the subject” (qtd. in Tomšič 187). Lacan points out that 
“the discourse of science leaves no place for man” (Other Side 147) because “Any order, 
any discourse that resembles capitalism leaves aside what we will simply call the things 
of love” (qtd. in Venheule 8). In Nolan’s Interstellar, we witness how science as a 
discourse in the service of capitalist system ignores subjectivity and love. This section 
focuses on the ideological role of NASA, which is specifically manifested in the 
character of Professor Brand. My argument is that Professor Brand is a father figure who 
demands too much from the crew of the Endurance by telling them a big scientific lie. I 
claim that Professor Brand neglects the basic feelings of Cooper and other crew members 
of the Endurance and attempts to turn the whole team into cogs in the machine of the 




 Once the irruption of the Real immobilizes everyday life, NASA, which has already 
been working several years in preparation for the advent of the blight, decides to send a 
team of astronauts to space in order to save the world. As Professor Brand informs 
Cooper, there are two plans: Plan A and Plan B. The objective of Plan A is to find 
another planet which is as habitable as Earth, then a mass exodus to the target planet. 
Plan B, on the other hand, serves as an alternative in case Plan A is no longer workable. 
The purpose of Plan B is to carry a certain number of fertilized eggs to a target habitable 
planet in order to save the human species from extinction. It is only with the promise of 
Plan A that the reluctant Cooper accepts Professor Brand’s offer to pilot the spacecraft. In 
order for Plan A to become viable, Professor Brand should solve an equation. Dr. John 
Brand tells Cooper that he would have solved the gravity equation when Cooper comes 
back. There is a very large blackboard in Professor Brand’s office on which he has 
written some mathematical formulas: 
Cooper: How far have you got? 
Professor Brand: Almost there. 
Cooper: You’re asking me to hang everything on an almost? 
Professor Brand: I’m asking you to trust me. Find us a new home, and by 
the time you return, I will have solved the problem of gravity. I 
give you my word. (00:35:19-40) 
Professor Brand encourages Cooper to forget about himself and his children by going 
into the space to save thousands of children like his own. When Cooper tells him, “I’ve 
got kids, professor,” John Brand says, “Get out there and save them” (00:31:18-22). As 




kept one important piece of information from them: that there was no answer for the 
equation right from the start, that Plan A is a signifier without signified, and therefore, 
there is no possibility for Plan A to work. In other words, Cooper sacrifices his 
relationship with his children for nothing. In this sense, science provides no more than an 
empty signifier which is far from what it promises to be. The fact that only one of the two 
plans seems feasible signifies the unreliability of science and confirms Lacan’s point that 
“the closure of science” is “a successful paranoia” (Écrits 742).  
 Not only does John Brand tell a big lie to send people into space travel, but also he 
supports the ideology of capitalism under the name of human values. He is the father 
figure and the perfect representative of the law in the film. Several times in the film, 
Professor Brand proves to be the voice of patriotism and sacrifice. Earlier in the film as 
he is trying to encourage Cooper to pilot the Endurance, he tells him that they sent some 
of the very brave, sacrificial astronauts to a related Lazarus mission ten years ago. In the 
conference room inside NASA facility, as Cooper, Amelia Brand (Anne Hathaway), 
Doyle (Wes Bentley), and Romilly (David Gyasi) are seated around a table, discussing 
the possibilities of the interstellar travel, Professor Brand stands up and walks towards a 
set of twelve pictures hanging on the wall, saying, “Twelve possible worlds, twelve 
Ranger launches carrying the bravest humans ever to live” (00:32:38-44). Each picture 
shows a smiling astronaut with helmet held in both hands, and the flag of the USA in the 
right. Later, we discover that all these people perished during the Lazarus missions 
(except for Dr. Mann, who is killed during the action of the film). What the pictures 
present is in sharp contrast with the tragic deaths of these scientists: the destruction of 




Professor Brand plays with words signifies the way that ideology promises a better future 
but demands too much from the subject. 
 Professor Brand’s fatherly figure steps inside once more in the second half of the 
film. In this specific scene, which occurs many years after the start of the interstellar 
mission and right after the sub-mission to the Miller’s planet, as we hear the voice of 
Amelia’s father, we see the dazzling light of the video spread over her face intermittently 
as she is sitting desperately on the floor: “Stepping out into the universe, we must 
confront the reality of interstellar travel. We must reach far beyond our lifespans. We 
must think not as individuals but as species” (01:25:08-25). The spread of the shadow of 
Amelia’s father over her face signifies one more fact about Professor Brand: although he 
knows that his daughter is in love with Wolf Edmunds, he sends each to a different 
planet, thus ruining the possibility of a future relationship between them. Later in the 
film, when Amelia lands on Edmunds’ planet, she finds that it is too late as she finds out 
that he perished alone several years ago.    
 It is only in his deathbed that Professor Brand tells the truth to Murph. As he is 
laying in the bed, he tells Murph, “I let you all down [.…] You had faith. All those years 
I asked you to have faith. I wanted you to believe that your father [Cooper] would come 
back [.…] I lied to you. There was no need for him to come back. There’s no way to help 
us” (01:31:39-32:56). As Murph asks him in disbelief, “But Plan A. All this. All these 
people. And the equation” (01:32:58-33:05). John Brand shakes his head in 
disappointment and regret. Right after Professor Brand’s death, the dejected Murph sends 
a video message to the crew on space, telling them that Professor Brand’s ambitious 




suffocate, to starve” (01:41:11-22). Startled, Amelia Brand tells Cooper that “my father 
dedicated his whole life to Plan A. I have no idea what she’s talking about” (01:41:52-
59). Here, Dr. Mann (Matt Damon) reveals that there was no Plan A right from the start. 
As Amelia shows signs of rage over why they didn’t tell the rest of the crew, Dr. Mann 
answers, “He knew how hard it would be to get people to work together to save the 
species, instead of themselves or their children. You never would’ve come unless you 
believed you would save them” (01:43:12-23). It is in such instances that one could find 
how ideology works in general: it works towards creating a society around an abstract 
concept or a certain imaginary purpose. The way that Professor Brand robs Cooper’s 
team of one important piece of information, and the inability of the crew to find the truth 
reminds us of how magic works in The Prestige: as Cutter says, 24 “But you won’t find it 
[the secret of magic] because of course, you’re not really looking. You don’t really want 
to work it out. You want to be fooled” (02:04:42-57). The crew of the Endurance are not 
so much different from the audience, who watch the magic tricks in The Prestige. 
 
6.4 The Illusory Other and the Doomed Promise of Desire  
 Professor Brand’s strong attachment to the realm of the law is also seen in his 
attempts to instill the idea that there is an Other or, as he himself calls it, a they, who are 
watching everything on Earth, and, who are capable of doing actions beyond human 
understanding. Several times in the film, there is an indication of the unknown they who 
seem to have planned everything for the mass exodus of the inhabitants of Earth. This 
absent Other is important for two reasons: first, it serves as the Lacanian master signifier 
                                                 
24 The roles of Cutter in The Prestige, Miles in Inception, and Alfred in The Dark Knight are all played by 




or point de capiton, which fills the lack by providing meaning for the empty side of 
interstellar travel; second, it shows that one’s desire “is the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 
Four Fundamental Concepts 38). As we see throughout the film, it is this mysterious 
Other that shapes the desire of the subject: the desire to know. “The [Lacanian] Other,” as 
McGowan points out, “appears to know something that the subject itself does not” 
(Capitalism and Desire 35). In this section, I discuss the way that this illusory they or 
others triggers the subject’s desire and shapes the lives of the crew members of the 
Endurance. I will finally argue that Cooper finds a way to break free from the chains of 
desire by understanding that the Other doesn’t exist.  
 It is Professor Brand who first mentions the others to Cooper. In the scene where he 
is encouraging Cooper to pilot the Endurance, he tells him that he has been chosen by 
them. Cooper and Brand are shown face to face in close-ups as they are standing inside 
the NASA facility:  
Cooper: There’s not a planet in our solar system that could sustain life, 
and the nearest star is over a thousand years away. And that doesn’t 
even qualify as futile. Where’d you send them? 
Professor Brand: Cooper, I can’t tell you anymore unless you agree to 
pilot this craft. You’re the best pilot we ever had. 
Cooper: I barely left the stratosphere. 
Professor Brand: This team never left the simulator. We need a pilot and 
this is the mission you were trained for. 
Cooper: Without even knowing it? An hour ago, you didn’t even know I 




Professor Brand: We had no choice, but something sent you here. They 
chose you. 
Cooper: Who’s ‘they’?” (00:30:22-31:04) 
Professor Brand’s reaction is only silence as he is shown in close-up with a blank face. 
After another few words, Cooper repeats the same question but once again no answer. 
Professor Brand ascribes everything to the absent others as the only way to answer 
Cooper’s questions. The they serves as the signifier that answers infinite questions raised 
by Cooper and the rest of the team members. It is what Lacan calls point de capiton or 
the “button tie […] by which the signifier stops the otherwise indefinite sliding of 
signification” (Écrits 681). The point de capiton “magically turns confusion into a new 
Order” (Žižek, Less Than Nothing 149) by providing a temporary fixed meaning to 
several related concepts; in Interstellar, the related concepts are those that don’t find a 
clear meaning through the discourse of science; however, the imaginary other is the only 
signifier that brings the unanswerable under its own name.  
 In the next sequence, as Romilly discusses some anomaly in our galaxy in the 
conference room, once again there is a mention of the they:  
Romilly: We started detecting gravitational anomalies almost 50 years 
ago. Mostly small distortions to our instruments in the upper 
atmosphere […] But of all these anomalies, the most significant is 
this: Out near Saturn. A disturbance of space-time. 
Cooper: Is that a wormhole? 
Romilly: It appeared 48 years ago.  




Professor Brand: Another galaxy. 
Cooper: A wormhole’s not a naturally occurring phenomenon. 
Amelia Brand: Someone placed it there.  
Cooper: They? 
Amelia Brand: Mm. And whoever they are, they appear to be looking out 
for us. That wormhole lets us travel to other stars [.…] 
Doyle: They’ve put potentially habitable worlds right within our reach. 
(00:31:27-32:27) 
Professor Brand and Romilly instill the idea in Cooper’s mind that this they is the force 
that has chosen him to embark on the interstellar mission. Cooper agrees to pilot the 
Endurance. Later in the film, when Cooper decides to pilot the Endurance, he comes to 
Murph’s room to say goodbye. Murph gets angry with him and accuses him of 
abandoning her. Here, there is once again an indication of this Other. Cooper tells Murph 
that “They chose me. Murph, they chose me” (00:38:36-39). This they which is an 
invisible, external, all-present abstract entity, who watches the world from an invisible 
place, remains a force with an unknown origin. It has an ideological function as it 
provides meaning for the inexplicable questions of the subjects: it is a master signifier 
which holds meaning together by filling the empty spot in human existence: it is “the 
point of convergence” (Lacan, Psychoses 268), which creates “a unified field” of 
meaning (Žižek, Sublime Object 95). 
  In our discussion of the role of the invisible they, focusing on two objects clarifies 
important facts: the bookshelf in Murph’s room and the Tesseract in the fifth dimension. 




These objects contradict each other in the sense that while the former piques curiosity and 
triggers the desire to know, the latter retroactively provides answers and quenches the 
thirst for knowledge. The bookshelf, in line with Professor Brand, boosts the idea that 
there is an inaccessible hand behind the wall. The Tesseract cancel out this idea by 
revealing that there is no ghost or any others behind the wall. The initial scene of the 
film, which takes 14 seconds, is probably the film in miniature as it foreshadows what the 
spectator should expect to see on the screen. An extreme close-up, pan shot shows a 
couple of toy spacecraft next to a row of books in the bookshelf while grains of dust fall 
gently. The bookshelf serves as a curtain that obstructs vision by blocking the eyes from 
seeing behind it, therefore, covering the truth of the so-called ghost mystery, and 
postponing the obtaining of the objet petit a. It, in fact, serves as the wall between reality 
and the invisible realm of the fifth dimension. Since Murph is unable to see behind the 
bookshelf, she claims that there is a ghost in her room. While his father and brother reject 
her claims time and again, Murph insists that she can feel the presence of the ghost. This 
invisible force, as we reach the last minutes of the film, is revealed to be Cooper himself 
trying to communicate with Murph from inside the Tesseract. Therefore, while the 
bookshelf creates the sublime Other, the Tesseract trivializes it by showing what lies 
behind the wall.  
 The bookshelf in Murph’s room is shown several times in Interstellar. Our first full 
grasp of it occurs earlier in the film as Murph and Cooper enter her room. The reason that 
Cooper enters Murph’s room is because of the fact that while he is walking along the 
hall, he hears the sound of something strange from inside her room, which is later 




inspects everything suspiciously. The scene is in low-key lighting with Murph standing 
behind Cooper. The camera cuts to a single shot of Cooper’s face, half in the dark. While 
Murph desperately attempts to convince her father, he does not accept what she says: 
Murph: Nothing special about which book. I’ve been working on it, like 
you said. I counted the spaces [between books in the shelf].  
Cooper: Why? 
Murph: In case the ghost is trying to communicate. I’m trying Morse. 
 […] 
Cooper: I just don’t think your bookshelf is trying to talk to you. 
(00:14:52-15:15) 
Despite Murph’s further attempts, Cooper believes that there is a scientific reason behind 
this ghost-book story.  
 When Cooper informs Murph that he has decided to embark on the interstellar 
mission, she gets angry with him, imploring him not to go, yet Cooper doesn’t change his 
mind. Before leaving, he tries to get things right with Murph, but all in vain. Cooper 
walks along to exit the room. When he gets at the door, a book drops on the floor from 
the bookshelf. As we discover later in the film, the ghost is Cooper himself who attempts 
to communicate with Murph from the fifth dimension. In other words, it is the future 
Cooper who desperately tries to make the past Cooper stay: this contradicts Professor 
Brand’s idea that the others chose Cooper for the mission. The past Cooper is simply the 
desirous subject, who is looking for knowledge, and that is why he sets off to space. The 
future Cooper knows retroactively that Professor Brand’s plan was only a sham and that 




misdirects the subject by directing him to an imaginary object, which doesn’t exist. It 
resists the look, hinders desire, and demands more from the subject. The subject does not 
really know what the desirous bookshelf wants. Like the relationship of the subject with 
the Other, the subject imagines that the Other needs him to do something, while in 
actuality the Other doesn’t want anything specific from the subject. 
 During the interstellar mission, the role of the they becomes even stronger. When the 
Endurance gets closer to the wormhole, Cooper asks, “The others made it, right?” 
(00:59:18-19), to which Doyle answers, “[a]t least some of them” (00:59:21-22). After 
Doyle’s death in the Miller’s planet, Cooper asks Amelia Brand, “The beings that led us 
here, they communicate through gravity, right?” (01:15:24-29). When she confirms, 
Cooper continues, “Could they be talking to us from the future?” (01:15:31-32). Amelia 
says, “Maybe” (01:15:33), to which he responds “[i]f they can…” (01:15:34-35). Amelia 
Brand interrupts him to say, “They are beings of five dimensions. To them, time might be 
another physical dimension. To them, the past might be a canyon that they can climb into 
and the future a mountain they can climb up but to us, it’s not” (01:15:37-53). The others, 
in this sense, is an impossible, inaccessible force which falls beyond human 
understanding.  
While the bookshelf delays the object of desire, the Tesseract moves exactly in 
the opposite direction; because of its backward movement in time, it trivializes desire by 
revealing that the other behind the wall never wanted Cooper to embark on the 
interstellar mission. When Cooper jettisons TARS and himself towards the black hole 
known as Gargantua, he finds himself in a dark world, where the only visible objects are 




his body upside down. The surrounding outside world is completely silent until when we 
see a sphere which is exactly the direction that Cooper has plunged in himself. The only 
voice we hear is that of Cooper: a combination of slowed-down breathing and violent 
gasping caused by shivering. As he gets inside the Tesseract, we feel the rapid pace of his 
downward movement, the dazzling light over his face and body; his yelling comes to a 
halt when he finds himself suspended in the air as he produces a grunting sound 
accompanied by several deep breaths. This Tesseract is actually beyond our four 
dimensions in the sense that it incorporates all moments in time simultaneously; in a way 
Cooper exists outside of time. Because of such an atemporal experience, as Kip Thorne 
says,25 “Cooper can move far faster than the flow of time in the bedroom extrusions, so 
he can easily travel through the tesseract complex to most any bedroom time that he 
wishes” (260). That is why when Cooper moves vertically down the Tesseract, he finds 
himself behind the bookshelves in Murph’s room.  
 The last mention of the they occurs inside the Tesseract. As Cooper is trying to send 
binary data to Murph, TARS communicates with him from somewhere else, telling him 
that it was saved by them:  
Cooper: You survived. 
TARS: Somewhere, in their fifth dimension. They saved us. 
Cooper: Yeah? Who the hell is they? And just why would they want to 
help us? 
                                                 
25 Kip Thorne (b. 1940) is the renowned American physicist, whose scientific advice helped Christopher 
Nolan in making Interstellar. He wrote The Science of Interstellar (2014), which sheds lights on the more 




TARS: I don’t know, but they constructed this three-dimensional space 
inside their five-dimensional reality to allow you to understand it 
[.…] You’ve seen that time is represented here as a physical 
dimension. You’ve worked out that you can exert a force across 
space-time. (02:26:55-27:25) 
 The mystery of the they gets resolved by the end of the film. Cooper’s lasts words reveal 
something about the relationship between the subject and this imaginary Other(s): “they 
didn’t bring us here at all. We brought ourselves” (02:28:38-45). The Other is no more 
than a human construct, a master signifier created by the ideological discourse of 
capitalism to contain the subject. It is only when Cooper finds the non-existence of this 
ubiquitous Other that he frees himself from its chain, that he enables himself to do 
something beyond the Symbolic, namely to communicate with the three-dimensional 
space.  
Inside the Tesseract, Cooper is shown mostly in medium and long shots. 
However, since he is suspended in a time continuum, he is shown from all directions 
including from above or beneath. He is able to see inside Murph’s room while she is only 
able to see the falling of books on the ground, caused by her father on the other side. 
Cooper shouts Murph’s name three times but she simply doesn’t hear him. Because the 
Tesseract gives an unlimited time continuum, Cooper is able to see Murph in different 
time periods, from childhood until the present time. The Tesseract enables Cooper to see 
inside Murph’s room in all directions along a continuum. In other words, inside the 
Tesseract, wherever he looks, he is able to see Murph’s room and the bookshelf. As 




opening the door to enter. Murph tells him, “If you’re leaving, just go!” (02:23:31-32). 
Despite the future Cooper’s shouts, which urge him to stay, the past Cooper leaves. 
Cooper uses a set of dots and dashes and throws books on the floor to send a message: S-
T-A-Y. Inside the room we see crosscuttings to Murph as a child and Murph as she is 
now. Cooper is unable to change the past. He is only able to send a message to the 
present Murph to help her solve the equation. In “About Time Too: From Interstellar to 
Following, Christopher Nolan’s Continuing Preoccupation with Time-Travel,” Jacqueline 
Furby argues that  
Whereas the past often contains an irreconcilable traumatic loss for many 
of Nolan’s protagonists, Cooper’s past is not finished, not closed-off from 
the present, and he is able to communicate with his daughter in the past, 
and visit her in the future (or rather her future) at which time he receives 
forgiveness and is able to move on with his life (253).  
Unlike what Furby claims, it is not actually the past, but the present time that Cooper is 
able to change. He is unable to change his past, namely his decision to get involved in the 
mission to save the world. What he is able to change is to provide a solution to Professor 
Brand’s equation by sending a message to Murph. In a moment of revelation, the grown-
up Murph discovers that it was her father who was sending messages from behind the 
bookshelf. Cooper sends the required binary data to Murph’s watch and she solves the 
equation eventually. Cooper is saved, brought to a hospital, and eventually visits his 
daughter for a few minutes, but then again sets off to another mission, now to find Brand 
in Edmunds’ planet. Cooper figures out the truth behind the bookshelf: it was his own 




Cobb in Inception, Cooper resolves the missed reality that haunted him throughout the 
space travel by giving a visit to Murph.  
The scene of Cooper’s eventual visit to Murph is a sad one as she has reached the 
end of her life while her father, due to the fact that time ran more slowly for him, seems 
young. The over the shoulder shots of Cooper and Murph in the hospital show their 
tearful faces with Hans Zimmer’s sad score, as they both regret the missed reality that 
would never come back: Murph is getting too close to death, which is too disappointing 
for her seemingly young father. As Cooper walks towards the exit, there is a cut to 
Amelia Brand as she mourns the death of her beloved Wolf Edmunds: She is shown in 
medium shot from behind as she is looking at TARS excavating operation digging out for 
the remains of Edmunds’ camp, where she is supposed to execute Plan B and create a 
new human colony. Both Cooper and Amelia confront the traumatic encounter of the 
missed reality of their life: they sacrificed important people in their life only because of 
an illusory Other which was based on a fake scientific plan. Although, as the film 
clarifies, one can do nothing about the past, one can understand the truth of desire. This 
understanding is important as it reveals the fact that the subjects don’t need to invest in 
the impossible promises of desire; rather, they should take pleasure from the more 
ordinary things in life. 
 
6.5 The Anamorphotic Surplus: Rethinking Consciousness 
In Nolan’s Interstellar, there is a surplus, which acts anamorphotically to grab the 
spectators’ attention. It appears in the form of an anomaly in the picture, affecting time, 
space, and sound. The function of this surplus is to question consciousness and the way 




minds regarding concepts that they have taken for granted for a long time. This surplus 
evades perception because it seems trivial at first sight. In this section, I focus on this 
anamorphotic surplus to highlight it as a way to reconsider the way that we look at our 
world. In my discussion, I consider specific moments as the encounter with the gaze: an 
encounter that warns the subject that desire would lead to no eventual object.  
In Interstellar the manipulation of time occurs in two specific ways: narrative 
time, or the arrangement of the events in the plot in a certain artistic form, and time warp, 
which is a scientific term signifying the relativity that occurs along the space-time 
continuum. While we can certainly find films by Nolan in which narrative time has been 
arranged much more radically than Interstellar, in none other we might locate time warp. 
Time warp is to be considered as the agent of the Real because it creates a prolonged 
trauma, a threat, or, to be more exact, a fear of imminent death. As we witness, the effect 
of time warp is sometimes boosted by narrative time in certain spots in the film. 
During the first twenty minutes of the film, the exposition occurs through 
interviews with some very old people talking at intervals about how the arrival of the 
Dust affected their life many years ago. The first old woman who appears in front of the 
camera is Murph (Ellen Burstyn), who is shown in close-up in a dark background: “Well, 
my dad was a farmer. Um, like everybody else back then. Of course, he didn’t start that 
way” (00:01:14-24). The spectators will find only belatedly that this speaking woman 
was actually Murph. At the end of the film, right after Cooper is saved, he is brought to 
his (preserved) home. Outside, there are several monitors broadcasting the same old 
people talking about the massive dust. One of these monitors is located near the corn 




face, saying the same words: “Well, my dad was a farmer. Um, like everybody else back 
then. There just wasn’t enough food” (02:37:44-51). We know that several decades have 
passed and, because of time warp, Cooper remained almost the same age just because 
time passed much slower for him than it passed on Earth. Narrative time, therefore, 
remains harmonious with time warp because it is arranged to reflect how time slippage 
works for the subjects. The beginning of the film, therefore, is its ending: the narrative, in 
this sense, is an ouroboros, eating its own tail. Here, the surplus is the ending of the film, 
which appears in the beginning, in the image of Murph as a very old woman. The 
function of this surplus is to reveal the sad truth about desire: right from the start, we, as 
spectators, are provided with the destructive consequence of desire. Cooper’s interstellar 
mission, and his moving across time warps, brings nothing but separation from his 
daughter. However, the spectators only belatedly come to understand that Cooper’s desire 
to know was doomed to fail: the film’s ending which functions as a surplus at the 
beginning of the film is the spectators’ encounter with the gaze. In Nolan’s films, 
structural anamorphosis occurs when the initial sequence sticks out from the rest of the 
narrative because it belongs to a set of events that chronologically occur much later. The 
spectators figure out this chronological anomaly only belatedly: as the film reaches a 
certain point, we understand that this surplus was staring at us right from the start without 
our knowledge. This surplus is the gaze that reveals retroactively a bitter truth about the 
subject in the film. The sad truth that the initial sequence in Interstellar reveals is the 
impossibility of the moving backwards of time.  
Time is not the only dimension in Interstellar, which provides us with a surplus to 




anamorphotic Real. The incredibly huge waves of water in Miller’s planet, which cause 
Doyle’s death, produce a surplus which is not pleasant to look. When Amelia Brand, 
Doyle, and Case start walking on the watery surface of the Miller’s planet, Amelia 
mistakes the huge approaching waves of water for mountains. These gargantuan waves 
are simply overwhelming not only because of their towering height but also because of 
their seeming motionlessness. They are mostly shown in extreme long shots, but once we 
see a low angle shot, we understand the fear and speechlessness of the crew of the 
Endurance. However, this colossal shape by itself does not provide an encounter with the 
Real; rather it is the way it causes Doyle’s death that we encounter the gaze. As massive 
waves of water get closer, Cooper shuts the entrance of Ranger 1, which results in Doyle 
being swept away by the floods of water. When Ranger 1 leaves Miller’s planet in a rush, 
on the monolithic watery surface of the planet there is a spot, a surplus, which is actually 
the half-visible body of Doyle. The dead body floats on water, in the middle of the frame, 
but at a distance there are gigantic waves coming closer to wash away Doyle’s body. It is 
here that the anamorphotic Real appears to magnify not the gigantic waves but actually 
Doyle’s dead body: it is the traumatic effect of death that haunts the spectators during this 
scene of space distortion. To expand, Doyle’s body is the waste produced by the 
ambitious interstellar project. His death is the starting point of a number of other human 
sacrifices that appear later in Interstellar. The scene is the ruin of the fantasy which was 
promised by Professor Brand early in the film.  
 Besides time and space, sound is also manipulated in Interstellar. The film is 
perhaps the most significant work created by Nolan in terms of sound because of its 




complaints about the sound quality and the fact that in some scenes it was almost 
impossible to hear the conversation due to the heightened background music. One of the 
major theaters in which the film was shown, made an announcement to the audience: 
“Please note that all of our sound equipment is functioning properly. Christopher Nolan 
mixed the soundtrack with an emphasis on the music. This is how it is intended to sound” 
(McClintock). And one viewer complains: “I noticed right away that there were parts 
where the music totally obliterates the dialogue” (Leopold). While it is true that 
Interstellar is a science-fiction film, Nolan never forgets that it is the human reality that 
matters most. As he himself says, “We feel human presence in every sound. And I think 
that was very important to keep in the film […] not just the space they will look at, but 
the people in that space” (Elegyscores 00:04:07-18). The score, composed by Hans 
Zimmer, which accompanies scenes in space and overshadows dialogue, represents the 
tiniest emotions of the characters much better than dialogue. As Nolan points out, “Many 
of the filmmakers I’ve admired over the years have used sound in bold and adventurous 
ways. I don’t agree with the idea that you can only achieve clarity through dialogue. 
Clarity of story, clarity of emotions —I try to achieve that in a very layered way using all 
the different things at my disposal —picture and sound” (Giardina). By inserting certain 
moments when silence overcomes sound, and music overshadows dialogue, Nolan directs 
us to a better understanding of the psychic reality of his characters. 
 In Interstellar, spectators are occasionally provided with images that do not 
correspond with sound. This no-sound experience takes place several times, and only 
after the launch of the Endurance, beyond Earth’s atmosphere. In some scenes, while we 




make a sharp contrast because silence permeates everywhere. However, these scenes are 
not those that provide us with the anamorphotic surplus. The encounter with the gaze in 
the form of anamorphosis occurs in the scenes that portray the deaths by explosion of 
Romilly and Mann.  
 Although in the occasion of Doyle’s death the surplus is the body that floats in 
water, the explosion of Romilly and Mann doesn’t leave any leftovers. Romilly and 
Mann die within a few minutes: the explosions that cause their deaths take less than 
seconds. There is a contrast, however, in the way that the explosions are portrayed. While 
in Romilly’s case the explosion seems to be accompanied by diegetic sound, Dr. Mann’s 
death is shown without sound. Romilly and Mann die in the same manner. Mann arranges 
for KIPP to explode in case anyone attempts to access its information. When Romilly 
attempts to obtain KIPP’s archive, which contains the true data of the planet, it explodes 
and Romilly perishes in less than a second. Dr. Mann’s death occurs in the same way. As 
he is trying to take control of the Endurance, Cooper, far away inside Ranger 1, warns 
him several times through radio messages: “Do not attempt docking” (02:02:38-39) or 
“Do not open the hatch” (02:06:03-04). Mann doesn’t do what Cooper asks. When his 
Ranger is trying to dock, which is shown in aerial view and extreme long shots, Dr. Mann 
attempts to open the hatch of the Endurance. As he hears Brand’s voice asking him not to 
open the hatch, Mann tells her that he is taking control of the Endurance: “This is not 
about my life or Cooper’s life. This is about all mankind. There is a moment…” 
(02:07:14-22). Before he finishes this sentence, a massive explosion occurs with no 
sound. Perhaps the explosion is so overwhelming that it is impossible to record its voice. 




with protruding eyes, as the light of explosion falls on their faces. The anamorphotic 
surplus is, therefore, the incongruity between the image and sound. This scene provides 
an encounter with the gaze: the dejected faces of Amelia and Cooper show the ruin of 
fantasy that Professor Brand promised. The Real of the psychic life should be seen 
exactly in such moments when there is a discrepancy in the Symbolic Order. In Mann’s 
case, the silent explosion, oxymoronic as it may seem, represents the truth of the 
witnessing subjects, which, in this case, are the dumbfounded faces and protruding eyes 
of Amelia and Cooper; in other words, when the subject watches such a tremendous 
scene, her or his psychic reality is filled with pauses and silences, and it is in such 
moments that we hear the Real of our existence. 
 The anamorphotic surplus, therefore, in all its three forms (time, space, and sound) 
serves to undermine the fantasy at the core of human desire. Like the skull in Holbein’s 
The Ambassadors, it shows the futility of earthly endeavors and the object that desire 
promises. It is presented as a spot in the picture, which forces itself on perception. The 
spectators might experience such encounters in real life, but they simply ignore it. 
Christopher Nolan, however, facilitates our encounter with the gaze through his 
anamorphotic art. This experience, which is at the heart of Nolan’s cinema, is the key to 
reconsider our surrounding world. It tells us how our desire makes us obsessed with 












 This dissertation covered a long 15-year time span (2000-2014) in the career of 
Christopher Nolan, a period which started with Memento, his breakthrough into 
Hollywood, and ended with Interstellar, his latest film at the time of completion of this 
project. I provided a chronological reading of his films and focused on his portrayal of 
the subject through the lenses of Jacques Lacan. Throughout this dissertation, I 
demonstrated that the subject, as presented by Nolan, is the subject of desire: the endless 
quest to fill the essential lack is the pivotal feature of Nolan’s characters. As Lacan 
clarifies, “desire crawls, slips, escapes, like the ferret” (Four Fundamental Concepts 
214). Desire, in other words, produces a labyrinth and promises that there would be an 
eventual object that fills the lack of the subject. The subjects of desire, therefore, mistake 
every object that they crave as the objet petit a. The objet petit a is the lack in every 
human object, but it itself is lacking, too. In Lacan’s words, it “is no being” but “the void 
presupposed by a demand” (Feminine Sexuality 126). The lack of the lack is the root of 
the subject’s desire. In his films, Nolan provides the spectators with the subject’s 
obsession with the search for the objet petit a.  
The direct consequence of obsession with the objet petit a is that intersubjective 
relationships are affected. As we witnessed in the previous chapters, in Nolan’s films, 
subjects sacrifice other subjects in order to obtain what they want. Rivalry, hatred, and 
the thirst for revenge are the major features that define the characters in Nolan’s 
Memento, The Prestige, and The Dark Knight. The characters in these films look for 
jouissance or the ultimate pleasure that they can get in their actions. They are unable to 




consequence of looking for the ultimate pleasure is that the subject is destroyed; even 
more, he sacrifices other subjects in his futile attempts. In Nolan’s later films, there is a 
change: the subjects better understand the truth of desire and, by doing so, they can 
manage the traumatic encounter. In Inception and Interstellar, the subjects are 
emancipated because they know that the object as promised by the Other is not attainable. 
Although they encounter the bitter truth that total pleasure is impossible, they handle the 
trauma and improve their relationships with other subjects. Now the question is: how do 
the later subjects in Nolan’s cinema come to know the truth about the deceptiveness of 
desire?  
The answer to the above question is that in the encounter with the (anamorphotic) 
gaze, these later subjects understand the inaccessibility of the objet petit a. The gaze, in 
this sense, is an experience that shatters the fantasy of an eventual moment of completion 
or total satisfaction. The gaze helps the subject uncover the truth about desire. The only 
way to resist the desire of obtaining the impossible object is to find pleasure in the more 
common things of life. As Slavoj Žižek points out, “instead of running after the 
impossible, we must learn to consent to our common lot and to find pleasure in the trivia 
of our everyday life” (Looking Awry 8). In his films, Nolan shows us that to be obsessed 
with the impossible object of desire leads to destruction.  
The major contribution of this dissertation to existing knowledge is its focus on 
the concept of anamorphosis. I provided instances in the cinema of Nolan, where 
anamorphosis appears to show the limits of the Symbolic Order. The paradoxical two-
dimensional Penrose Steps in Inception that creates the illusion of a three-dimensional 




that are beyond its logic. Also, the Joker’s amateurish videos in The Dark Knight, which 
appear as stains in the film’s narrative, are to be considered as a surplus that reminds us 
of the essential distortion in vision. This anamorphotic spot, which might seem trivial, 
opposes itself to the sublime art of filmmaking to shows how distorted is the view 
provided by the filmmaker. 
In this project, I discussed how the encounter with the anamorphotic gaze reveals 
the impossibility of fantasy at the core of desire. In Memento, I argued, Leonard’s 
Polaroid that projects his desire on certain objects (such as the dead bodies of the 
victims), shows that he is seeking jouissance in every action that he performs. The gaze 
as objet petit a appears in Leonard’s face nearly at the end of the film: an extreme close-
up of his chest, which he has tattooed with the words “I’VE DONE IT” promises that his 
impossible quest has eventually worked; however, as the camera tilts up to his dejected, 
indifferent face, it dawns on us that his fantasy is doomed to fail. This titling up of the 
camera is the encounter with the gaze as it shows the impossibility of obtaining the objet 
petit a. At the end of The Prestige, as I mentioned in Chapter 3, when one of the Borden 
twins shoots Angier, the latter’s sudden realization of the fact that the twins’ 
transportation show was a simple trick is accompanied by a moment of disbelief and 
agony, as he remembers the impossible quest that he went through to find the objet petit 
a. As Angier dies, the spectators watch his body on the floor. The spectators, who 
imagine that they are in control of the image, suddenly encounter a shot that shatters their 
illusion. The panning of the camera to the left shows original Angier’s frozen body inside 
a water tank: his dumbfounded look and protruding eyes signify the suffering he 




in the scene shows that the spectators were being looked at all the time. In Inception, the 
anamorphotic gaze appears in Cobb’s occasional encounters with the image of his dead 
wife. In every encounter, the impact of the trauma is so massive that Cobb becomes 
speechless and distracted. Mal appears as a stain in every picture that Cobb sees because 
it points to a missed reality that he could have avoided. In the last encounter, we see how 
Cobb loses hope in the impossible objet petit a as he discovers that it is impossible to 
change a moment in the past.  
In my discussion of The Dark Knight and Interstellar, I pointed out that 
anamorphosis may also occur when there is an incongruity between the image and sound. 
In The Dark Knight, Harvey Dent who was the best citizen of Gotham, and who once 
fantasized the future romantic relationship with Rachel, loses everything in an explosion 
set up by the Joker: Rachel dies and his face is harshly disfigured all of a sudden. 
Although he is saved, once he figures out these bitter facts, he screams as he is lying on 
his bed in the hospital. We cannot hear his voice because the agonizing pain in his voice 
is too much to be heard normally. Dr. Mann’s scene of the sudden death by explosion in 
Interstellar is similar to what we witnessed in The Dark Knight. As he informs the team 
that he is about to take control of the Endurance, his error causes a massive explosion 
resulting in his death. As Cooper and Amelia are watching this scene from afar, their sad, 
dejected faces show the impact of the traumatic encounter on the subject. We cannot hear 
the explosion once again because it is not within the range of our hearing. Such instances 
show the massive impact of the traumatic encounter as a moment of non-hearing in the 




Throughout this dissertation, I argued how narrative time would provide us with 
the anamorphotic gaze. I proposed the term structural anamorphosis, or the gaze as a 
temporal point in the plot of the film. Structural anamorphosis as the encounter with the 
gaze occurs when a certain part of a later plotline appears early in the film: the function 
of this surplus is to shatter the spectators’ fantasy belatedly. In other words, this cuttable 
piece is a stain, like the skull in Holbein’s The Ambassadors, with two functions: first, it 
tells the spectators that they were not in control of the scene from the start; second, it 
reveals the futility of the subject’s quest for the inaccessible objet petit a. Structural 
anamorphosis, therefore, is on the side of the gaze as it questions perception as a 
straightforward or conscious process and shows the objet petit a as impossible. It is, in 
fact, time as a stain or surplus that undermines our conception of narrative and reality. 
Structural anamorphosis is not simply a non-linear arrangement of the narrative events; 
rather it is a temporal dislocation in the film that only belatedly betrays its significance: 
the futility of the expected fantasy.   
In my critique of the deceitful path of desire, I related it to the functioning of 
ideology, especially that of contemporary late capitalism. Desire is the essence of 
capitalism: the cunning path of desire produces an obsession with objects and asks the 
subjects to seek ultimate pleasure in every form. In no ideology other than capitalism do 
objects obtain such a pivotal importance. Capitalism promises that the passage of time 
will bring the objet petit a, the fetishist object, “as something substantial that the subject 
has lost through a traumatic event” (McGowan, Capitalism and Desire 26). It asks 




essential problem of the capitalist’s obsession with objects is the fact that it damages 
intersubjective relations through commodity fetishism.  
In my critique of the ideology of capitalism, I pointed out that Nolan’s 
anamorphotic art is a space for revision. In his films, Nolan provides the spectators with 
an opportunity for looking awry; he slows down perception by creating puzzles out of 
narratives in order to make the spectators rethink (conscious) perception and (taken-for-
granted) ideological views of life, and implicitly asks them to transfer this view to life. 
By inviting the spectators to reconsider their worldviews, Nolan implies that ideology, 
and capitalism in particular, require re-examination. 
Nolan’s cinema is an example of ideology as unconscious, subjectivity as an 
interaction with the Other, and desire as an endless loop, with fantasy as fruitless for the 
subject’s existential lack. His films are both a reflection on ideology and a demand for 
revision and rethinking because, as he attempts to show in all of his films, perception is 
not reliable. The sentence “Are you watching closely?”, which is repeated several times 
in The Prestige tells us most about the cinema of Christopher Nolan. Nolan tacitly asks 
the spectator of his films to question the authenticity of the picture they are being 
presented with. In a way, his films “acknowledge our limitations in knowing and seeing” 
(Detweiler 85). From Memento, in which spectators are deceived into believing that 
Leonard Shelby is actually looking for the murderer of his wife, to Interstellar, in which 
Professor Brand hides the truth about Plan A, the films of Nolan question the way the 
spectators watch things in the theaters.  
The spectators are expected to expand this critical view of the motion picture in 




unconsciously defining their existence. The spectators are not supposed to constantly 
suspecting their reality (as did Mal in Inception), trying to escape it by killing 
themselves; rather, they are being asked to question things in their surroundings that that 
they have taken for granted. Certainly, there are (anamorphotic) moments in real life in 
which the Symbolic Order is revealed to be a groundless construct, one world among the 
many other possible ones. The Real that occasionally forces itself on the mundane reality 
through anamorphosis, provides opportunities for subjects to reconsider their 
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